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ORPORATE acquisitions have become a hot topic in the last few
years.' Economists laud takeovers as a necessary mechanism for
ouster of inefficient managements. 2 Others vilify corporate take-
overs as wasteful and as deterrents to the pursuit of long-term goals. 3
Whichever position is correct, the number of takeovers has increased dra-
matically over the last few decades. During the late 1960s, the United States
witnessed a boom in mergers and acquisitions. 4 After falling to its lowest
1. See Berry & Scott, What to Do About Takeovers, MGMT. REV., Feb. 1986, at 61;
Crock, The Right Question to Ask About Corporate Takeovers, Bus. WK., Mar. 11, 1985, at 88;
Dobrzynski, A New Strain of Merger Mania, Bus. WK., Mar. 21, 1988, at 122; Egan, The New
Rule of Raiding, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 18, 1988, at 53; Jones, Do All These Deals
Help or Hurt the U.S. Economy, Bus. WK., Nov. 24, 1986, at 86; Perham, It's a New Game in
Mergers, DUN'S Bus. MONTH, Apr. 1986, at 28; Reilly, Merger Madness, FORTUNE, May 13,
1985, at 101; Sheeline, Deals of the Year, FORTUNE, Feb. 1, 1988, at 34; Taub, Who Cares
About the Shareholders?, FIN. WORLD, May 15, 1988, at 15; Thackray, America's Shareholding
Sheep, MGMT. TODAY, Oct. 1985, at 86; Weidenbaum, The Best Defense Against the Raiders,
Bus. WK., Sept. 23, 1985, at 21; Williams, It's Time for a Takeover Moratorium, FORTUNE,
July 22, 1985, at 133; Melloan, New Debate Over Corporate Governance, Wall St. J., Nov. 11,
1986, at 36, col. 3.
2. Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel are the leading advocates of the potential bene-
fits of takeovers. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J.
698 (1982); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding
to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981); see also Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion Report of Recommendations of Advisory Committee on Tender Offers, [Special Report
No. 1028] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) (July 15, 1983), Separate Statement of Frank H. Easter-
brook and Gregg A. Jarrell, at 71 (July 8, 1983); Goldman, Takeovers Keep Management on
Thier Toes, FE, May 1985, at 22; Magnet, Restructuring Really Works, FORTUNE, Mar. 2,
1987, at 38.
3. See, e.g., Alexander, Is the United States Substituting a Speculative Economy for a
Productive One, 20 J. ECONOMIC ISSUES 365 (1986) (concentration on takeovers is replacing
research and development); Chatinover, Takeovers Deliver Body-Blow to Long Term Growth,
FE, May 1985, at 25; Saul, Hostile Takeovers: What Should Be Done?, HARV. Bus. REV.,
Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 18 (criticizing contention that inefficient target managements spur take-
overs); Sigler, Takeovers and the Economic Cost, CORP. BD., Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 5 (arguing that
hostile takeovers create no new wealth and replace equity with debt); see also Drucker, Corpo-
rate Takeovers-What Is To Be Done?, 82 PUB. INTEREST 3 (1986); Ehrbar, Have Takeovers
Gone Too Far?, FORTUNE, May 27, 1985, at 20; Michel & Shaked, Takeover Madness: Corpo-
rate America Fights Back, BARRONS, July 14, 1986, at 65.
4. See, e.g., G. BENSTON, CONGLOMERATE MERGERS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND
REMEDIES 6-7 (1980) (dollar volume of mergers increased from approximately $2 billion in
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point in 1974 and 1975, 5 the number of mergers increased rapidly after
1980.6
More importantly, tender offers have become much more prevalent in the
last twenty years. 7 Although the absolute number of tender offers has varied
over the years, the trend in the dollar volume involved in these transactions
is upward.8 Especially in the last few years, tender offers have been used
heavily in larger transactions. 9 Nevertheless, a substantial portion of tender
offers involve small- to medium-sized firms. 10
1960 to $15 billion in 1968); P. STEINER, MERGERS, MOTIVES, EFFECTS, POLICIES 9 (1975)
(illustrating that the number of acquisitions tripled between 1960 and 1969); Bureau of Eco-
nomics, Federal Trade Commission, Report No. 6-15-18, Statistical Report on Mergers and Ac-
quistions 58-59 (Oct. 1973) (indicating rise in number of large mergers exceeding $10 million
from 54 in 1963 to 173 in 1968). Between 1965 and 1970, the number of completed mergers
and acquisitions exceeding $1 million increased from 1,354 to 1,712. See A Twenty-Year Pro-
file of Mergers and Acquisitions, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Jan.-Feb. 1986, at 42 (statistics
include only transactions of $1 million or more). The Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(i),
78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982), was enacted in 1968 primarily in response to the dramatic up-
surge in takeovers that bypassed the merger regulations of the federal securities laws because
they were carried out through tender offers. See Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 632
(1982).
5. See Twenty-Year Profile, supra note 4, at 42 (showing 926 mergers and acquisitions
during 1974 and 981 in 1975); Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, Statistical
Report on Mergers and Acquisitions 26 (Dec. 1978) (indicating approximately 1,047 mergers of
all types completed in 1975 compared to 2,359 in 1973).
6. The number of mergers and acquisitions rose from 1,565 in 1980 to 4,323 in 1986. See
1987 Profile, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, May-June 1988, at 45 [hereinafter 1987 Profile].
Mergers increased 48.6% in 1981, 32.3% in 1984, and 26.1% in 1986 over the previous years.
Id. Correspondingly, the total monetary value of the acquisitions increased 104.1% in 1981 to
$67 billion, and 139.7% in 1984 to $125 billion, over the previous years. Id.
7. See generally E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CON-
TROL (1973); see also Hayes & Tausig, Tactics of Cash Take-Over Bids, in THE BUSINESS OF
ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS 257, 259 (G. Scott Hutchinson ed. 1968) (number of firms ac-
quired through a tender offer rose from 300 in 1956 to 1100 in 1965).
8. See Austin, Nigem & Bernard, Tender Offer Update: 1987, MERGERS & ACQUISI-
TIONS, July-Aug. 1987, at 49 [hereinafter Tender Offer Update: 1987]. The dollar volume has
risen from $9 billion in 1979 to $46.8 billion in 1985. Id. In addition, the number of tender
offers has increased from a low of approximately 77 in 1983 to 183 in 1986. Id. The dollar
volume and number of tender offers in 1986 represented an increase of 29% and 51%, respec-
tively, over 1985 levels. Id.
9. Tender offers provided the mechanism for eight of the ten highest priced takeovers in
1985. Austin & Mandula, Tender Offer Update: 1986, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, July-Aug.
1986, at 55. Moreover, ten completed tender offers in 1986 were valued at more than $1 billion.
Tender Offer Update: 1987, supra note 8, at 49. Six of the ten largest takeovers in 1987 were
executed through tender offers including the highest priced takeover of the year, a $7.6 billion
acquisition by British Petroleum Co. PLC of a minority interest in Standard Oil Co. Tender
Offer Update: 1988, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, May-June 1988, at 23 [hereinafter Tender
Offer Update: 1988].
10. See, A Lively Market in Small Deals, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Mar.-Apr. 1986, at
18 (two-thirds of reported mergers and acquisitions for 1984-1985 were valued at less than $25
million and one-third at less than $5 million); see also Two-Tier Tender Offer Pricing and Non-
Tender Offer Purchase Program, Exchange Act Release No. 21,079, [1984 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,637, at 86,931 (June 21, 1984). Between 1981 and 1983, 60% of
tender offers consisted of any-or-all offers with two-tier and pure partial offers occurring at
approximately the same rate (20%). Id. at 86,929. The incidence of any-or-all offers, however,
occurred primarily with smaller target firms, while two-tier and partial offers predominated
among large and medium size targets. Id. at 86,921. Two-tier offers occurred twice as often as
the other types in very large takeovers. Id. at 86,931. See also infra notes 364-368 for statistics
on the size of targets in tender offers and mergers. Many expect the recent adoption of a best
1988]
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One may structure corporate control acquisitions through merger or
tender offer I in a variety of ways. The acquisition for example, may involve
an exchange of the target's stock for all cash, the bidder's stock, debt instru-
ments issued by the bidder, or a combination of these three.12 The acquisi-
tion, regardless of the method, forces target shareholders to confront the
decision whether to sell their shares. Target shareholders, unfortunately,
must make this decision without the benefit of very important information:
management forecasts of future operations. Current statutory and regula-
tory law does not clearly require a target's management to disclose "soft
information."' 13 Case law on this issue is confused. The SEC policy of per-
missive disclosure contains serious drawbacks, 14 and thus generally fails in
price rule by the SEC, which requires bidders to pay all target shareholders the same price
even in a two-step transaction, to deter two-tier takeovers. See Amendments to Tender Offer
Rules-All Holders and Best Price, Sec. Act Release No. 6,653, [Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 84,016, at 88,186 (July 11, 1986).
11. Generally, one can distinguish mergers from tender offers by the method of acquisi-
tion. Mergers involve shareholders of the target voting on a proposal presented by manage-
ment at a shareholders' meeting. Tender offers consist of an offer to buy shares addressed
directly to the target shareholders. Mergers require negotiation with and consent of the target
management and therefore are usually restricted to friendly takeovers. The tender offer, on the
other hand, provides a method of obtaining control where the target firm's management either
opposes or refuses to actively support a merger. Tender offers also allow a bidder to acquire
effective control without purchasing all of the outstanding target shares. See V. BRUDNEY &
M. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE 709-16 (2d ed. 1979); see also Fleischer & Mund-
heim, Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 317 (1967) (explaining
mechanics of tender offer as another technique for creating business combination). Many pre-
fer the tender offer method because it can be accomplished more quickly than a merger. Id.
12. See SCHMULTS, FORMS OF TRANSACTIONS IN MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 54, 55-61
(A. Kramer & J. McCord eds. 1969) (Practicing Law Institute); Note, The Federal Scheme of
Tender Offer Regulation, 7 J. CORP. L. 525, 525 (1982). All cash tends to constitute the domi-
nant medium with tender offers with solely cash payment involved in approximately 85-96%
of the offers between 1981 and 1986. See Austin & Mandula, supra note 8, at 55; Tender Offers
Update: 1987, supra note 8, at 49; see also Hayes & Tausig, supra note 7, at 260. All cash also
represents the most common form of payment when all types of mergers and acquisitions are
included, occurring nearly twice as frequently as the combination of cash and stock payments.
See, e.g., 1987 Profile, supra note 6, at 51 (form of payment for 1987-54% cash, 10% all
stock. 17% combination of cash, stock or debt instruments); 1986 Profile, Mergers & Acquisi-
tions, May-June 1987, at 57, 61 (forms of payment for 1986-44% cash, 11% all stock, 17%
combination of cash, stock or debt instruments).
13. The definition of "soft information" includes opinions, predictions, analyses, and
other subjective evaluations as opposed to "hard information", which involves statements con-
cerning objectively verifiable historical facts. See HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN
COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., IST SESS., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CORPORATE
DISCLOSURE TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 347 (Comm. Print 1977)
[hereinafter REPORT ON DISCLOSURE], abstracted in [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 81,357, at 88,663 (Nov. 3, 1977). Soft information may also include forecasts of
earnings, revenues, and other financial data; future dividend policy; statements of any other
forward-looking information such as plans; statements concerning past or present situations
such as a company's market share where precise statistics are not available; and statements of
motive, purpose, or intention. See Schneider, Nits, Grits, and Soft Information in SEC Filings,
121 U. PA. L. REV. 254, 255 (1972); see also Kohn v. American Metal Climax, 458 F.2d 255,
265 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972) (soft information includes "future earnings,
appraised asset valuations and other hypothetical data"). There is no clear delineation be-
tween hard and soft information does not exist. Schneider noted that "many apparently hard
statements have soft cores and vice versa." Schneider, supra, at 256.
14. See Note, The SEC Safe Harbor for Forecasts-A Step in the Right Direction, 1980
DUKE L.J. 607 [hereinafter Safe Harbour].
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its purpose. The Williams Act' 5 was intended to protect investors by requir-
ing full and fair disclosure of information important in deciding how to re-
spond to a tender offer. 16 A policy of mandatory disclosure of target
management's financial forecasts would significantly enhance the accom-
plishment of this goal. In addition to recognizing individual shareholders'
interests in greater knowledge and information, this policy would promote
society's interest in economic efficiency.
This Article discusses the inadequacy of SEC policy and case law to deal
effectively with forecasts. Moreover, it reviews the empirical studies con-
cerning the information content and accuracy of management forecasts.
Empirical evidence reveals that management forecasts provide new, useful
information to investors. Market impact studies show that stock price
movements relate to public disclosure of management forecasts. Research of
the accuracy of forecasts indicates that management forecasts are superior to
both analysts' forecasts and forecasts generated from statistical models. This
empirical evidence militates in favor of the mandatory disclosure of manage-
ment forecasts, especially in corporate control contests. This Article also
discusses the potential additional costs associated with public disclosure.
The Article concludes that mandatory disclosure of company forecasts re-
sults in cost-efficiency. This Article also touches upon the attitude toward
and treatment of forecasts in takeover situations in England, where public
disclosure is more prevalent than in the United States.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CURRENT POLICY
ON FINANCIAL FORECASTS
A. Evolution of SEC Policy
Initially, the SEC placed an absolute ban on soft information in commis-
sion filings. 17 The SEC predicated this decision on the traditional view that
SEC documents should include only "factual" or objectively verifiable infor-
mation,' 8 and that soft information could mislead unsophisticated inves-
15. See Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 455 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(i), 78m(d)-
(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982)).
16. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 3-4 (1967); H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2811, 2813-14; 113
CONG. REC. 854, 855 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams); see also Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977) ("sole purpose of the Williams Act [is] protection of investors"); Berman
v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1319 (W.D. Mich. 1978) (Congress's primary pur-
pose in adopting Williams Act was to ensure that public shareholders confronted with tender
offer receive complete and truthful information).
17. See South Coast Serv. Corp. v. Santa Ana Valley Irrigation Co., 669 F.2d 1265, 1271.
(9th Cir. 1982); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, 478 F.2d 1281, 1294 (2d Cir. 1973); J. SELIGMAN,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION AND MODERN FINANCE 557 (1982); Guidelines for Release of Information by
Issuers Whose Securities are in Registration, Sec. Act Release No. 5180, [1970-1971 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,192, at 80,578 (Aug. 16, 1971) (companies should limit
information in prospect/uses to "factual information and should not include such things as
projections, predictions, forecasts or opinions with respect to value"); Schneider, supra note
13, at 257-58.
18. See Sec. Act. Release No. 5180, supra note 17; Fiflis, Soft Information: The SEC's
Former Exogenous Zone, 26 UCLA L. REV. 95, 97 (1978); Hewitt, Developing Concepts of
19881
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tors. 19 Inevitably, this position drew increasing criticism.20 Commentators
considered unrealistic the belief that investors were unaware of the inherent
uncertainties of projections, especially when accompanied with cautionary
statements.
2 1
As a result, in November and December 1972, the SEC conducted public
hearings on the issue of disclosing estimates, forecasts, or projections of eco-
nomic performance. 22 The SEC soon thereafter announced "a significant
departure from the Commission's historic policy of generally not permitting
the disclosure of sales and earnings projections in SEC filings."'2 3 Although
Materiality and Disclosure, 32 Bus. L. 887, 955 (1977) (SEC prohibited forecasts in filings,
unless they involved negative trends). Harry Heller, a long-time staff attorney with the SEC,
gave the following often quoted explanation of the SEC's position:
The question will be raised, if the determination of future earnings is the prime
task confronting the investor, why not require or permit a direct prediction of
[future] earnings? The answer to this is that the Securities Act, like the hero of
"Dragnet," is interested exclusively in facts. Conjectures and speculation as to
the future are left by the Act to the investor on the theory that he is as compe-
tent as anyone to predict the future from the given facts. Since an expert can
speak with authority only as to subjects upon which he has professional knowl-
edge and since no engineering course or other professional training has ever
been known to qualify anyone as a clairvoyant, attempts by companies to pre-
dict future earnings on their own or on the authority of experts have almost
invariably been held by the Commission to be misleading because they suggest
to the investor a competence and authority which in fact does not exist.
Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities Regulation, 16 Bus. L. 300, 307-08
(1961).
19. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS-A
REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS
(1969) [hereinafter WHEAT REPORT], summarized in [Special Studies 1963-1972 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 74,601, at 65,241 (1971).
It has been the Commission's long-standing policy not to permit projections and
predictions in prospectuses and reports filed with the Commission. Such docu-
ments are designed to elicit material facts. Their factual character is widely
recognized. Investors and their advisors are at liberty to make their own projec-
tions based on the disclosures resulting from the Commission's requirements. A
real danger exists, in the Study's judgment, that projections appearing in pro-
spectuses and other documents filed under the securities laws and reviewed by
the Commission would be accorded a greater measure of validity by the unso-
phisticated than they would deserve.
Id. at 96; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9, note (1976) (giving example of "predictions as to
specific future market values, earnings or dividends" as potentially misleading). But see infra
note 34 (discussing the deletion of the references to earnings and dividend projections in note
to rule 14a-9). Of course, this position involves circular reasoning in that shareholders' expec-
tation of "hard" data in SEC reports, which establishes the basis for excluding soft informa-
tion, exists because of the SEC's policy of including only hard data in its documents.
20. A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD
§ 6.5, at 136.123 (1985); see Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some Reali-
ties, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1151, 1198 (1970); Mann, Prospectuses: Unreadable or Just Unread?-
A Proposal to Reexamine Policies Against Permitting Projections, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 222
(1971); Schneider, supra note 13.
21. REPORT ON DISCLOSURE, supra note 13, at A-312. Some commentators noted that
projections were commonly circulated informally so investors were not unaccustomed to deal-
ing with this type of information. See Schneider, supra note 13, at 269.
22. See Public Proceedings in the Matter of Estimates, Forecasts or Projections of Eco-
nomic Performance, Exchange Act Release No. 9,844, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 79,075, at 82,322 (Nov. 1, 1972).
23. Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Sec. Act Release No.
5,362, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,211, at 82,666 (Feb. 2,
[Vol. 42
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declining to make corporate managements generate and release projections
as an initial matter, the SEC took the position that once a corporation volun-
tarily disclosed a projection to any outsiders, then the corporation must dis-
close the information publicly. 24 The SEC release concluded:
The results of the hearings conducted by the staff have convinced the
Commission that now is the appropriate time to take action in this area,
to recognize the realities of the situation, and to take the lead in devel-
oping standards and guidelines that will enable all issuers to understand
their responsibilities and all investors to have equal access to projection
information. 25
After more than two years, the SEC released specific proposals to imple-
ment its new policy. 26 The proposed rules required corporations to file in-
formation on any projection,27 including material assumptions, furnished to
any outsider. Additionally, the SEC delineated the criteria for the applica-
tion of a safe harbor rule to alleviate the potential for per se liability that
attached to unrealized projections.28 A company, once subjected to the SEC
1973). Fifty-three witnesses testified at the hearing and the SEC received over 200 letters from
interested persons. Id. For a summary of the comments, see [1972] 180 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) A-5 to A-6; [1972] 179 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) A-7 to A-10; [1972] 178 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) A-6 to A-19. See also Edwards & Warren, Management Forecasts: The SEC
and Financial Executives, MSU Bus. Topics, Winter 1974, at 51.
24. See Sec. Act Release No. 5,362, supra note 23. The major impetus for this policy
change stemmed from the desire to correct the perceived unfairness in the prevailing practice
of selective informal disclosure of this information, especially to securities analysts. The SEC
also noted, however, the relevance of projections. "Information gathered at the hearings rein-
forced the Commission's own observation that management's assessment of a company's fu-
ture performance is information of significant importance to the investor ... and that such
information should be available, if at all, on an equitable basis to all investors." Id. at 82,667.
25. Id. at 82,668. The Commission also recognized the need for establishing standards for
liability consistent with the securities laws. See id. at 82,666, 82,668; see, also WHEAT RE-
PORT, supra note 19, at 65,242 (insurmountable problems of liability would arise unless the
SEC gave projections in prospectuses some measure of immunity).
26. See Proposed Rules on Earnings Projections, Sec. Act Release No. 5,581, [1974-1975
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,167, at 85,299 (Apr. 28, 1975); see also Gor-
mley, Financial Forecasts: Problems and Considerations, 6 SEC. REG. L.J. 32, 42 (1978).
27. The proposed rules defined "projection" as:
a statement made by an issuer regarding material future revenues, sales, net
income or earnings per share . . . expressed as a specific amount, range of
amounts ... or percentage variation from a specific amount ($2.20 plus or minus
10 percent or "an increase of 10 percent over last year"), or a confirmation by an
issuer of any such statement made by another person .... [S]tatements that
another person's projection is "in the ballpark," "attainable" or "on target" are
examples of a confirmation.
Sec. Act Release No. 5,581, supra note 26, at 85,302. The proposed rule did not contain a
definition of "material," but the release indicated that any statement relating to the issuer's
total future sales, net income or earnings per share would be material, while a projection relat-
ing to a subsidiary or particular line of business might be material depending on the facts in the
particular situation. Id.
28. Id. at 85,303. The SEC attempted to limit applications of the safe harbor protection
to "situations where there is the greatest likelihood of a reasonable projection." Id. The crite-
ria related to the manner of preparation, form, and manner of disclosure. The projection had
to satisfy the following conditions: (1) prepared with reasonable care, (2) generated by qualified
personnel, (3) carefully reviewed and approved by management at the appropriate levels, (4)
have a reasonable factual basis, and (5) represent management's good faith judgment. Id. As
to form, the projection had to include at least sales or revenues, net income, and fully diluted
earnings per share. Id. The maximum horizon was one-and-a-half years ahead. Id. As for the
1988]
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disclosure system, would be required to continue to provide projections in its
annual Form 10-K or declare and explain why it had ceased the disclo-
sures.2 9 This approach attempted to establish an on-going system of public
disclosure that came close to widespread mandatory disclosure.
The proposals generated rapid dissent. 30 Many companies complained
about the costs and burdens of revising the projections. 31 Many viewed the
safe harbor provisions as too subjective and stringent. 32 As a result, the SEC
withdrew all the proposed rules.33 The SEC, in a rather abbreviated release,
did not fully explain this withdrawal, but instead adhered to its belief that
investors find projections useful and issued very general guidelines for volun-
tary disclosure. 34
While the proposed guidelines awaited final approval, the Advisory Com-
mittee on Corporate Disclosure was appointed to review the entire SEC dis-
closure policy, including projections. 35 In its report, the Advisory
manner of disclosure, the SEC required material assumptions and cautionary statements on
ultimate achievement of the projection. Id. Finally, if the issuer represented that someone had
reviewed the projection, the issuer had to supply information concerning the relationship of
the reviewer to the corporation and where investors could obtain a copy of the reviewer's
report. Id. at 85,304. Moreover, the SEC deemed only companies with sufficient experience in
budgeting and reporting to have a reasonable basis for making public projections. The safe
harbor rule, therefore, applied only if a company had prepared budgets and had been subject to
and complied with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 reporting requirements for at least
three years. Id. at 85,303.
29. Id. at 85,302. The SEC did not require companies to file with them if the company
retained the projection internally or furnished the projection in connection with the following
transactions: (a) a nonpublic securities offering, (b) a commercial loan, (c) negotiations with
underwriters, (d) negotiations for a merger or sale of assets, (e) private disclosure to a govern-
ment agency, or (f) disclosure to accountants or counsel. Id. at 85,306. Furthermore, the
SEC would have compelled a company to revise any projection the SEC had reason to believe
no longer had a reasonable basis. Id. at 85,305. The SEC failed to provide guidance on the
meaning of a "reasonable basis," and some commentators criticized the vague language in
many of the standards in the proposed rules. See, e.g., Gormley, supra note 26, at 42.
30. See Safe Harbor, supra note 14, at 619.
31. See [1975] 320 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) D-1 to D-4.
32. See Gormley, supra note 26, at 42; Safe Harbor, supra note 14, at 619.
33. See Adoption of Amendment to Rule 14a-9, Withdrawal of Proposed Rules, and Dis-
closure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Sec. Act Release No. 5,699, [1975-
1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,461, at 86,200 (Apr. 23, 1976). The SEC
received 420 letters on the proposal, a rather large response. Id. at 86,201.
34. See id. The release replaced the extensive proposed rules with proposed Guides 62
and 4, which represented expressions of the practices the Division of Corporate Finance would
follow in reviewing filings containing projections. Projections were allowed when the follow-
ing three factors existed: (1) management had a reasonable basis for the projections; (2) man-
agement presented projections in an appropriate format; and (3) the accompanying disclosures
facilitated investor understanding of the basis for and limitations of projections. Id. at 86,203.
Pending final adoption of the proposed guides the SEC adopted another guide numbered 4,
dealing with an unrelated matter, so that proposed Guide 4 became Guide 5. Also in this
release, the SEC amended the note to rule 14a-9 (17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1988)), deleting the
reference to "earnings" projections as an example of misleading information. Id.
In this release, the SEC's position on reporting projections seemed ambivalent. At one
point, for instance, the SEC commented that "the Commission is neither encouraging or dis-
couraging the making and filing of projections because of the diversity of views ... ." Id. at
86,202. At another point, the SEC stated, "The Commission . . . [is] of the view that the
flexibility of a general disclosure guide will encourage a certain degree of experimentation in
the disclosure of projections . I..." Id. at 86,203.
35. See Solicitation of Public Comments by Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclo-
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Committee endorsed the SEC's movement toward greater disclosure of soft
information and recommended "that the Commission actively and generally
encourage the publication of forward-looking and analytical information in
company reports to shareholders and in Commission filings."' 36 Neverthe-
less, the Advisory Committee eschewed endorsing mandatory disclosure in
favor of an experimental, 37 voluntary policy facilitated through creation of a
safe harbor rule. 38
The SEC shortly thereafter adopted final guidelines very similar to the
earlier proposed guidelines and the Advisory Committee's recommenda-
tions.39 The SEC adopted extremely flexible guidelines that impose few spe-
cific limitations on companies. For instance, the SEC did not create absolute
requirements concerning prior operating or reporting history, disclosure of
assumptions, minimum items to be disclosed, third-party review, or time ho-
rizons for or updating of projections. 4° The SEC instead merely indicated
that these issues may be relevant in determining whether a projection is mis-
leading.41 Despite its earlier skepticism of the need for a simplistic safe har-
bor provision,42 the SEC released proposals for two versions of a safe harbor
sure, Sec. Act Release No. 5,707, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
80,531, at 86,374 (May 18, 1976) (giving notice of the appointment of the Advisory Committee
on February 2, 1976, and its purpose). See generally Kripke, Where Are We on Securities
Disclosure After the Advisory Committee Report, 6 SEC. REG. L.J. 99 (1978); Sommer, Survey.
Report of the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure to the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission-Foreword, 26 UCLA L. REV. 48 (1978).
36. REPORT ON DISCLOSURE, supra note 13, at D-14. More specifically, the Advisory
Committee advocated encourgaging "public companies to disclose statements of management
projections of future company economic performance in their filings with the Commission
.... " Id. at 345.
37. Id. at 354. The Advisory Committee recommended creation of an experimental pro-
gram and monitoring to determine the usefulness of the information disclosed to investors, the
corresponding costs to the issuers, and the responsiveness of the issuers to investor needs. Id.
at 344.
38. The safe harbor rule proposed by the Advisory Committee would have precluded lia-
bility against issuers unless a plaintiff could prove that the issuer made a disclosure without a
reasonable basis or absent good faith. Id. at 344-45, 364. In withdrawing its more complex
proposed safe harbor provisions, the SEC stated its belief that disclosure of reasonably based
and adequately presented projections would not subject issuers to liability under the securities
laws even without a safe harbor rule. See Sec. Act Release No. 5,699, supra note 33, at 86,202.
39. See Guides for Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Sec. Act
Release No. 5,992, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,756, at 81,034 (Nov.
7, 1978); cf REPORT ON DISCLOSURE, supra note 13, at 345-46 (explaining the Advisory
Committee's Report on Corporate Disclosure).
40. See Sec. Act Release No. 5, 992, supra note 39, at 81,038-040.
41. The SEC noted that a history of operation or experience in reporting "may" be among
the factors providing a reasonable basis for a projection. Id. at 81,038. The Commission
stated its belief that disclosure of assumptions generally would aid investors, assist in establish-
ing a reasonable basis and "under certain circumstances ... may be material to an understand-
ing of projected results." Id. (emphasis added). Although disclosure of sales or revenues, net
income, and earnings per share "usually are key elements in an appropriate presentation of a
projection," management should have flexibility on which items to disclose. Id. Management
may exercise discretion on whether to have an independent review, but management must
reveal any relationship between the company and reviewer. Id. at 81,039. Finally, given vari-
ances among industries, management should maintain "the responsibility for selecting the
most appropriate time period [for the projection] depending on all the facts and circum-
stances." Id.




The safe harbor rule finally adopted, rule 175, 44 combined elements from
each of the proposed versions.45 The major provision of rule 175 provided
that the SEC would not deem a "forward-looking statement" as fraudulent
or misleading "unless it is shown that such statement was made or reaf-
firmed without a reasonable basis or was disclosed other than in good
faith."'46 Several commentators have criticized the imprecision in terms
such as "reasonable basis" and "good faith."'47 Furthermore, this rule did
43. Proposed Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Sec. Act Release No. 5,993, [1978 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,757, at 81,041 (Nov. 7, 1978). Version A contained
provisions presented by the SEC, and Version B provided the rule recommended by the Advi-
sory Committee on Disclosure. The two versions differed in several respects. Version A in-
cluded only projections of specific financial items such as revenues, income, and earnings per
share. Version B, however, included management's general plans and objectives, planned capi-
tal expenditures and financing, and dividend and capital structure policies. Id. at 81,043.
Also, Version A applied only to companies required to file reports with the SEC under Sec-
tions 12(g) and 15(d) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(g) and 78o(d)
(1982), whereas Version B would have protected any company. Id. Version A would have
also placed the burden of proving good faith and reasonable basis on the defendant, while
Version B placed the burden of proof on the plaintiff. Id. at 81,044.
The Advisory Committee believed that the unsettled state of existing case law necessitated a
safe harbor rule in order to encourage voluntary disclosure. Id. at 81,042. In contrast to its
statements in Sec. Act Release No. 5,699, the SEC specifically stated its desire to encourage
disclosure of projections:
[I]n light of the significance attached to projection information and the preva-
lence of projections in the corporate and investment community, the Commis-
sion has determined to follow the recommendations of the Advisory Committee
and wishes to encourage companies to disclose management projections both in
their filings with the Commission and in general.
Sec. Act Release No. 5,992, supra note 39, at 81,037.
44. 44 Fed. Reg. 38,810 (1979) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.175 and 240.3b-6 (1988)).
45. See Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Sec. Act Release No. 6,084, [1979 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,117, at 81,938 (June 25, 1979). Rule 175, for example,
includes from the Advisory Committee proposal: (1) application of the rule to capital expendi-
tures, financing, dividends, capital structure, and management's plans and objectives of future
operations; (2) placement of burden of proof on plaintiff to show the absence of good faith or a
reasonable basis for the projection; and (3) protection for disclosure of assumptions with the
projection. Similar to Version A, rule 175 applies primarily to prior reporting companies, but
the rule also covers projections included within registration statements of initial public offer-
ings. Id. at 81,943. The rule's protection, more importantly, covers only statements included
in documents filed with the SEC or included in annual reports to shareholders. Id. As a
result, Rule 175 does not protect projections made in press releases or statements to analysts,
unless they also appear in SEC documents. The SEC intended rule 175 to provide an incentive
for wider dissemination of this information. The rule defines a forward-looking statement as:
(1) A statement containing a projection of revenues, income (loss), earnings
(loss) per share, capital expenditures, dividends, capital structure or other finan-
cial items; (2) A statement of management's plans and objectives for future oper-
ations; (3) A statement of future economic performance contained in
management's discussion and analysis of financial condition and results of oper-
ations included pursuant to Item 303 of Regulation S-K or Item 9 of Form 20-F;
or (4) Disclosed statements of the assumptions underlying or relating to any of
the statements described in paragraphs (c)(l), (2) or (3) above.
17 C.F.R. § 230.175(c) (1988). Also in this release, the SEC withdrew from note (a) to Rule
14a-9 (17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1988)) the reference to predictions of dividends as an example of
a possibly misleading statement. See Act Release No. 6,084, supra at 81,938.
46. 17 C.F.R. § 230.175(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
47. See Brown, Corporate Communications and the Federal Securities Laws, 53 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 741, 796 (1985); Fiflis, supra note 18, at 109; Safe Harbor, supra note 14, at
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little more than mirror the broad requirements already adopted by the
courts.48 While the safe harbor rule may have provided some minimal pro-
tection for issuers from strict liability, the rule added little in areas requiring
higher standards of proof, such as negligence or scienter.49
Despite indication that the SEC would monitor the effectiveness of its pol-
icy and publish additional guidelines, 50 the SEC's current policy remains
relatively unchanged. 51 Companies are encouraged to voluntarily disclose
projections in SEC filings "that have a reasonable basis and are presented in
an appropriate format."' 52 A history of operations or experience in projec-
tion, as well as an outside review, may provide a reasonable basis, but neither
is required. 53 Disclosure of at least sales or revenues, net income, and earn-
ings per share are recommended but not required, unless selective disclosure
639. Compare the ambiguity of the terms in rule 175 with the more specific requirements in
rule 144 (17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1988)) (dealing with sale of restricted stock), and rules 505 and
506 (17 C.F.R. §§ 230.505 and 230.506 (1988)) (dealing with limited stock offerings).
48. See Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1040 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485, 490 (9th Cir.
1974); G & M, Inc. v. Newbern, 488 F.2d 742, 745-46 (9th Cir. 1973); Eichen v. E.F. Hutton
& Co., 402 F. Supp. 823, 829 (S.D. Cal. 1975); Schuller v. Slick Corp., [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,065 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Beecher v. Able, 374 F. Supp. 341,
348 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Green v. Jonhop, 358 F. Supp. 413, 420 (D. Or. 1973); Dolgow v. An-
derson, 53 F.R.D. 664, 676 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 464 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1972).
49. Both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contain
several provisions on which one might base liability for faulty projections. Only § 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982) (involving registration statements), imposes
strict liability. Other sections such as §§ 12 and 17 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 771, 77q (1982), involve negligence standards. One must prove scienter under §§ 10(b) and
13(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78m(e) (1982), and rule lOb-
5 (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987)). The standard of liability for § 14(e) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982), remains unclear, but several courts hold that
scienter applies. See, e.g., MacFadden Holdings, Inc. v. J.B. Acquisition Corp., 641 F. Supp.
454, 461 (S.D.N.Y), rev'd on other grounds, 802 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1986); Pryor v. U.S. Steel
Corp., 591 F. Supp. 942, 955 (S.D.N.Y 1984), rev'd in part on other grounds, 794 F.2d 52 (2d
Cir. 1986); Caleb & Co. v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 599 F. Supp. 1468, 1474 (S.D.N.Y.
1984). See generally Comment, The SEC Policy for Projections: New Problems in Disclosure,
21 UCLA L. REV. 242 (1973).
50. See Sec. Act Release No. 6,084, supra note 45, at 81,944 ("The Commission antici-
pates that as the staff gains further experience with disclosure of forward-looking information,
it will recommend the publication of such guidelines or interpretive releases on specific aspects
of such disclosure in order to provide guidance to issuers.").
51. The substance of Guides 62 and 5 on projections has been incorporated in regulation
S-K (17 C.F.R. § 229.10 (1988)). In 1982, the SEC embarked on a reform program for filings
denominated integrated disclosure. This reform program, among other things, eliminated the
prior system of issuing guides that explained division practices but did not have the binding
legal effect of formalized SEC rules. See Recission of Guides and Redesignation of Industry
Guides, Sec. Act Release No. 6,384, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 3760, at 3303 (Mar. 3, 1982);
Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Sec. Act Release No. 6,383, Accounting Series
Release No. 306, [Accounting Series Releases 1937-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 72,328, at 62,990 (Mar. 3, 1982).
52. 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b) (1988).
53. Id. § 229.10(b)(1). The rule fails to indicate whether an outside reviewer's report
must be filed. It indicates only that if management states an outside review was conducted, the
company must also disclose the qualifications of the reviewer, the extent of the review, the




would be misleading, such as partial disclosure of contradictory trends.5 4
Although not formally defined, a projection is an opinion of the most prob-
able specific amount or the most reasonable range for each financial item
projected based on the accepted assumptions. The SEC policy recommends
the disclosure of significant assumptions or key factors affecting the potential
results of a projection along with a cautionary statement about uncer-
tainty.5 5 Additionally, the SEC indicated that management should consider
disclosing the variances with actual results of previous projections.5 6 While
intended to provide flexibility, this policy is so amorphous as to be of little
usefulness. As a result, development of guidelines in this area has been sub-
stantially left to common law.
B. The Courts Struggle with Projections
1. Focus on Reliability
No general rule requires corporations to disclose all material information
in their possession as an initial matter.5 7 An obligation to disclose particular
information arises only when a duty to disclose exists. This duty can be
created by specific federal statutes, specific SEC rules, and the general anti-
fraud statutes and rules. 58 Since no specific statutory or regulatory obliga-
tion requires corporations in control contests to disclose forecasts, 59 courts
have looked to the antifraud statutes.
The general implicit antifraud statutes and regulations basically forbid the
misrepresentation or omission of material facts. They also embody the half-
truth principle, which is the obligation to disclose all material facts needed
to make other statements previously made not misleading.6° Several of the
54. Id. § 229. 10(b)(2). For instance, sales may be increasing while earnings are decreasing
due to a rise in expenses or costs of operations. Disclosure of the sales figures alone would
imply the company's worth was increasing when just the opposite was true.
55. Id. § 229.10(b)(3)(i).
56. Id. § 229.10(b)(3)(ii). The SEC believes users may also benefit from an analysis of
reasons for the variances, especially when the analysis would highlight particular risk factors
of the business. Id.
57. See, e.g., Roeder v. Alpha Indus., 814 F.2d 22, 26-27 (1st Cir. 1987); Starkman v.
Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 238 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1015 (1986);
Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1202 (3d Cir. 1982); Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys. Inc.,
582 F. Supp. 128, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see also Bauman, Rule l0b-5 and the Corporation's
Affirmative Duty to Disclose, 67 GEO. L.J. 935 (1979); Brown, supra note 47, at 750. But see
Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal Securities Law, 73 GEO. L.J. 1083 (1985) (arguing in
favor of an SEC rule creating general affirmative duty to disclose material information).
58. See Fiflis, supra note 18, at 114. See generally REPORT ON DISCLOSURE, supra note
13, at VI, XLIII-XLV (discussing mandatory disclosure system based on statutes and agency
rules).
59. See Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 239 (6th Cir. 1985) (no requirement
to disclose projections in tender offer materials), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1015 (1986); Howing
Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 625 F. Supp. 146, 156 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (no disclosure of projections
required in freeze-out merger under rule 13e-3); Mendell v. Greenberg, 612 F. Supp. 1543,
1550 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (financial projections not required by SEC in proxy materials); Resource
Exploration v. Yankee Oil & Gas, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 54, 64 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (soft informa-
tion not required to be disclosed by Williams Act).
60. See, e.g., Rudolph v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 800 F.2d 1040, 1043 (11th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1604 (1987); Lockspeiser v. Western Md. Co., 768 F.2d 558, 561 (4th
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provisions impose on certain individuals a duty to speak in particular situa-
tions such as proxy solicitations 61 and tender offers.62 The most commonly
litigated antifraud provisions, however, are section 10(b)6 3 and rule l0b-5, 64
which apply to all purchases and sales of securities. Since rule lOb-5 does
not specify who has an initial duty to speak, the courts have developed a
limitation requiring that a confidential relationship exist between the parties
to create a duty to disclose, in addition to the existence of a material fact.65
Cir. 1985 (cause of action raised by claim of omission of facts material to merger)); State
Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 853 (2d Cir. 1981) (company that
volunteers information must make full disclosure of material facts); First Va. Bankshares v.
Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1314 (5th Cir.) (issuer who undertakes to say anything has duty to
speak the full truth), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1977); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968) (statement reasonably intended to influence investors must not be
so imcomplete as to mislead), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
61. See § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982), rule 14a-3 (17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1988)), and
schedule 14A (17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1988)), involving disclosure items for proxy
disclosure.
62. See § 14(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78(d) (1982), rule 14d-9 (17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9 (1988)),§ 14(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(c) (1982), rule 14e-2 (17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1988)), and schedule
14D-9 (17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (1988)), concerning management and third-party statements
in tender offers. See generally Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters., Inc., 744 F.2d 978, 984 (3d Cir.
1984) (involving tender offer by majority shareholder). See also § 13(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e)(1982); rule 13e-4 (17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4 (1988)), and schedule 13E-4 (17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-
101 (1988)) (issuer tender offers); rule 13e-3 (17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1988)), and schedule 13E-
3 (17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1988)) (going-private takeonvers by issuers and their affiliates).
See generally Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp. 294 (D. Del. 1981) (involving issuer
tender offers); Chris Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 346 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973) (involving target management statements during third-party
tender offer).
63. Section 10(b) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly, by use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange
(b) to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as neces-
sary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
64. Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988).
65. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226-30 (1980). The confidential relation-
ship generating the duty to speak often originates in fiduciary duties created by state law. See,
e.g., id. at 228; Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939) (recognizing the fiduciary duty of
management to shareholders). The duty to speak can also be derived from other related SEC
rules. See, e.g., Pittsburg Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 680 F.2d 933, 941-42 (3d
Cir. 1982) (finding duty to speak in both state law and SEC rule). The fiduciary status alone
does not create an obligation to disclose information, but it must be coupled with a triggering
event such as a stock transaction or the making of some affirmative statements.
1988]
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Individuals having a confidential relationship with shareholders, such as cor-
porate officers, directors, and controlling shareholders, are termed "insid-
ers." 66 Given the duty to speak placed on corporate officers as insiders, or
explicitly in certain situations, combined with the duty to make complete
disclosure once a statement is made, the question of the existence of an ini-
tial duty to disclose is rarely in controversy. Instead, cases involving fore-
cast disclosure have focused on whether the particular soft information was
"material."
In the early years, some courts reacted to the antidisclosure policy of the
SEC by stating that projections could not be published in SEC filings be-
cause they were per se misleading.67 Most courts, however, deferred to the
SEC policy by scrutinizing the factual situations carefully and requiring a
high level of reliability before allowing disclosure. 68 The courts tend to ana-
lyze disclosure of projections under the rubric of materiality, 69 but the defi-
66. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653 (1983); Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227; Feldman v.
Simkins Indus., Inc., 679 F.2d 1299, 1304 (9th Cir. 1982); SEC v. Fox, 654 F. Supp. 781, 790
(N.D. Tex. 1986); Berman v. Gerber Prods., Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1319 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
67. See Union Pac. R.R. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400, 409 (N.D. Ill. 1964)
(forecast of future earnings "mislead by conveying a certitude which inherently they cannot
possess."); cf. Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 398 F.2d 447 (10th Cir. 1968)
(asset appraisals inherently misleading); see also Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some
Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1151, 1198 (1970) (former SEC official views
projections as prophecies and not proper for registration).
68. See Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414, 421 (6th Cir.) (law does not require
insider to volunteer any economic forecast), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1974); Kohn v. Ameri-
can Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 265 (3d Cir.) (SEC and courts discourage presentations
of asset appraisals, future earnings or hypothetical data in proxy materials), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 874 (1972); Denison Mines Ltd. v. Fibreboard Corp., 388 F. Supp. 812, 819 (D. Del.
1974) (SEC discourages asset valuations in filings); Thomas v. Duralite Co., 386 F. Supp. 698,
717 (D.N.J. 1974) (law does not require private dreams, aspirations, or other hopes of buyer to
be disclosed), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 524 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1975).
69. See, e.g., First Va. Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1314 (5th Cir. 1977) (opin-
ion or prediction actionable under rule l0b-5); G & M, Inc. v. Newbern, 488 F.2d 742, 745
(9th Cir. 1973) (forecast actionable under § 10(b) as "material fact"); James v. Gerber Prods.,
Inc., 587 F.2d 324, 327 (6th Cir. 1978) (tentative forecasts and projections are not material);
see also Jacobs, What is a Misleading Statement or Omission Under Rule lOb-5?, 42 FORDHAM
L. REV. 243, 279-87 (1973) (company need only disclose underlying material facts); cf. Green-
field v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 757 (3d Cir. 1984) (preliminary merger negotiations not
material as matter of law), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985); Reiss v. Pan Am. World Air-
ways, Inc., 711 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1983) (same proposition). In one frequently cited case,
however, the court analyzed the misleading nature of the defendant's intention to sell a target
company's assets following a merger distinct from the issue of materiality. See Gerstle v.
Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973). While finding defendant's asset apprais-
als not required to be disclosed, the court held that defendant's proxy statements on continuing
the target's operations contradicted its intentions to liquidate the target, so they were mislead-
ing. Id. at 1296. The court went on to find that this information was material to the share-
holders' decision on the merger proposal. Id. at 1302-03. This opinion is not a dramatic
departure from the traditional approach of finding projections inherently misleading. First,
the appellate court accepted the lower court's finding as to defendant's intentions to liquidate,
thereby making this information definite and similar to "hard" information. Second, this find-
ing rested primarily on the blatant contradictions between the statements already appearing in
the proxy statement and the accepted "present" intentions of the defendants, which happened
to concern future actions. Rather than indicating that soft information may be required to be
disclosed as independently material, this opinion merely illustrates that very reliable relevant
information with a future-oriented component may be material where it directly conflicts with
statements voluntarily made by the defendant. Cf Levinson v. Basic, Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 746-
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nition of materiality espoused by the Supreme Court in TSC Industries, Inc.
v. Northway, Inc. 70 is ill-suited to the task. In that case, the Court indicated
that an omitted fact is material if there is a "substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider it important" in making an invest-
ment decision or if disclosure of the omitted fact "significantly alter[s] the
'total mix' of information made available."'7 1 This standard deals with the
relevance of the information, whereas most courts focus on the reliability of
projections. 72 Moreover, courts have utilized various standards for
reliability.
2. Various Standards for Creating Obligation to Disclose
a. Traditional Absolute Standard
Appellate courts have applied at least four categories of standards for de-
termining a disclosure duty related to company projections. First, the tradi-
tional view holds that no duty exists to disclose soft information. For
example, in Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.73 the court refused to require
47 (6th Cir. 1986) (distinguishing between independent duty to disclose merger negotiations
and duty to disclose that arises after other statements denying existence of merger negotiations
have been made), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 978, 99 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1988) (act of publishing misleading
statements denying existence of ongoing merger negotiations did not represent violation of rule
10b-5 without finding that merger negotiations independently were material); Greenberg v.
Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 760 (3d Cir. 1984) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (false denial of
preliminary merger negotiations violates rule 1Ob-5). But see Note, A Hard Look at Soft Infor-
mation, 16 SETON HALL L. REV. 511, 523-25 (1986) [hereinafter Hard Look] (arguing that
Gerstle court focused on nature of information and rejected view that soft information was
inherently misleading).
70. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
71. Id. at 449. The statement reads as follows:
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote .... It does
not require proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact
would have caused the reasonable investor to change his vote. What the stan-
dard does contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all the
circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the
deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. Put another way, there must be a
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the "total mix"
of information made available.
Id. The courts have applied the TSC Industries standard in corporate acquisition situations
under various anti-fraud provisions and disclosure rules. See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 50 (1977) (TSC Industries standard applies to tender offers under § 14(e));
Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 238 (6th Cir. 1985) (TSC Industries standard
applied to tender offer under § 10(b)), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1015 (1986); Pavlidis v. New
England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 737 F.2d 1227, 1231 (1st Cir. 1984) (TSC Industries
standard applied to mergers under § 14(a) and rule 14a-9 for proxies drafted by insiders or
outsiders); Howing v. Nationwide Corp., 625 F. Supp. 146, 151 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (TSC Indus-
tries definition of materiality applicable to action involving rule 13e-3); Resources Exploration
v. Yankee Oil Gas, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 54, 62 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (involving tender offers under
§ 14(e)); cf Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1205 (3d Cir. 1982) (TSC Industries should be
used in both rule lOb-5 and § 14(e) cases); Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 693 (1st Cir.
1978) (TSC Industries standard applicable to projections in action under § 12(2)).
72. The Supreme Court did acknowledge that some information may be so unreliable that
disclosure may cause more harm than good. TSC Indus., Inc., 426 U.S. at 448.
73. 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
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disclosure of asset appraisals in a merger transaction. 74 After gaining con-
trol of General Outdoor Advertising (GOA), the defendants sold twenty-
three of its thirty-six advertising plants. Gamble-Skogmo then proposed a
merger with its subsidiary, offering one share of Gamble-Skogmo preferred
stock for each share of GAO. Plaintiffs sued, alleging a violation of rule 14a-
9(a) for, inter alia, Gamble-Skogmo's failure to disclose in the proxy state-
ment its appraisals of the remaining plants. Even though the appraisals were
developed based on information concerning the actual market value of the
recently sold plants, the court relied on the SEC's long-standing policy of
discouraging such disclosure in SEC filings in reversing the trial court.7 5
The court also rejected the arguments of the SEC in its amicus curiae brief
advocating a case-by-case approach rather than a blanket view that asset
appraisals were not material. 76 Although Gerstle involved asset appraisals,
the Second Circuit has also applied this view to projections. 7
More recently, in Pavlidis v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc. 78
the First Circuit applied an absolute standard to nondisclosure of projec-
tions. In 1960, the New England Patriots Football Club (Patriots) was in-
corporated with 100,000 privately held voting shares. After purchasing all
the voting shares, William Sullivan created a separate shell corporation into
which the Patriots could be merged. 79 In November 1976, a proxy state-
ment offering shareholders cash for their shares was issued.80 After the
merger was approved, plaintiffs brought suit under section 14(a) and rule
14a-9, alleging the proxy statement omitted material information including a
favorable projection of future income.8 1 Even though the district court
found the proxy statement "an artful attempt to minimize the future profit-
ability of the Patriots," 82 the court of appeals upheld the lower court's ruling
that there was no obligation to disclose the financial projections. 83
74. Id. at 1294.
75. Id. The court stated, "[i]t has long been an article of faith among lawyers specializing
in the securities field that appraisals of assets could not be included in a proxy statement." Id.
at 1293.
76. Id. The court believed such an approach violated both the Commission staff's own
practices and legal precedent. Id.
77. See Mendell v. Greenberg, 612 F. Supp. 1543, 1550 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Flum Partners
v. Child World, Inc., 557 F. Supp. 492, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Lewis v. Oppenheimer & Co.,
481 F. Supp. 1199, 1208 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
78. 737 F.2d 1227 (1st Cir. 1984).
79. The creation of a separate corporation wholly owned by one or several persons with
no business purpose other than to be a merger partner for the target corporation is a common
method for turning a public corporation into a private corporation. See Berkowitz v.
PowerMate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 36, 342 A.2d 566 (1975); Rothschild, Going Private, Singer
and Rule 13e-3, 7 SEC. REG. L.J. 195 (1979). Certain "going private" transactions by way of
merger, tender offer, or purchase of stock are now federally regulated. See rule 13e-3 (17
C.F.R. 240.13e-3 (1988)) and Schedule 13E-3 (17 C.F.R. § 240.130-100 (1988)).
80. Under Massachusetts state law, a majority vote of each class of shareholders including
those owning nonvoting shares had to approve a merger. 737 F.2d at 1230.
81. Id. at 1232. Two days after the merger vote, defendants prepared a prospective in-
come statement revealing expectations of greater future earnings than otherwise indicated in
the information in the proxy statement. Id. at 1232-33.
82. Id. at 1230 (quoting district court).
83. Id. at 1233.
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In its opinion the court restated the traditional absolute position that "the
federal securities laws do not require corporate management to include spec-
ulations about future profitability in proxy statements .... -84 In an ambigu-
ous qualification the court said that specific information in a financial
projection may be subject to required disclosure as material, but "failure to
disclose the projection itself does not establish a [section] 14(a) violation."'8 5
Although the court did not elaborate, this qualification may have been an
attempt to distinguish any "objective" facts on which a projection is based
from the perceived "subjective" projection itself.8 6 This approach only high-
lights the incongruity in the courts' treatment of soft information.
The traditional absolute approach. had its origins in the strict position of
the SEC that projections were inherently misleading.8 7 Now that the SEC
has substantially modified its policy by encouraging disclosure, this ap-
proach no longer has any supporting foundation.88 Moreover, this view vio-
lates the intent of the securities laws in providing full disclosure of material
information.8 9 Clearly, the traditional absolute approach is an anachronism
with no place in the modern investment environment.
b. Reasonable Certainty Standard
Some courts have applied a "reasonable certainty" test to disclosure of
84. Id.; see Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 199-200 (7th Cir. 1978) (financial projections
not material in insider trading action); Marsh v. Armada Corp., 533 F.2d 978, 987 (6th Cir.
1976) (disclosure of projections not required to be disclosed under rule lOb-5 in merger proxy
statement), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977). The court also stated that the SEC policy was to
discourage disclosure of projections at the time the proxy statement was issued. Pavlidis, 737
F.2d at 1233. This statement was clearly incorrect. As early as 1973, the SEC had announced
its decision to abandon its earlier position in favor of permissive disclosure of projections. See
supra note 23 and accompanying text. While it had withdrawn the proposed rules that had
required disclosure under certain circumstances, the SEC had published proposed Guides 62
and 5 and stated a position of not discouraging disclosure of projections in April 1976, approx-
imately six months prior to issuance of the defendants' proxy statement. See supra notes 33-34
and accompanying text.
85. 737 F.2d at 1233.
86. See, e.g., Strauss v. Holiday Inns, Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,383 at 93,339 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (defendant need not disclose earnings projection in
prospectus, but must disclose underlying primary data which could indicate prior earnings
trend would not continue).
87. See, e.g., Christopher v. Time, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 95,056 at 97,690 (S.D.N.Y 1975) (court felt constrained to adhere to rule forbidding
disclosure of appraisals despite equitable and other reasons favoring disclosure).
88. But see Mendell v. Greenberg, 612 F. Supp. 1543, 1550 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (applying
traditional approach to financial projections despite change in SEC policy because new disclo-
sure policy is only voluntary and not mandatory).
89. Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 11 (1984) (Williams Act intended to
provide full disclosure); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478 (1977) (the "funda-
mental purpose" of the 1934 Securities Act was to implement a "philosophy of full disclo-
sure"); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (the purpose of
the securities acts "was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of ca-
veat emptor .... "); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 563
(E.D.N.Y. 1971) ("the keystone of the Securites Act of 1933, and of the entire legislative
scheme of the securities laws is disclosure"). Concerning Congress's intent to promote full
disclosure in tender offers through the Williams Act, see supra note 16.
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projections. For instance, in Panter v. Marshall Field & Co. 90 Marshall
Field's management sent a letter to the company's shareholders during a
fierce takeover battle stating that interim nine-month consolidated net in-
come increased 13%. 91 After the suitor had withdrawn the proposed tender
offer, plaintiff shareholders sued target management under section 10(b) and
rule lOb-5 92 for failing to disclose earnings projections contained in a five-
year plan, which had indicated an anticipated decline of 7% in consolidated
net income. The court held that disclosure of the earnings projections was
not required because they were not "reasonably certain."'93
In determining whether these projections were reasonably :certain, the
court emphasized the intended purpose of the projections and the expected
limited audience. The five-year plan generally was used internally for plan-
ning and budgeting. 94 The evidence indicated that the projections were con-
tinually updated, and varied from the estimates of Marshall Field's
investment banking advisors.95 Even though the projection differed signifi-
cantly from the published statements, the court concluded that no disclosure
duty arose because the projections were merely tentative estimates prepared
for management with no expectation that they would be made public.96 The
court made no analysis of the potential relevance of this information. Addi-
tionally, the court's failure to explain why information suitable for review by
directors in assessing a takeover bid is not also suitable for shareholders
faced with that same issue implies a belief that the disclosure laws should be
applied with the view that shareholders are very unsophisticated.
90. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
91. Id. at 292. The letter also indicated that income before deducting taxes and losses on
certain ventures was up 24.4%, and that sales had increased 9.4%. The letter mentioned
several actions management had taken to improve earnings such as modernization of stores,
analysis of new store locations, and disposition of unprofitable ventures.
92. The court rejected liability based on § 14(e) because, the bidder had withdrawn the
offer before it had become effective. 647 F.2d at 283. This questionable conclusion is charac-
teristic of the conservative tenor of the entire opinion, including its discussion of projections
and the court's attempt to limit the protection afforded shareholders in a takeover battle. See
generally Note, Panter v. Marshall Field & Company: A Tender Offer Field's Could Refuse, 58
CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 1151 (1982) (arguing court improperly applied business judgment rule
to shield directors); Comment, Panter v. Marshall Field & Co.: The Good Faith Standardfor
Corporate Directors, 16 U. RIcH. L. REV. 405 (1982) (criticizing the decision).
93. 646 F.2d at 293. The court actually mentioned two standards for disclosure of projec-
tions. First, it said that as an initial matter, "there is no duty upon management or directors to
disclose financial projections." Id. at 292. Then the court noted that once partial disclosure
occurs, there is a duty to make full disclosure of all material facts necessary to avoid making
the statements not misleading. Id. It was in this latter situation, often referred to as half-
truths, that the court implied the theoretically lower reasonableness standard would apply.
Given the financial disclosures specifically required in takeover situations,however, many cir-
cumstances will involve the half-truth aspect of the anti-fraud laws. See supra notes 61, 67.
94. Panter, 646 F.2d at 292.
95. Id. The court said the projections had been "hastily" updated on the same day the
Marshall Field directors met to consider the bidder's first takeover proposal. Id. It also men-
tioned the substantial variance between the actual results for net income, a 25% decline, and
the forecasted performance, a 7% decline, as an indication of the tentative nature of the projec-
tions. Id. This type of post hoc reasoning lends little support to the conclusion that the pro-
jections were tentative when originally prepared.
96. Id. at 293; see also Kademian v. Ladish Co., 792 F.2d 614, 625 (7th Cir. 1986) (no
duty to disclose internal valuations under federal securities laws).
[Vol. 42
MANAGEMENT FORECASTS
Similarly, in Vaughn v. Teledyne, Inc. 9 7 the court declined to impose a
duty to disclose financial projections unless they were reasonably certain. 98
In this case, Teledyne made a series of six major issuer tender offers between
1972 and 1976, which substantially reduced the number of outstanding
shares and increased the percentage of shares owned by the defendants,
Teledyne management. 99 Also, Teledyne's earnings increased dramatically
in 1975 and 1976. The plaintiffs, who had sold their shares in the tender
offers, sued, alleging the defendants perpetrated a scheme to enhance their
control and earnings income and failed to disclose favorable earnings projec-
tions as part of the plan.
The court noted first that the SEC does not require companies to disclose
financial projections.' ° ° Defendants admitted that separate operating units
of the company prepared semi-annual business plans that included sales and
earnings forecasts. 10 1 As in Panter, the court discounted the value of these
forecasts because of their expected limited use. "It is just good general busi-
ness to make such projections for internal corporate use. There is no evi-
dence, however, that the estimates were made with such reasonable certainty
even to allow them to be disclosed to the public."'' 0 2 Furthermore, the court
noted the absence of evidence suggesting the need for disclosure to make
prior statements not misleading.10 3
The rather abbreviated treatment of this issue demonstrates the court's
deference to corporate management's decision not to disclose its earnings
expectations. Especially in situations involving issuer tender offers, however,
this deference is suspect. The mere fact that the projections were part of the
internal budgets does not prove they were unreliable or would be especially
inaccurate. Even more important, the exclusive concentration on the in-
tended internal use of the projection totally ignores the potential relevance of
this information, thereby shifting the focus from the needs of the sharehold-
ers to the protection of management. This approach puts total control of the
disclosure issue in the hand of company officers. '04 Both Vaughn and Panter
identified few elements of the "reasonable certainty" standard.
A recent Fourth Circuit case, Walker v. Action Industries, Inc.,'0 5 how-
97. 628 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1980).
98. Id. at 1221.
99. Id. at 1217. The number of outstanding shares decreased from 38 million to 11 mil-
lion, and the defendants' stock ownership increased from 4% to 10.5%.
100. Id. at 1221.
101. Id.
102. Id. (emphasis in original).
103. Id.
104. The court's opinion also represents a type of circular reasoning in that internal projec-
tions are not required to be disclosed publicly simply because they are not released publicly.
Internal budgets may indeed often be of questionable merit for purposes of public use when
they are prepared primarily as a motivational tool. See Schachner, Published Forecasts and
Internal Budgets, CPA J., Jan. 1975, at 19, 20 (published forecast cannot be simply abridged
version of a budget). Nevertheless, merely labeling a projection an "internal budget" without
assessing its suitability for public use and its information content is an unsatisfactory way of
handling the issue.
105. 802 F.2d 703 (4th Cir. 1986).
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ever, more fully specifies the factors associated with reasonably certain pro-
jections.10 6 In July 1982, Action made a tender offer to purchase 15% of its
own shares at $4.00 per share. In the tender offer statement, Action re-
ported unaudited interim financial statements showing a $4 million net loss,
compared with a $1 million net gain for the same period the previous year.
Action stated an expectation of increased sales but lower annual earnings
from the prior year. In August 1982, Action issued a press release stating its
audited financial statements showed that fiscal 1982 sales were up and earn-
ings were down.107 During this period, Action had prepared internal sales
forecasts indicating substantial increases in sales in the first quarter of fiscal
1983; this information, however, was never publicly disclosed.' 08 Walker
sold his shares in September 1982 at $5.25. In October 1982, Action issued
another press release revealing a 75% sales increase and net earnings of $1.5
million for the August-October 1982 period, causing the stock price to rise
to $15.75 shortly thereafter. Walker sued, arguing Action had a duty to
disclose its financial projections in the tender offer statement and August
press release.
The court gave several reasons for rejecting Walker's claim. First, it noted
the absence of an express federal requirement to disclose projections. 109 Sec-
ond, it felt the SEC policy of permissive disclosure as expressed in rule 175
should not be disturbed by imposition of mandatory disclosure by the
courts.110 Then the court identified three factors militating against disclo-
sure in this specific instance: uncertainty, potentiality to mislead, and im-
practicality. Action revised its quarterly sales forecasts monthly. The
erratic pattern of the forecasts, which showed expected increases ranging
from 30% to 129% over a four-month period, evidenced their uncertain na-
106. The court stated that it was not adopting any specific standard enunciated by the
other circuits. Id. at 709 n. 11. Nevertheless, it rejected the traditional approach of no duty to
disclose financial projections under any circumstances and condoned release of projections that
were "reasonably certain." Id. at 710.
107. This result was due to proportionally higher costs associated with the additional sales.
108. Id. at 705. Action Industries' fiscal year 1983 actually covered the period from July
1982 through June 1983.
109. Reviewing the requirements of rule 13e-4 (17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4 (1988)) and schedule
13E-4 (17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-101 (1988)), the court noted that financial statements for the two
most recent fiscal years and most recent quarter were to be reported, but no similar specific
provision required disclosure of financial projections. Walker, 802 F.2d at 709. Of course, this
finding goes to an initial duty to disclose and not full disclosure relative to statements already
made as was alleged in this case.
110. This court viewed the SEC policy as a continuing evolutionary process that had
moved from the earlier total ban to a voluntary disclosure position.
We perceive the current SEC regulatory environment to be an experimental
stage regarding financial projection disclosures. Respecting these evolutionary
processes, we believe that a further transition, from permissive disclosure to re-
quired disclosure, should be occasioned by congressional or SEC adoption of
more stringent disclosure requirements for financial projections, rather than by
the courts.
Id. at 709. While the Walker court was one of the few courts stating it, this reluctance to go
beyond the voluntary policy of the SEC seems to pervade many court decisions in this area.
Given the SEC expressions of "encouraging" disclosure and the required disclosure of other
types of soft information, this extreme reluctance is questionable.
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ture."'I The forecasts also tended to be highly inaccurate because of the
volatile actual sales pattern of the company; therefore, disclosure had a high
potential for misleading investors. Finally, disclosure would have been im-
practical because of the need to update the projections frequently." 12 Both
the uncertainty of the disclosure and its potential to mislead concern the
reliability of the information. Although the court refused to accept an abso-
lute absence of duty to disclose, its deference to the SEC voluntary disclo-
sure policy leaves the impression that a fairly high standard of "reasonable
certainty" would be required.' 13
c. Balancing Approach
The Third Circuit has taken a unique position on mandatory disclosure of
soft information. In Flynn v. Bass Brothers Enterprises, Inc.,114 the court
adopted a balancing test that incorporates elements of both relevance and
reliability. "Courts should ascertain the duty to disclose asset valuations
and other soft information on a case-by-case basis, by weighing the potential
aid such information will give a shareholder against the potential harm, such
as undue reliance, if the information is released with a proper cautionary
note."' '5 This approach utilizes both the relevance criteria of TSC Indus-
tries and the reliability aspects of the typical judicial analysis of
projections. 116
Flynn involved a tender offer for National Alfalfa Dehydrating and Mill-
ing Company by Bass Brothers Enterprises, Inc. in March 1976. The de-
fendants acquired two reports prepared by Prochemco, Inc. containing asset
appraisals based on alternative hypothetical valuations that indicated per
111. Id.
112. Id. at 710.
113. Due to the extreme facts in this case, the level of certainty, potential to mislead, and
impracticality generally necessary to evoke a disclosure duty is unclear. The court indicated
that disclosure of information on actual orders and sales also suffered from the problems of a
potential to misleading investors and impracticality that might have prevented imposing a
disclosure duty even though this was certain or "hard" information. Id.
114. 744 F.2d 978 (3d Cir. 1984).
115. Id. at 988.
116. See, e.g., Hard Look, supra note 69, at 534. This balancing approach was not alto-
gether unique. Before TSC Industries, the Second Circuit in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case
mentioned a balancing approach that should be applied for determining the materiality of
prospective events.
[W]hether facts are material within Rule lob-5 when the facts relate to a partic-
ular event and are undisclosed by those persons who are knowledgeable thereof
will depend at any given time upon a balancing of both the indicated probability
that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of
the totality of the company activity.
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969). The decision in TSC Industries is not inconsistent with the Texas Gulf Sulphur balanc-
ing test. See Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 842-43 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'don other grounds, 463
U.S. 646 (1983). Other cases have applied the Texas Gulf Sulphur approach. See, e.g., State
Teachers Retirement v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 854 (2d Cir. 1981); Elkind v. Liggett &
Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 166-67 (2d Cir. 1980); SEC v. Mize, 615 F.2d 1046, 1051 (5th Cir.
1980); Harkavy v. Apparel Indus., Inc., 571 F.2d 737, 741 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC v. Bausch &
Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 17-18 (2d Cir. 1977).
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share values up to 250% above the tender offer price.1 17 Prochemco had
prepared the reports in anticipation of its own tender offer, but it was unable
to obtain sufficient financing. In addition, a vice president of National Al-
falfa had prepared a stock valuation study also indicating a per share value
double the tender offer price.118 Plaintiffs contended that Bass Brothers'
failure to disclose these asset valuations represented a material omission
under sections 10(b) and 14(e).
The court reviewed the historical treatment of soft information by the
courts and the focus on reliability.119 Unlike several other courts, 120 this
court viewed the movement by the SEC from a policy of discouraging disclo-
sure to one of permissive disclosure of projections as a significant recognition
of the importance of this information. Noting that the time lag between
issuance of a tender offer or proxy statement and a final court decision had
retarded the evolution of the law in this area, the court declared that its new
balancing approach would be applied prospectively.1 21
One set of factors to be considered includes those concerning reliability,
such as the facts upon which the soft information was based, the qualifica-
tions of those who prepared it, its original purpose, and the degree of subjec-
tivity or bias reflected in its preparation.1 22 Other factors, reflecting the
importance of the information, include the relevance to the shareholders'
impending decision, the uniqueness of the information, and the availability
of other more reliable sources of information. 123 Unfortunately, the court
gave no guidance on the weights to be accorded these factors. 124 Relevance
should be the initial consideration, with disclosure prevented only if the in-
formation is clearly unreliable or the potential to mislead could not be miti-
gated through fuller disclosure.' 25  Applying the typical approach to the
117. Flynn, 774 F.2d at 982. The two reports contained various per share valuations such
as $6.40 realizable through liquidation under stress, $12.40 realizable through orderly liquida-
tion, and $16.40 as a going concern. Id. The tender offer price was $6.45.
118. Id. at 989.
119. Several indicia of reliability as to asset appraisals utilized by the courts include the
following: (1) the qualifications of those who prepared the appraisal; (2) the certainty of the
underlying data; (3) the purpose for which it was prepared; and (4) potential reliance on the
appraisal by shareholders. Id. at 986. See, e.g., South Coast Servs. Corp. v. Santa Ana Valley
Irrigation Co., 669 F.2d 1265, 1272 (9th Cir. 1982); James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 587 F.2d 324,
327 (6th Cir. 1978); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1292-94 (2d Cir. 1973);
Alaska Interstate Co. v. McMillian, 402 F. Supp. 532, 571 (D. Del. 1975).
120. See, e.g., Walker v. Action Indus., Inc., 802 F.2d 703, 709 (4th Cir. 1986); South Coast
Servs. Corp., 669 F.2d at 1271; Mendell v. Greenberg, 612 F. Supp. 1543, 1550 n.8 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
121. 744 F.2d at 987-88.
122. Id. at 988.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Note, Disclosure of Soft Information in Tender Offers After Flynn v. Bass
Brothers Enterprises, Inc., 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 915, 927 (1985) [hereinafter Tender
Offers After Flynn]; (discussing the Flynn factors); Note, Target Corporation Disclosure of Soft
Information in Tender Offer Contests, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 825, 831 (1986) [hereinafter Tar-
get Corporation Disclosure].
125. Current SEC policy reflects the view that greater disclosure will alleviate potential to
mislead. See regulation S-K, item 10(b) (17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b) (1988)) (allowing outside re-
view provided adequate disclosure of relationships between reviewer and registrant, and en-
couraging disclosure of assumptions used in forecast, prior forecasting accuracy, and
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facts because the tender offer occurred in 1976, the Flynn court held the
plaintiffs had not demonstrated that either the Prochemco reports or the
target manager's valuation study had sufficient indicia of reliability to re-
quire disclosure. The court, however, added that under the new standard
"the case might well have been for the jury."' 26
d. Substantial Certainty Standard
The Flynn decision represented a logical departure from the prior judicial
approach to disclosure of soft information. The opinion recognized the fac-
tors that led the SEC to change its policy and ameliorate the extremely pa-
ternalistic prior approach. Nevertheless, in a recent case, Starkman v.
Marathon Oil Co., 127 the Sixth Circuit declined to follow the Flynn court,
instead applying yet a fourth standard, the "substantial certainty" standard,
which also analyzes disclosure solely in terms of reliability. Starkman con-
cerned the takeover battle between Mobil Oil Company and United States
Steel Corporation (USS) for control of Marathon Oil Company. Aware of
Marathon's status as a prime takeover target, the company's president in-
structed John Strong, a company vice president, to prepare a valuation that
included discounted cash flow estimates of proven, probable, and potential
oil reserves.' 28 The Strong Report, based partly on nonpublic information,
valued Marathon's net assets at between $276 and $323 per share, with the
discounted value of the oil reserves constituting a large part of the total
value. 129 A second report was prepared by First Boston, an investment
banking firm hired by Marathon to assist in handling any takeover bids.
This report, which did not take into consideration the more speculative po-
tential oil reserves, estimated Marathon's value at between $177 and $225
per share. 130 Marathon's market price just before the $85 Mobil tender offer
was $63.75 per share.' 3 '
Marathon's board of directors fought the Mobil offer, telling shareholders
minimum items); see also Tender Offers After Flynn, supra note 124, at 923, 934 (disclosure
should be required if information has some relevance and is neither clearly reliable nor unrelia-
ble); Hard Look, supra note 69, at 534-35 (reasonable shareholders' perception should be ana-
lyzed before weighing harm and benefits of disclosure); cf. Fiflis, supra note 18, at 133-34
(advocating balancing approach and listing several factors including degree of hardness of
information, potential harm to shareholders through disclosure, and facility of disclosing and
qualifying information).
126. 744 F.2d at 990-91, 991 n.22.
127. 772 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1195, 89 L. Ed. 2d 310 (1986);
see also Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986)(companion case). In an earlier related case, Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366
(6th Cir. 1981), the Sixth Circuit had held that a lock-up option given United States Steel to
purchase a valuable oil field and stock from Marathon at very favorable prices constituted
"manipulative acts or practices" in violation of § 14(e) of the Williams Act. This position was
subsequently rejected by the Supreme Court. See Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1
(1985).
128. 772 F.2d at 234.
129. Id.
130. Id. Three other available asset appraisals by two securities analysts and an oil indus-
try appraisal company based only on publicly available information about the company esti-




it was grossly inadequate and soliciting other bidders to serve as a "white
knight." During negotiations, Marathon provided USS with the Strong Re-
port, First Boston Report, and separate five-year earnings and cash flow
forecasts.1 32 After reaching agreement with Marathon's board, USS made a
two-step tender offer for an initial purchase of 51% of Marathon's shares at
$125 per share and a second stage merger with shareholders receiving a
subordinated debenture with a face value of $100.133 The USS offer was
successful, and USS obtained control of Marathon. The plaintiff sued under
section 10(b), alleging that Marathon's failure to disclose publicly the Strong
Report, the First Boston Report, and the earnings and cash flow forecasts
constituted an omission of material facts that rendered the other statements
by the company misleading.1 34
Adhering to the standard enunciated in prior Sixth Circuit cases, the
Starkman court stated that soft information such as asset appraisals and
projections generally need not be disclosed unless they are "virtually as cer-
tain as hard facts."' 35 Once the tone reflected in this general approach was
established, a similar very limited disclosure duty followed with respect to
corporate acquisition contests. The court indicated that a tender offer target
must disclose projections and asset appraisals based upon predictions of fu-
ture conditions "only if the predictions underlying the appraisal or projec-
tion are substantially certain to hold."' 36 As stated, this test looks to all the
underlying assumptions on which a forecast is based and requires a very
high level of certainty. The concentration on the assumptions rather than
the ultimate forecast itself is interesting but troublesome because of the po-
tentially large number of assumptions associated with any forecast. As a
practical matter, this standard virtually eliminates the finding of a duty to
disclose by creating an insurmountable barrier. By their very nature, as-
sumptions as to prospective events are uncertain. 37 Establishing that each
of the potentially numerous assumptions will be substantially certain to hold
is virtually impossible. Also, the court failed to provide useful guidance on
132. Id. at 235.
133. Id.
134. The company statements included a press release and letter to shareholders challeng-
ing the Mobil offer as grossly inadequate, not reflective of current asset values, and depriving
the long-term investor of the opportunity to participate in the potential future values of the
company. Id. at 235-36. Similar statements appeared in the schedule 14D-9 filed with the
SEC. Id. The plaintiff also contended that Marathon should have informed shareholders of
the negotiations with United States Steel. Id. at 236.
135. Id. at 241.
136. Id. (emphasis added); see also James v. Gerber Prod. Co., 587 F.2d 324, 327 (6th Cir.
1978) (interim earnings reports rise to level of materiality only when they can be calculated
with substantial certainty).
137. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 47, at 798 n.257.
Requiring substantial certainty for appraisals and projections as a precondition
to disclosure represents somewhat of an oxymoron. Future-looking informa-
tion, such as a projection, is by definition speculative and uncertain. Indeed,
courts generally do not even consider a statement about future revenues or prof-
its a projection if the revenue or profits are substantially certain to occur.
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the meaning of "substantial certainty."' 38 Moreover, this standard focuses
almost exclusively on accuracy, ignoring other criteria such as relevancy and
the procedures used by the preparers.
Not surprisingly, the court found no duty to disclose the Strong and First
Boston Reports or the Marathon five-year earnings and cash flow projec-
tions. According to the court, the reports were based on "highly speculative
assumptions" concerning potential oil and gas reserves, recovery rates, and
future oil prices over a period of several decades. 139 As for the earnings and
cash flow projections, the court provided no analysis; it merely stated they
did not rise to the level of substantial certainty.' 40 Furthermore, the court
held disclosure of these projections was not necessary to make Marathon's
statements concerning the inadequacy of the Mobil offer not misleading be-
cause they indicated Marathon's shares were worth more than the $85 bid
price and disclosure of the $200 per share estimates could mislead share-
holders to believe the higher price could actually be obtained.' 4'
The Starkman court criticized the Flynn balancing approach for creating
a "judicial cost-benefit analysis [that] is uncertain and unpredictable" and
for neglecting the market's voluntary provision of information to sharehold-
ers through competing tender offers. 142 The court stated:
Our approach, which focuses on the certainty of the data underlying
the appraisal or projection, ensures that the target company's share-
holders will receive all essentially factual information, while preserving
the target's discretion to disclose more certain information without the
threat of liability, provided appropriate qualifications and explanations
are made. 143
Despite the court's pronouncement that its "substantial certainty" stan-
dard represents a happy medium, its position falls short on both ends. First,
the court misplaces reliance on the market to provide sufficient information
on the true value of a company's shares.1'a Furthermore, most corporate
138. A forecaster can usually determine only a range of probability figures based on prior
projection variances that a projection will be accurate. The court used vague terms such as
"speculative" and "substantial" that give only a very imprecise indication of the degree of
expected accuracy that would satisfy the standard.
139. 772 F.2d at 242.
140. Id. The court supported this conclusion by merely citing two prior Sixth Circuit
cases, Biechele v. Cedar Point, Inc., 747 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1984), and James v. Gerber Prods.
Corp., 587 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1978). The lack of analysis is unfortunate, but the court proba-
bly believed these projections were too speculative partly because they were formulated pri-
marily for use in a selling document. See, e.g., Biechele, 747 F.2d at 216.
141. It is difficult to reconcile these two reasons for nondisclosure. If the $200 per share
estimate was so speculative, it should not provide support for the Marathon board's statement
that the $85 bid was "grossly inadequate." If the board did rely on the estimate for fighting
the Mobil offer and for its statements, keeping this information from the shareholders who are
the owners of the corporation and for whom the board merely acts as a representative seems
counter-productive to their interests.
142. 772 F.2d at 242.
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88
HARV. L. REV. 297 (1974); Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal
for Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 257-58 (1983) (stock market prices not accurate
reflection of a company's intrinsic value).
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control acquisitions are not contested, so no competing offers are gener-
ated. 145 Second, Starkman ignores the importance of soft information and
utilizes a stringent standard abandoned by the SEC and arguably tougher
than the "reasonable certainty" standard.1 4 6 Third, the court places too
much authority in the target management's discretion on whether to disclose
information. 147 As this case illustrates, target management often has insuffi-
cient incentives to disclose forecasts voluntarily even with a hostile takeover
attempt, and few companies have ever done so. The court's "substantially
certain" test is vague and provides little substantive guidance. The
Starkman approach represents a step backward toward the outmoded tradi-
tional, absolute view.
e. Probability/Magnitude Standard
A recent Supreme Court case supports the application of a balancing ap-
proach to determine the materiality of earnings projections, rather than a
universal certainty standard. In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson 148 the Court rejected
the use of a standard that required an "agreement-in-principle" on the price
and structure of a merger before preliminary merger negotiations would be
considered material under the TSC Industries standard. Several of the pol-
icy rationales advanced for the merger negotiations agreement-in-principal
test that the Court deemed insufficient are similar to the primary justifica-
tions for the certainty standards for projections. Although the Court de-
clined to address other kinds of speculative information such as earnings
145. See, e.g., Tender Offer Update: 1987, supra note 8, at 50. Instances where target man-
agement resisted the initial bid constituted approximately 24-38% of all tender offers from
1982-1986. Id. In 1987, approximately 29% of the tender offers were contested by manage-
ment. See Tender Offer Update: 1988, supra note 9, at 25. Not even in all of these instances
did a second bid materialize. Also, the number of contested takeovers represented only 7-14%
of all mergers and acquisitions from 1982-1987. Compare Tender Offer Update: 1987, supra
note 8, with 1987 Profile, supra note 6, at 45. See also Exchange Act Release No. 21,079, supra
note 10, at 86,926 (26 out of 148 tender offers between 1981 and 1983 involved multiple bids);
Dodd & Ruback, Tender Offers and Stockholder Returns: An Empirical Analysis, 5 J. FIN.
ECON. 351 (1977).
146. The forecasting process involves several elements concerning accuracy at various
points in time. The Starkman standard focuses on two of these elements. The first concerns
the confidence level of the forecaster that the projection will be accurate. The second involves
the variance between the projections of the assumptions (or the ultimate forecast itself) and
the actual results. The Starkman "substantially certain to hold" approach imposes high stan-
dards for both of these elements. It requires substantial certainty as to the ex ante forecaster
confidence level and implies an expected actual variance error rate close to 0%. In other
words, the forecaster must have some imprecise, high (substantial) level of confidence that his
projection or assumptions will be absolutely correct. Although the cases are ambiguous, the
reasonable certainty standard arguably imposes a lower level of forecaster confidence and a
lower level of actual accuracy than the substantial certainty standard. For example, a forecast
made with a confidence level of 80% to be within 10% of the actual results may be reasonably
certain but probably would not satisfy the Starkman standard. It is particulary this apparent
requirement of close to 100% accuracy that makes this standard so unrealistic.
147. See, e.g., Merrifield, Projections in SEC Filings: Debate Rages Over Worth, in SEC
'74, at 149, 154 (1974) (since institutional investors have access to forecasts, all investors
should receive them); Reiling & Burton, Financial Statements: Signposts As Well As Mile-
stones, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1972, at 45, 53 (decision whether to disclose forecasts
should not be left to corporate management).
148. 108 S. Ct. 978, 99 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1988).
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projections, 149 the reasoning of the decision is clearly applicable to manage-
ment forecasts.
The major reason given for the certainty standards is the perceived need to
protect shareholders from being misled. Many courts have feared that inves-
tors would attach too much importance to company forecasts. In Levinson
the Supreme Court resoundly repudiated this type of juristic protective ap-
proach, and emphasized the congressional purpose of promoting full disclo-
sure through the federal securities laws. "Disclosure, and not paternalistic
withholding of accurate information, is the policy chosen and expressed by
Congress."' 50 Investors should not be considered so unsophisticated that
they are unable to appreciate the uncertain nature of contingent
information. 15 1
A second rationale for the certainty test is the protection of corporate
managements. This protection is accomplished in two ways. First, the cer-
tainty standards require fairly high thresholds or levels of certainty before
the information is required to be disclosed. Second, the creation of a broad-
based rule purportedly facilitates recognition by corporations of what infor-
mation should be considered material.' 5 2 The Supreme Court noted in Lev-
inson, however, that while a bright-line rule is easier to use than assessing all
the circumstances of each situation, "ease of application alone is not an ex-
cuse for ignoring the purposes of the securities acts and Congress' policy
decisions." 5 3 The Court cautioned against establishing materiality based on
strict rules that are necessarily over- or under-inclusive, and are directed at
aiding corporate managers. 154 The approach established in TSC Industries
is essentially fact specific and investor oriented, rather than issuer oriented.
The benefits from establishing a restrictive materiality rule are outweighed
by the costs of excluding some potentially relevant information and conflict
with the policy of full disclosure.
In Levinson the Court sanctioned a balancing test for determining the ma-
teriality of contingent or speculative information or events. It adopted the
probability/magnitude standard enunciated earlier by the Second Circuit in
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur,155 which said that materiality depended on "a
balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the
anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company
activity."' 56  With respect to earnings forecasts, application of the
149. Id. at 984 n.9, 99 L. Ed. 2d at 209.
150. Id. at 984, 99 L. Ed. 2d at 210.
151. "The role of the materiality requirement is not to 'attribute to investors a child-like
simplicity, an inability to grasp the probabilistic significance of negotiations,' . . . but to filter
out essentially useless information." Id. at 985, 99 L. Ed. 2d 210 (emphasis added) (quoting
Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 1987)).
152. As discussed earlier, the reasonable and substantial certainty standards are far from
clear, and they tend to create rather than alleviate confusion. See supra notes 85, 104, 146 and
accompanying text.
153. 108 S. Ct. at 985,99 L. Ed. 2d at 211.
154. See id.
155. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
156. 401 F.2d at 849; see also supra note 116. The Texas Gulf Sulphur case involved, in
part, scientific test results for an exploratory drill hole that indicated the discovery of a poten-
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probability/magnitude standard would encompass factors related to both
the reliability and relevance of the information such as those identified by
the court in Flynn. The emphasis of the Court in Levinson on full disclosure,
however, indicates that the materiality inquiry must focus on the reasonable
investor's viewpoint, and the "total mix" of available information. Further-
more, in assessing reliability, a reasonable investor should not be deemed
unsophisticated or unable to understand the inherently speculative nature of
projections.
The most important aspect of the Court's opinion concerning materiality
in Levinson is the clear repudiation of the outdated paternalistic approach
towards soft information. Nevertheless, the decision did not solve all the
problems associated with the existing policy on disclosure of earnings projec-
tions. The TSC Industries materiality test requires an analysis of all the facts
on a case-by-case basis, and does not appear to permit a more specific broad-
based rule. Clarity and simplicity are laudable characteristics for legal rules.
The current certainty standards, however, contravene the purposes of the
securities laws by facilitating the concealment of projections, and preventing
shareholders from making decisions based on a full range of information.
The SEC should review the evidence demonstrating the manifest relevance
of management forecasts, and develop regulations calling for mandatory dis-
closure in a manner designed to moderate their unreliability.
II. EVIDENCE ON THE RELEVANCE OF FORECAST INFORMATION
A. Relevance of Future-Oriented Information to the
Investment Decision Process
The traditional investment decision process is future-oriented.1 57 The in-
vestor chooses the security expected to yield the highest return relative to
the degree of risk. 158 Return represents the present value of the stream of
expected future income, which depends on the company's earnings.'5 9 As a
result, information about the projected earnings of a company is directly
tially large mineral ore deposit in Canada. The differences between earnings projections and
the "events" or type of information involved in Texas Gulf Sulphur and Levinson should not
preclude application of the same materiality test. Indeed, the performance of a company re-
vealed through earnings figures could be considered an "event" occurring over a prolonged
specified period.
157. See Note, Disclosure of Future-Oriented Information Under the Securities Laws, 88
YALE L.J. 338, 341 (1978) ("In order to make a realistic, informed investment decision, inves-
tors need information about the future of the firm."); see also Fiflis, supra note 18, at 99-102.
158. See H. LATANE, D. TUTTLE & C. JONES, SECURITY ANALYSIS AND PORTFOLIO
MANAGEMENT 236-37 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter H. LATANE]; W. SHARPE, PORTFOLIO THE-
ORY AND CAPITAL MARKETS 19 (1970). Risk concerns the probabilities that the actual return
will deviate from the expected return. See W. SHARPE, supra, at 25-26; see also Ofer, Investors'
Expectations of Earnings Growth, Their Accuracy and Effects on the Structure of Realized Rates
of Return, 30 J. FIN. 509 (1975).
159. See B. GRAHAM, D. DODD & S. COTTLE, SECURITY ANALYSIS (4th ed. 1962). Re-
turn may consist of dividend income or the increase (or decrease) in future sales price. Gener-
ally, corporate earnings ultimately result directly in dividends or are reflected in resale prices.
See H. LATANE, supra note 158, at 216; Miller & Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth, and the
Valuation of Shares, 34 J. Bus. 411 (1961).
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related to the estimation of return, which in turn relates to the present value
of a security.160 The SEC has repeatedly acknowledged the relevance of fi-
nancial projections.' 61 While most cases dealing with required disclosure of
projections ignore the issue of relevance, courts have acknowledged the im-
portance of information contained in the projections.1 62
Similarly, future-oriented information is relevant in the takeover context.
When faced with a tender offer, a shareholder has three options: (1) tender
the shares to the offeror, (2) sell in the market, or (3) retain the shares. 163 A
primary factor in choosing among these options is the intrinsic value of the
target's shares. 164 A shareholder must compare his estimate of the value of
160. See also Dean, Public Dissemination of Projected Earnings-Pro and Con, 25 MERCER
L. REV. 511, 534 (1974); Fiflis, supra note 18, at 103; Mann, supra note 20, at 224 ("where the
issuer is going, not where he has been, will determine future market prices and the ultimate
success of the investment decision."); Ohlson, Price-Earnings Ratios and Earnings Capitaliza-
tion Under Uncertainty, 21 J. ACCT. RES. 141 (1983) (empirical analysis of relationship be-
tween security prices and expected earnings); Sprouse, The Importance of Earnings in the
Conceptual Framework, J. ACCT., Jan. 1978, at 64, 67.
161. See Sec. Act Release No. 6084, supra note 45, at 81,940. Sec. Act Release No. 5992,
supra note 39, at 81,037.; Sec. Act Release No. 5699, supra note 33, at 86,202 n.3; Sec. Act
Release No. 5362, supra note 23, at 82,671.
162. E.g., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 164 n.12 (2d Cir. 1980) ("the
materiality of management's views concerning [future earnings prospects] is beyond doubt")
(citations omitted); REA Express, Inc. v. Interway Corp., 410 F. Supp. 192, 197-98
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 538 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1976); cf. Alfaro v. E.F. Hutton &
Co., 606 F. Supp. 1100, 1105 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (predictions on future profitability of oil com-
pany actionable under rule 10b-5); Abrams v. Oppenheimer Gov't Sec., Inc., 589 F. Supp. 4, 9
(N.D. Ill. 1983) (forecasts can be material facts under federal securities laws); Kripke, A
Searchfor a Meaningful Disclosure Policy, 31 Bus. LAW. 293, 298 (1975) (amount and method
of disclosure varies depending upon purpose and evidence of disclosure).
163. Although similar, the choices available to target shareholders in a merger situation
have some important differences. With a merger, the shareholders are voting on the takeover
offer, not actually tendering or giving up ownership rights to their shares at that time. In a
tender offer situation, the offeror has the option of buying any shares tendered, so the choice of
relinquishing ownership rights is more immediate than with a merger. Nevertheless, the target
shareholders have the same information concerning valuation of their stock in either
circumstance.
164. The intrinsic value of the company's shares can vary from the market price. See
Hagaman & Jensen, Investment Value and Security Analysis, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Mar.-Apr.
1977, at 63-64. Intrinsic value is based on the discounted stream of future income and changes
only in response to the company's operating fortunes. Market price is much more volatile and
affected by overall market movements. Id.; see also Lowenstein, supra note 144, at 257-58
(stock market price not an accurate reflection of company's intrinic value). Information for
determining intrinsic value of the target shares is relevant whether the tender offer is for all
cash or a combination of cash and securities or whether the offer is intended to result in the
bidder obtaining control. In either an any-or-all offer or a partial offer, valuation of the tar-
get's shares is an important consideration in responding to the offer.
To some extent, this is inconsistent with the most popular version of the efficient market
theory (the semi-strong version) which states that market prices accurately reflect all publicly
available information. See J. LORIE, P. DODD & M. KIMPTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEO-
RIES AND EVIDENCE 64-65 (1985); Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for
Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1978).
This theory, however, has come under increasing criticism. See, e.g., Gordon & Kornhauser,
Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1985).
In addition, market price adjustments based on new information reflect the collective reaction
of traders to the information. This valuation may differ from the value placed on the target's
shares by the individual shareholder who has unique investment concerns such as personal tax
considerations. Hence, information concerning the intrinsic value of the company shares is
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the target's shares with the offered price and the market price. 165 Since fu-
ture earnings are important in valuing the target company's shares, earnings
projections are especially relevant in assessing the options available to a tar-
get shareholder. Target management is a logical source for this information
because of its extensive knowledge of the company's operations and future
plans. 166 In addition, the short time-frame for tender offers 167 militates in
favor of increased disclosure of pertinent information such as earnings pro-
jections by target management, which has the most information on which to
derive forecasts.1 68
B. Survey Evidence
Since 1973, when the SEC announced its decision to abandon its tradi-
tional position against disclosure of projections, several surveys have indi-
cated that investors and market professionals consider future-oriented
relevant in and of itself, in addition to the market price. See also Johnson, Disclosure in Tender
Offer Transactions: The Dice are Still Loaded, 42 U. PiTr. L. REV. 1, 6 (1980) ("shareholder
must evaluate his holdings in the target company and must compare his potential future bene-
fits from that company with the benefits that might accrue to him if he accepts the offer").
Moreover, to the extent management forecasts represent new nonpublic information, the effi-
cient market theory would recognize that such information may be important because it would
not be incorporated into the market price. See REPORT ON DISCLOSURE, supra note 13, at
XXXIV (efficient market theory makes no statement as to optimum amount of information
that should be made available or desirable accuracy of it).
165. The factors involved in responding to a tender offer are much more complex than this
statement would imply. First, determining the intrinsic value of the shares is difficult. Second,
other relevant factors include the expected success of the offer, the expected post-takeover
market price if the offer is successful, whether any competing bids will be made if the offer is
unsuccessful, and the movement of market price during the pendency of the offer. See, e.g.,
Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 1693, 1721 (1985) (major factor in target shareholder's decision is difference between
offer price and expected post-takeover value of shares); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper
Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1164
(1981) (value of target stock is sum of two components: market price if no successful offer,
multiplied by likelihood that there will be none, and a future tender offer price multiplied by
likelihood that some offer will succeed); Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids,
HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1967, at 135, 147 (decision whether to hold or sell requires
estimate of probabilities of tender offer's success or failure and estimate of subsequent price
action of stock under either event); Johnson, supra note 164, at 10 (shareholder must weigh
offer merits, chance for success, value of holdings as a continuing investment, and price on
open market); Jorden & Woodward, An Appraisal of Disclosure Requirements in Contests for
Control Under the Williams Act, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 817, 826 (1978) (shareholder can sell
in market or wait for competing bid but he incurs risk that his shares will not be purchased).
166. See Johnson, supra note 164, at 6, 30; Target Corporation Disclosure, supra note 124,
at 836-37.
167. Rule 14e-l(a) (17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1988)) requires nonissuer tender offerors to
hold open the offer at least twenty business days. Rule 14d-7 (17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (1988))
allows shareholders to withdraw their tendered shares during the pendency of the tender offer.
These rules were intended to give shareholders more time to analyze the offer and prevent the
short offer periods common prior to passage of the Williams Act. Still, this is a much shorter
period than occurs in statutory mergers, which often take several months to complete. This
shorter time frame is the most attractive feature of the tender offer process for corporate ac-
quirers. But see Lowenstein, supra note 144, at 317, 322-23 (arguing that shareholders need
more time to consider tender offers and proposing six-month open period).
168. Studies indicate that corporate management forecasts tend to be more accurate than
those of outsiders including securities analysts. See infra Part III.B. 1.
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information pertinent to investment decisions. For instance, an early survey
of financial analysts and portfolio managers revealed that earnings forecasts
played a significant role in investment decisions. 169 Those surveyed believed
that corporate forecasts contained "important information that would influ-
ence investment decisions."' 170 These professionals advocated expanded dis-
closure of management forecasts.' 17 Another survey of both sell-side
brokers and buy-side analysts indicated the utility of management projec-
tions. 172 Over 90% of both groups said management projections of com-
pany performance were pertinent to development of their investment
recommendations.173 In a third survey conducted in 1981, professional se-
curities analysts rated forecasts from company management as the most im-
portant source for direct forecast information. 174 Additionally, they
considered management's projections of future sales the second most impor-
tant type of assistance given analysts by companies. 175
Securities professionals find management forecasts valuable because they
advise and sometimes act for shareholders. The argument that the disclo-
sure of projections would mislead the naive does not apply to these sophisti-
cated professionals. Given the expanded role of analysts and portfolio
managers in the present securities markets, 176 expanded public disclosure of
earnings forecasts would enhance the quality of their services, thereby bene-
fitting both individual investors and the efficiency of the market as a
169. Stewart, Research Report on Corporate Forecasts, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Jan.-Feb. 1973,
at 77, 84. This 1972 survey involved Financial Analysts Federation (FAF) members with 757
analysts and 235 portfolio managers responding to a mail questionnaire. Id. at 81.
170. Id. at 84.
171. See, e.g., id. at 82, exhibit H (over 80% favored either requiring or permitting system-
atic disclose of management forecasts).
172. See Reckers & Taylor, The US. Takes a New Look at Financial Forecasts, COST &
MGMT., Mar.-Apr. 1980, at 26, 27. Sell-side brokers are analysts who produce research and
then sell it to other brokers and clients. Buy-side analysts purchase research from the larger
sell-side firms and use it in making stock recommendations to individual clients. Id. at 26.
This survey done by the 1977 Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure staff took almost
two years to complete and covered a wide range of New York brokers, regional brokers, and
analysts for institutional investors such as foundations, pension funds, insurance firms, and
mutual funds. Id. at 26, 30 n.3.
173. Id. at 28, table 3. The survey covered several types of future-oriented information
regarding budgets and performance projections, as well as management analysis of projected
relationships of general economic ratios and specific industry factors. With each type, over
90% of the analysts said the information was either vital or supplementary. Id. at 27. More
specifically, 45% of the buy-side and 64% of the sell-side analysts felt performance projections
were vital, while 45% and 32%, respectively, said this information was supplementary. Id. at
28. See also Danos & Imhoff, The Auditor and Financial Forecasts, J. ACCT., June 1981, at
104, 109 (most of the 42 auditors interviewed felt that forecasts would be very useful to inves-
tors and creditors).
174. See F. LEES, PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE EARNINGS FORECASTS, CONFER-
ENCE BOARD REPORT No. 804, at 33 (1981). Management's forecasts ranked ahead of fore-
casts by other analysts. Id.
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 47, at 803 (analysts' reports and recommendations can
have a significant impact on company's stock); Parker, A Professional's Thoughts-Needed
Information, 24 Bus. LAW. 63, 64 (1968) (analysts influence preponderance of investment




Concomitantly, investors have expressed a need for prospective informa-
tion. A 1975 survey of shareholders of New York and American stock ex-
change companies indicated a desire for future-oriented information by both
sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. 178 Just over 77% said they
wanted earnings forecasts in the corporate annual report.179 A second, more
comprehensive study of investor attitudes by the 1977 Advisory Committee
on Corporate Disclosure revealed that most investors regarded future-ori-
ented data useful.1 8 0  Seventy-five percent responded that the company's
own assessment of its future business prospects was extremely useful or
moderately useful in the investment decision process.1 8' Support for a spe-
cific earnings per share forecast in the annual report was less enthusiastic,
but a majority of those offering an opinion expressed approval.' 8 2 The pri-
mary reason given by those opposed to earnings forecast disclosure was the
belief that forecasts would not be precise.' 8 3 Concern about this problem,
however, could be alleviated by disclosure of the imprecision of the forecast
and improvement in forecasting techniques. These surveys demonstrate the
desire of shareholders for future-oriented information generally and for earn-
ings forecasts in particular. More importantly, the surveys illustrate the rel-
evance of prospective information to the individual investor. Review of the
surveys of analysts and investors reveals the usefulness of forecasts to both
audiences. 1
8 4
177. Analysts often acquire some information from corporate managements concerning
their forecasts, but this information is generally vague and disclosure is inconsistent. Public
disclosure would promote more equitable distribution of forecast information and improve
accuracy.
178. See Epstein, The Shareholder's View of Earnings Forecasts, MANAGERIAL PLAN.,
Nov.-Dec. 1975, 33, 35. The survey analyzed responses to mailed questionnaires from 432
shareholders who owned at least 100 shares. Id. at 35. The study showed that sophisticated
shareholders, determined on the basis of several factors such as education, money invested in
securities, and employment in the area of finance, were as likely to find the company presi-
dent's letter in the annual report useful in investment decisions as nonsophisticated sharehold-
ers. Id. at 35. The president's letter was the only item in annual reports at that time that
included information on future expectations.
179. Id. at 36. Epstein concluded, "The corporate shareholder wants the [earnings fore-
cast] information and can use the information in his investment decisions." Id.
180. See Reckers & Taylor, supra note 172, at 26. The investor survey involved approxi-
mately 4,730 shareholders of publicly held companies, all of whom held less than 1,000 shares.
Id.
181. Id. at 27, table I.
182. Id. at 27. Forty-seven percent favored this action, 34% opposed it, and 19% were
undecided. Id.
183. Id. Fifty-two percent said the large number of variables that entered into earnings
forecasting prevented them from being precise. Id. Other areas of concern included manage-
ment's excessive optimism, management's increased legal vulnerability, and fear of erratic
market responses to forecasts. Id.
184. See, e.g., REPORT ON DISCLOSURE, supra note 13, at D-15 ("Management forecasts of
sales and earnings seem to be of special interest to investors and analysts.").
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C. Information Content of Earnings Forecasts
1. Market Impact Test
Prior to the Supreme Court's enunciation of the reasonable investor stan-
dard in TSC Industries, some courts proposed a "market impact" standard
for determining materiality under the federal securities law. This standard
requires evidence that improper disclosure of the material fact would impact
the market price of the security. 185 The two standards are similar to the
extent both involve the expected actions of a broad spectrum of investors. 186
They differ, however, in the required reaction to the information. A fact is
material under the reasonable investor standard if it would have influenced
the decision-making process; it need not actually make the investor change
his decision.1 87 The market impact standard, however, necessarily requires
the information to be significant enough to cause an investor to buy or sell
the security. Hence, if the information would cause enough investors to
trade so as to affect the market price, it would be considered material.' 88
The TSC Industries standard is broader than the market impact standard
because the former includes facts that would not cause the market price to
change if disclosed.' 89 Therefore, the market impact standard is included
within the reasonable investor standard; satisfying the former would neces-
sarily satisfy the latter.' 90 Evidence on the changing market price in connec-
185. See, e.g., Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 734 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
915 (1968); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963); SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); see
also Note, Securities Regulation-Fraud in Securities Transactions and Rule J0b-5-A Survey
of Selected Current Problems, 46 N.C.L. REV. 599, 618-20 (1968) (material fact will have
direct effect on market value of securities).
186. The TSC Industries standard is an objective test involving the hypothetical proto-
typical reasonable investor. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445 (1976);
Kin-Ark Corp. v. Boyles, 593 F.2d 361, 366 (10th Cir. 1979); SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325,
1331 (5th Cir. 1978); Dura-Bilt Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 89 F.R.D. 87, 94 (S.D.N.Y.
1981). The market impact test concerns the activities of a reasonable investor buying or selling
a particular security. See Lilly v. State Teacher Retirement Sys. Pension Fund, 608 F.2d 55,
60 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 939 (1980); SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457
F. Supp. 682, 708 (D.D.C. 1978).
187. See TSC Industries, Inc., 426 U.S. at 449; Kramas v. Security Gas & Oil, Inc., 672
F.2d 766, 768-69 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1035 (1982); Huddleston v. Herman &
MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 548 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
188. The market impact test is better suited to publicly held corporations with dispersed
stock ownership. Where stock prices could be affected by a few large shareholders, the under-
lying assumption of a collective judgment by a broad range of investors on the importance of
the information would be lacking. But see Myzel, 386 F.2d at 734 (applying market impact test
to closed corporation).
189. See, e.g., Knauss, Disclosure Requirements-Changing Concepts of Liability, 24 Bus.
LAW. 43, 60 (1968); Leavell, The Texas Gulf Sulphur Opinion in the Appellate Court. An Open
Door to Federal Control of Corporations, 3 GA. L. REV. 141, 145 n.26 (1968). But see Painter,
Rule lOb-5: The Recodification Thicket, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 699, 710 (1971) (similar results
under either standard).
190. See Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 842 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 463 U.S.
646 (1983); see also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (reason-
able investor standard encompasses any fact that might objectively impact the value of a cor-
poration's securities), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); SEC v. Shapiro, 349 F. Supp. 46, 53
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (reasonable investor standard includes facts that might affect the value of a
company's stock). Some commentators have advocated exclusive use of a market impact test
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tion with release of information is thus indicative of materiality under either
standard. 19'
2. Information Content of Management Forecasts
Several studies have investigated stock price movements associated with
public announcements of management forecasts. The underlying rationale
for these studies is similar to that of the market impact test for materiality.
If stock prices change in reaction to the public disclosure of corporate fore-
casts, this fluctuation is some evidence that the forecasts contain new infor-
mation not already incorporated into the market price and of interest to
investors.192 The typical procedure for measuring "information content" in-
volves analysis of price changes of the subject security surrounding the date
the management forecast was publicly disclosed (often called the announce-
ment period). In order to determine the price movement related to the fore-
cast, these studies usually utilize the market model,193 which separates the
when possible. See, e.g., Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 375 (1984); Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases
Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. LAW. 1 (1982). Indeed, some courts have contin-
ued to use this test even after the TSC Industries opinion and despite its more narrow range.
See, e.g., Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 578 F. Supp. 1041-1058 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (materiality
demonstrated by change in market price). One court mistakenly equated the TSC Industries
standard with the market impact test. See SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 15 (2d
Cir. 1977); cf. Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414, 418 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
830 (1974) (recognizing difference between reasonable investor and market impact tests).
191. See, e.g., Fischer v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 78 F.R.D. 237, 244 n.5 (E.D.N.Y.
1978) (absence of market reaction probative of lack of materiality); Gold v. DCL, Inc., 399 F.
Supp. 1123, 1129 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (same proposition); Sandier & Comwill, Texas Gulf
Sulphur: Reform in the Securities Marketplace, 30 OHIo ST. L.J. 225, 244 n.111 (1969).
192. See, e.g., Ball & Brown, An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers, 6 J.
ACCT. RES. 159 (1968); Foster, Stock Market Reaction to Estimates of Earnings per Share by
Company Officials, 11 J. ACCT. RES. 25 (1973).
193. William Sharpe developed the market model primarily to isolate two major compo-
nents of the stock price movement of individual securities, the systematic market component
and the individual firm component. See Sharpe, A Simplified Model for Portfolio Analysis, 9
MGMT. Sci. 277 (1963). The market model formula is as follows: R, = ai + bi R , + ei,
where
R, = the return of security i in period t
a,' bi = the intercept and slope of the linear relationship between R, and R.,
Rm, = the return on the market portfolio in period I
ei, = the stochastic error (or residual value) term for security i in period t
E(e,) = 0
The market model is based on market studies indicating that security prices normally move in
a linear relation with general market price changes and individual residual values being ran-
dom with an expected value of zero. See, e.g., Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of
Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970); Jensen, Risk, the Pricing of Capital Assets
and the Evaluation of Investment Portfolios, 42 J. Bus. 167 (1969). As a result, the information
content of an announcement can be identified by measuring the individualistic component
separate from the price movements reflected by the general market movement. See Beaver,
The Behavior of Security Prices and Its Implication for Accounting Research (Methods), 47
AcCT. REV. 407 (Supp. 1972). For a thorough statistical discussion of the market model, see
E. FAMA, FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCE 62-98 (1976). Most empirical studies of information
content use the individual firm time-series market model rather than the cross-sectional Capi-
tal Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to measure abnormal returns. See Lev & Ohlson, Market-
Based Empirical Research in Accounting: A Review, Interpretation and Extension, 20 J. ACCT.
RES. 249 (Supplement 1982).
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price change associated with information affecting the market as a whole and
the change associated with information related to the individual security.' 94
Early studies tended to indicate that management forecasts have informa-
tion content, but they suffered from methodological problems such as con-
tamination from other sources of information.1 95 Nichols and Tsay
conducted a study of longer-term executive forecasts to isolate the market
reaction to the forecast information alone. 196 Their results, showing abnor-
mal returns in the announcement week and cumulative abnormal returns
over a seventeen-week period (eight weeks both before and after forecast
announcement), indicated that management forecasts do have information
content. 197 Not surprisingly, the extent of the market reaction varied sym-
metrically with the size of the forecasted change in earnings. 98 Although
the returns were abnormal during the announcement week, indicating some
information content, the sample contained a sufficient number of small
194. Empirical studies usually indicate the reliability of their findings through the use of
statistical significance information. Utilizing probability distribution analysis, researchers can
determine the probability that their results are erroneous. The probabilities are typically ex-
pressed in terms of significance or confidence levels with the most commonly recognized levels
being 1% (.01), 5% (.05), and 10% (.10). These levels correspond to the degree of assurance
that the evidence supports the particular finding, with lower levels of significance representing
higher degrees of confidence. For expample, a .05 significance level means a 95% probability
that the particular finding is correct given certain assumptions. Significance levels are an im-
portant indicator of the validity of the results of any statistical study.
195. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 192, at 25; Patell, Corporate Forecasts of Earnings Per
Share and Stock Price Behavior: Empirical Tests, 14 J. ACCT. RES. 246 (1976). In Foster's
study only 9 out of the 68 annual earnings per share forecasts reviewed occurred more than 30
days before release of the actual earnings figures. The possibility of influence on price reaction
by news other than the forecasts weakened the results in Patell's study. One hundred and fifty-
three of the 336 forecasts were released simultaneously with figures on actual first or second
quarter earnings. Id. at 250.
196. Nichols & Tsay, Security Price Reaction to Long-Range Executive Earnings Forecasts,
17 J. ACCT. RES. 140 (1979). The authors included only forecasts unaccompanied by other
financial news or a cash dividend declared within a week of the forecast announcement and
where no stock split occurred within eight weeks before or after the forecast announcement.
Id. at 143. The annual earnings forecast also had to be published at least six months prior to
fiscal year-end. Id. at 142. The Wall Street Journal reported the sample forecasts from 1968
to 1973.
197. See id. at 154. Abnormal returns deal with individual period returns, while adding the
returns for all prior specified periods gives the cumulative abnormal returns up to each desig-
nated period. Both figures were analyzed because the absence of abnormal returns during the
immediate announcement period would not prove the lack of information content if the an-
nouncement was anticipated or leaked beforehand, and prices had already adjusted in the ear-
lier period. Therefore, cumulative abnormal returns, which reveal price movements for the
entire period, were also reviewed. For instance, in the Nichols & Tsay study the abnormal
returns were much larger during the announcement week for those firms with positive earnings
forecasts than for those with negative forecasts, while the latter had larger market reaction
prior to the announcement. Id. at 152.
198. Id. at 150-51. The fact that investors already have some expectation about future
earnings complicates the measurement of the effect of earnings forecasts. A management fore-
cast that mirrors a commonly expected figure generally would cause no abnormal market reac-
tion, implying no information content and lack of materiality. Cf Comment, The SEC Policy
for Projection: New Problems in Disclosure, 21 UCLA L. REV. 242, 266 (1973) (forecast proba-
bly not material if it follows pattern of earnings in prior years). This conclusion, however,
does not necessarily follow from this evidence. Management's forecast may be material under
the TSC Industries reasonable investor standard because it reinforces the expected belief and
offers a new and important source to verify the reasonableness of that belief.
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change securities that the authors were unable to state that the average of
the abnormal returns was statistically significant.199
Another study by Jaggi of forecasts by 121 firms between 1971 and 1974
used daily returns rather than weekly returns as in the Nichols and Tsay
study. 2°° This method reduced the possible dilution of the impact of the
forecast announcement. Jaggi analyzed returns for the twenty-one days sur-
rounding the forecast date to capture the impact of the forecast, some of
which often occurs before and after the actual announcement date.201 His
results illustrate statistically significant price adjustments on the day of an-
nouncement of the management forecasts, as well as shortly before and after
this day. 20 2 Jaggi also analyzed the returns in relation to the expectations of
investors for future earnings. He used three naive prediction models as
proxies for investor expectations. 20 3 Price adjustments occurred around the
announcement date even allowing for these expectations, which supports the
other evidence of significant price adjustments because of the forecast. 2°4
In a more recent study, Waymire examined more specifically the causes
for stock price adjustments to management forecasts. 20 5 Some authors of
the earlier studies had cautioned that other factors may have influenced their
conclusions that investors had significantly adjusted their expectations of fu-
ture earnings based on the information in the management forecasts. 206 Ab-
normal residuals or returns based on the market model demonstrated that
199. Nichols & Tsay, supra note 196, at 151, 153. The rank test, however, did indicate
abnormal returns during the announcement week at the .01 (10%) level of significance (or
confidence level). Id. at 149.
200. Jaggi, A Note on the Information Content of Corporate Annual Earnings Forecasts, 53
ACCT. REV. 961 (1978) (involving 144 forecasts). The sample included only annual forecasts
released at least eight months before fiscal-year end. Id. at 962.
201. This impact pattern may be due to several factors, including premature leakage of the
specific information, anticipation of the information spurred by disclosure of related informa-
tion or predictions by analysts, or imprecise identification of the exact disclosure period in the
study. Most studies use the publication date of the Wall Street Journal as the disclosure date,
but the forecast actually may have been released earlier or reported elsewhere such as on The
Broad Tape.
202. Id. at 964. The period showing statistically significant abnormal returns for the entire
sample occurred primarily between day -6 and + 2 where announcement day was day 0. Id. at
965, table 1. Seven of the nine days in this period had abnormal returns significant at the .05
(5%) level with the -2 to 0 period having the greatest number of significant returns. Id. More-
over, each of the four years, 1971-1974, had abnormal returns, significant at the .01 (1%) level
during the three days surrounding the announcement day. Id.
203. The three naive models used were: (1) a no-change model, which predicts earnings
per share (EPS) will be the same as the previous year; (2) an equal dollar change model, which
predicts that EPS will change by the same amount as the previous year; (3) an equal percent-
age change model, which predicts that EPS will change by the same percent as the previous
year. Id. at 965.
204. Id. at 965-66.
205. Waymire, Additional Evidence on the Information Content of Management Earnings
Forecasts, 22 J. ACCT. RES. 703 (1984).
206. See, e.g., Jaggi, supra note 200, at 966 (price adjustments may have been caused by
voluntary act of disclosure); Patell, supra note 195, at 273, 274 (same). Finding significant
price reactions, however, is strong evidence of at least some information content because other
possible explanations for this finding are unlikely to create statistically significant price move-
ments. To the extent the market is efficient, expectations of future earnings will already be
impounded into the stock price. New information leading to adjustment of these expectations
will be reflected in price movements.
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investors had altered their expectations of future stock returns. Given the
close relationship between returns and earnings, it is possible to imply infor-
mation content in the management forecasts from the abnormal stock return
movements. Some studies, however, showed that the abnormal residuals
were associated primarily with forecasts of positive future earnings ("good
news"), while little or even slightly positive price reaction to forecasts of
negative future earnings ("bad news") occurred. 2° 7 These findings suggest
that the act of disclosing the forecast, rather than the content of the forecast
itself, may have been the information signal causing the price movement.
Waymire utilized a more sophisticated methodology to identify price reac-
tions to management forecasts and the specific information content reflecting
future earnings performance. He found the following: (1) statistically signif-
icant positive price reactions to good news forecasts and negative price reac-
tions to bad news forecasts, and (2) significant positive association between
the magnitude of forecast deviation, defined as the difference between man-
agement forecast and "expected" earnings, and the magnitude of abnormal
residuals surrounding the forecast disclosure date. 20 8 Unlike the earlier
studies, which used time-series forecast models to determine expected future
earnings, he utilized analysts' forecasts published within two weeks prior to
the management forecast as the proxy for investors' expectations.20 9 Fur-
thermore, the effects of contemporaneous financial information disclosures
were taken into account.
Waymire examined 479 management forecasts of annual earnings per
share published between 1969 and 1973. Calculating the forecast deviation
as the difference between management forecast and a "consensus" analyst
forecast, he determined the unexpected component of the management fore-
cast. Good news forecasts were more prevalent than bad news forecasts only
207. See Nichols & Tsay, supra note 196, at 152 (no significant price movement for "bad
news" forecasts during week of forecast announcement); Patell, supra note 195, at 270-71
(finding positive abnormal residuals associated with "bad news" forecasts during one week
prior to and the week of the forecast announcement); see also Penman, An Empirical Investiga-
tion of the Voluntary Disclosure of Corporate Earnings Forecasts, 18 J. ACCT. RES. 132, 156-57
(1980) (negative price movement on day of "bad news" forecast announcement, but cumula-
tive abnormal residuals not statistically significant).
208. See Waymire, supra note 205, at 704; see also Jennings, Unsystematic Security Price
Movements, Management Earnings Forecasts, and Revisions in Consensus Analyst Earnings
Forecasts, 25 J. ACCT. RES. 90, 95 n.10, 99 (1987) (finding both significant price reaction to
management forecasts during week of forecast and correlation between direction of movement
and good news or bad news of forecast relative to analyst forecasts).
209. Id. See Waymire, supra note 205 at 704. An earlier study found a stronger association
between stock price movements and predictions of future earnings derived from analysts' fore-
casts than from two time-series models (modified submartingale and index model), which sup-
ports use of analysts' forecasts as surrogates for investor expectations rather than naive
forecast models. See Fried & Givoly, Financial Analysts' Forecasts of Earnings.: A Better Surro-
gate for Market Expectations, 4 J. ACCT. & EcON. 85 (1982). Another recent study compared
stock price association and unexpected earnings based on five measuring proxies including
three sophisticated Box-Jenkins models, a seasonal random walk model, and analyst forecasts.
The authors discovered that analyst forecasts exhibited the greatest association with abnormal
stock prices. See Brown, Hagerman, Griffin & Zmyjewski, An Evaluation of Alternative Prox-
ies for the Market's Assessment of Unexpected Earnings, 9 J. ACCT. & ECON. 159 (1987).
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in 1972 and 1973.210 Analysis of abnormal residuals demonstrated that the
stock price reaction correlated with the sign (positive or negative) of the
forecast deviation. The good news stock group had statistically significant
positive cumulative abnormal returns between days -1 and + 1.2 1I Also, the
abnormal residuals on day 0 (the announcement day) and -1 were statisti-
cally significant at a .01 (1%) level. Conversely, the bad news portfolio had
a negative price reaction during the -1 to + 1 day period, and significant
negative residuals on day 0 at the .01 (1%) level.2 12 Additionally, when the
stocks were divided into twenty-five portfolios and ranked according to the
size of deviation from expected earnings, the price revisions corresponded
with the size of the forecast deviation. 21 3
Waymire also attempted to excise the effects from disclosure of other
types of financial information on the stock price movements. Only 94 of the
479 sample forecasts were issued without some contemporaneous informa-
tion disclosure. 2 14 Utilizing simple time-series models to categorize the
other types of contemporaneous financial information disclosures as good,
bad, or neutral news based on their unexpected component (or deviation
from the expected model prediction), Waymire found a statistically signifi-
cant association between the sign of the management's forecast deviation
and the similar type of contemporaneous disclosures. 215 Nonetheless, the
majority of negative forecasts issued with only one type of contemporaneous
disclosure (good, bad, or neutral) were accompanied by good news disclo-
sures. 216 This mixing of favorable disclosures with negative forecasts tends
to dilute the stock price impact of the forecasts.
Waymire also divided the negative forecast deviation group into two port-
folios, one where at least one contemporaneous disclosure was good news,
210. Waymire, supra note 205, at 712-13. Good news forecasts were those where the fore-
cast deviation (difference between management forecasts and analysts' consensus forecasts)
was positive, and bad news forecasts were those with a negative forecast deviation. Id. at 708.
The large predominance of good news forecasts in 1972 and 1973 resulted in the overall sam-
ple's containing a majority (54.5%) of good news forecasts. Id.
211. Id. at 710. Day 0 is the day of publication of the forecast in the Wall Street Journal.
212. Id. Consistent with the earlier studies, the bad news portfolio exhibited statistically
significant negative cumulative abnormal residuals for days -100 to -2, which indicates the
existence of alternative sources of negative information concerning these companies prior to
release of the management's forecast. Id.
213. Id. at 711. The rank order correlation between the median forecast deviation and the
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR)(-1 to + 1) was statistically significant at the .002 level.
Id.
214. Waymire divided the other kinds of information disclosed near the time of his sample
forecasts into seven categories: quarterly earnings reports, quarterly earnings forecasts, divi-
dend disclosures, long-range forecasts, stock dividends and splits, corporate acquisitions or
mergers, and miscellaneous. Id. at 713. The two most frequent categories of contemporaneous
disclosures were miscellaneous (35.5%) and quarterly earnings reports (33.4%). Id. The oc-
curence of a forecast with no other contemporaneous disclosure was the third most common
situation (19.6%), ranking behind one additional disclosure (41.3%) and two additional dis-
closures (29.6%), respectively. Id. This breakdown shows that multiple disclosures are fre-
quent with forecast announcements.
215. See id. at 714.
216. Id. at 714-15. Sixty-five of the 98 negative forecasts (66.3%) were accompanied by




and the second consisting of the rest of the forecasts in this group. The first
portfolio had cumlative positive returns for days -1 to + 1,217 while the sec-
ond portfolio had cumlative negative returns for this period. The difference
between these two portfolios was statistically significant, 218 and illustrates
that the presence of conflicting contemporaneous disclosures reduces the
likelihood of finding significant price revisions with negative forecasts even
where the forecasts have information content. Like Nichols and Tsay, Way-
mire found that the price reactions were commensurate with the size of the
forecast deviation from expectations. Of those forecasts issued with no con-
temporaneous disclosures, the cumulative returns for days -1 to + 1 were
significantly positive and negative for the large magnitude positive and nega-
tive forecasts, respectively. 219
The findings in the Waymire study are important for several reasons.
First, they indicate that the specific information concerning future earnings
rather than the voluntary act of disclosure is the primary impetus causing
the stock price movement. Second, the study demonstrates the occurrence
of statistically significant price reactions to management forecast disclosure
despite the existence of alternative forecasts by professional analysts. Third,
it dispels the doubts about the importance of both positive and negative
management forecasts raised in earlier studies. 220
The stock returns studies have clearly demonstrated the relevance of man-
agement forecasts to investments decisions. They have consistently found
market reaction to forecast disclosure. These studies establish the material-
ity of management forecasts by providing evidence that would satisfy even
the stricter market impact test, as well as the reasonable investor standard.
This evidence strongly supports the investor surveys and theoretical frame-
work of the investment decision process that places a premium on future-
oriented information.
217. Id. at 716.
218. Id. (statistical significance was at the .002 level).
219. Id. at 716-17. The abnormal returns for the small magnitude forecasts were con-
versely related, with positive forecasts having negative (-.00242) cumulative abnormal returns
and negative forecasts having positive cumulative abnormal returns (.00945) for days + I to -1.
Id. at 716. These results were not significantly different from 0, so little can be concluded from
the converse relationship. The lack of statistical significance does imply only a weak stock
price reaction to this information.
220. See also Ajinka & Gift, Corporate Managers' Earnings Forecasts and Symmetrical Ad-
justments of Market Expectations, 22 J. ACCT. RES. 425, 442 (1984) (finding price movements
symmetrically related to direction (positive or negative) and size of deviation from expecta-
tions of management's forecast); Ruland, Management Forecasts, Stock Prices and Public Pol-
icy, 14 REV. Bus. & EcON. RES. 16, 26 (1978-1979) (finding stock price adjustments in
direction of deviation from naive model). The finding of a symmetrical market reaction to the
positive or negative character of the management forecast is consistent with other studies con-
cerning price reaction to actual earnings disclosures. See, e.g., Beaver, Clarke & Wright, The
Association Between Unsystematic Security Returns and the Magnitude of Earnings Forecast
Errors, 17 J. ACCT. RES. 316 (1979); Brown, Earnings Changes, Stock Prices and Market Effi-
ciency, 33 J. FIN. 17 (1978); Brown & Kennelly, The Information Content of Quarterly Earn-
ings: An Extension and Some Further Evidence, 45 J. Bus. 403 (1972); Foster, Quarterly
Accounting Data: Time-Series Properties and Predictive Ability Results, 52 ACCT. REV. 1
(1977); Jones, Rendelman & Latene, Earnings Announcements: Pre & Post Responses, 11 J.




Any thorough discussion of forecast disclosure policy cannot deal with
management forecasts in isolation. One indication of the importance of fore-
cast information is the lively market in forecasts by securities analysts. To
the extent analysts already provide prospective information, any recommen-
dation of mandatory disclosure of forecasts by companies must demonstrate
the benefits of such a policy.22 1 A major issue affecting all forecasts is accu-
racy. Traditionally, the accuracy of forecasts has been used-and misused-
as a measure of their value. Accuracy is also relevant to the proper alloca-
tion of social resources because investor's capital investment decisions are
heavily influenced by forecast information. The courts focus on accuracy as
the primary element in determining whether disclosure of existing company
forecasts should be compelled under the federal securities laws.2 22 Examina-
tion of the accuracy of analyst as well as of management forecasts provides
some insight into the problems of forecasting.
A. General Accuracy of Analyst and Management Forecasts
1. Analysts' Forecast Accuracy
Attempts to determine the accuracy of analyst forecasts have involved
various methods including surveys and empirical analysis. In an early re-
search study by the Financial Analysts Federation (FAF), the group of port-
folio managers surveyed indicated that 41% of the analyst annual forecasts
were accurate within 10%, and 93% were within 20%.223 A review of fore-
casts by several large institutions conducted for this same research project
showed a 10-15% error rate in annual earnings forecasts for the "average"
firm.224 The errors, however, varied greatly based on the particular indus-
try. 225 A review of analyst forecasts for the period 1972 to 1976 involving
ninety-two New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) companies revealed error
frequency rates of 30% or less in 84.8%, 20% or less in 71.4%, and 10% or
less in 50% of the forecasts. 226 A simple analysis of earnings forecasts ap-
pearing in Standard & Poor's Earnings Forecaster between 1977 and 1979
revealed absolute forecast errors of 10% or less in half of the forecasts, but
errors greater than 15% in just over one-third of the forecasts. 227 These
221. See generally Gonedes, Dopuch & Penman, Disclosure Rules, Information-Produc-
tion, and Capital Market Equilibrium: The Case of Forecast Disclosure Rules, 14 J. ACCT. RES.
89 (1976) (costs of mandatory disclosure must be weighed against benefits).
222. See, e.g., supra notes 143 & 146 and accompanying text.
223. See Stewart, supra note 169, at 82. The survey included responses from 757 analysts
and 235 portfolio managers. Id. at 81.
224. Id. at 79. The study reviewed forecasts by seven large institutional investors from
1960 to 1964.
225. Id. at 80. Forecast errors for the food industry were very small (approximately 3%),
while the errors for automotive firms were quite large (approximately 47%). Id.
226. Richards, Benjamin & Strawser, An Examination of the Accuracy of Earnings Fore-
casts, 6 FIN. MGMT. 78, 82 (1977).
227. F. LEES, supra note 174, at 35. Standard & Poor's Earnings Forecaster contains an-
nual forecasts for approximately 1,500 firms by Standard & Poor's in-house analysts and ap-
proximately 70 outside analysts. The analysis covered 90 corporations and constituted a
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evaluations of accuracy provide only a very general picture and do show the
range of possible forecast error.
More sophisticated analysis requires a more comprehensive evaluation
process. For instance, in one study of over 4,000 forecasts by more than
thirty-five brokers and analysts in England, the authors discovered that ana-
lyst forecasts had a smaller variation from the mean of the actual results
than did the realized security returns. 228 This result indicates that analyst
forecasts are generally conservative, with predictions falling within a nar-
rower range than occurred in the actual stock price movements. In another
study, analyst forecasts covering 100 companies listed on the NYSE between
1967 and 1972 averaged errors of 16.07% over this period.229 These studies
illustrate analyst forecasts generally exhibit error rates between 5-40%, with
few exceedingly inaccurate forecasts.
2. Corporate Forecast Accuracy
After 1973, when the SEC announced its policy change, the issue of the
ability of corporate managements to generate accurate forecasts received
greater scrutiny. Given the general corporate practice not to publish fore-
casts, 230 but often to provide them to analysts, 231 opinion surveys of analysts
and managements on company forecast accuracy are enlightening. Analysts
in the FAF survey said that 85% of corporate annual forecasts were within
20% of the actual result, while 35% were within 10%.232 Interestingly,
portfolio managers gave management performance a higher rating, saying
that 92% of the forecasts were within 20% of the actual results, and 50%
were within 10%.233
A survey of corporate managements for the Financial Executives Re-
search Foundation (FERF) involving 338 companies showed that company
forecast accuracy varied with the type of item forecast. For example, sales
and expense forecasts tended to be somewhat more accurate than earnings
simple comparison of actual reported net incomes with forecast incomes. Fifty-one percent of
the forecasts were within 10%, 12% were within 10-15%, and 37% had errors greater than
15%. Id.
228. Dimson & Marsh, An Analysis of Brokers and Analysts' Unpublished Forecasts of UK
Stock Returns, 39 J. FIN. 1257, 1268 (1984). The standard deviation for the broker group for
the 12-month forecast period was 10.2%, while the standard deviation for the realized returns
during this period was 30.9%. Id.
229. Barefield & Comiskey, The Accuracy ofAnalysts' Forecasts of Earnings per Share, 3 J.
Bus. RES. 241, 245 (1975).
230. See Abdelsamad & Gilbreath, Publication of Earnings Forecasts: A Report of Financial
Executives' Opinions, MANAGERIAL PLAN., Jan.-Feb. 1978, at 26, 27. Out of 119 responses to
a mail questionnaire sent to large corporations, only ten (8.4%) had published forecasted earn-
ings in the previous five years, and five of those planned not to do so again in the near future.
Id. at 27. See also F. LEES, supra note 174, at 29 (approximately 10% of 376 companies
surveyed provided some public disclosure of earnings forecasts).
231. Axelson, A Businessman's Views on Disclosure, J. ACCT., July 1975, at 42.
232. FINANCIAL ANALYSTS FEDERATION, DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE FORECASTS TO
THE INVESTOR 143 (1973) [hereinafter FAF STUDY ON DISCLOSURE]; see also F. LEES, supra
note 174, at 36 (12% of analysts responding said management forecasts were very reliable and
84% said they were somewhat reliable).
233. FAF STUDY ON DISCLOSURE, supra note 232, at 143.
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forecasts. 234 As for corporate annual sales forecasts, 95% of the companies
had variances from actual results within 20%, 84% had variances within
10%, and 53% had variances within 5%.235 With corporate earnings fore-
casts, 87% of the companies experienced variances within 20%, 70% had
variances within 10%, and only 37% came within 5% of actual results.
236
These differences demonstrate that a uniform error rate should not be ex-
pected with different types of financial items.237 A more recent survey of
sales forecasting revealed that accuracy decreased with longer time horizons
and narrower product grouping. For corporate sales forecasts of three
months to two years, the mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) 238 was
11%, and for forecasts over two years, it was 18%.239 The MAPE for prod-
uct line forecasts for the less than two-year and over two-year forecast hori-
zons was 21% and 26%, respectively. 240 These results support the belief
that conglomerate sales forecasts tend to be more accurate than individual
segmented forecasts.
Several early studies of published management earnings forecasts indi-
cated varying levels of accuracy. For instance, one study of fifty forecasts
made during 1968 found an average absolute percentage error of 20%.24, A
more expansive review of 201 forecasts made between 1966 and 1970 by
McDonald examined several aspects of accuracy. 242 He found that 35.3%
234. Financial Executives Research Foundation, How Accurate Are Forecasts?, FIN. EXEC-
UTIVE, Mar. 1973, at 26, 27 [hereinafter FERF Study]. The greater accuracy may result from
the more numerous components involved in a net income or earnings calculation as opposed to
a sales or expense calculation.
235. Id.
236. Id. Variances exceeding 20% occurred in only 5% of the company's sales forecasts,
but occurred in 13% of the earnings forecasts. Id.
237. Id. Differences in forecast accuracy may also vary based on the aggregate nature of
the company grouping. For example, the FERF Study showed that for expenses by division
(and corporate expenses), 53% (65%) were within 5%, and 82% (90%) were within 10%.
For sales by division (and corporate sales), 36% (53%) were within 5%, and 74% (84%) were
within 10%. For earnings by division (and corporate earnings), 22% (37%) were within 5%,
and 73% (80%) were within 10%.
Some evidence shows that use of segmented data for generating forecasts of earnings, rather
than actual aggregate earnings figures, may produce more accurate forecasts. See, e.g., Collins,
Predicting Earnings with Sub-Entity Data: Some Further Evidence, 14 J. ACCT. RES. 163
(1970). Better research, however, indicates that use of segmented data for predicting aggregate
earnings either produces no improvement in accuracy, see Hopwood, Newbold & Silhan, The
Potential for Gains in Predictive Ability Through Disaggregation: Segmented Annual Earnings
Forecasts, 20 J. ACCT. RES. 724 (1982) (use of segmented variables that contribute to aggregate
earnings amount does not necessarily lead to more accurate forecasts), or any improvement
would be specific to a particular forecasting situation, see, e.g., Ang, Aggregate versus Compo-
nent Forecasts of Financial Statement Items, 15 REV. Bus. & ECON. RES. 30 (1979).
238. The mean absolute percentage error measure represents the difference between the
actual value and the forecasted value divided by the actual value. This calculation permits
analysis of errors for firms with varying earnings values because it provides a uniform relative
percentage error measure.
239. Mentzer & Cox, Familiarity, Application, and Performance of Sales Forecasting Tech-
niques, 3 J. FORECASTING 27, 33 (1984).
240. Id.
241. Copeland & Marioni, Executive's Forecasts of Earnings per Share Versus Forecasts of
Naive Models, 45 J. Bus. 497, 505 (1972).
242. McDonald, An Empirical Examination of the Reliability of Published Predictions of
Future Earnings, 48 ACCT. REV. 502 (1973). The forecasts were taken from the Wall Street
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were within 5%, 48.8% were within 10%, and 70% were within 20% of the
actual results. 24 3 The average relative prediction error was 13.6%; but when
four extremely erroneous forecasts were removed, the average error dropped
to 10.2%.244 The study also found a tendency toward over-predicting
earnings.
24 5
Based primarily upon these types of general accuracy evaluations, critics
questioned the value of publishing management forecasts. 246 This evidence
provides a very limited picture of management forecasts and is inadequate to
determine their potential usefulness. Any assessment of the materiality of
published management forecasts cannot be ascertained solely on their accu-
racy or in isolation. The current majority approach of the courts toward
mandatory disclosure of existing company forecasts suffers from the same
myopia. Disclosure policy should be based on an evaluation of the informa-
tion content of management forecasts in relation to other available sources of
this information.
B. Comparison of Management Forecasts with Competing Sources
The two most prominent alternative sources of prospective information
are analysts and predictions derived from statistical models. Management
forecasts have been compared to both of these on the basis of accuracy, but
other issues such as availability and costs should also be considered. Never-
theless, unless management forecasts offer at least a comparatively similar
degree of accuracy, imposing mandatory disclosure may not be justified. As
a result, it is important that the empirical evidence tends to favor manage-
ment forecasting ability over these two other sources.
Journal and appeared between eight to twelve months before fiscal year-end. Id. at 503. Only
specific point estimates were included, with forecasts of point ranges being excluded. Id. The
sample covered 152 firms in four major industries and a few smaller industries. Id. at 504-05.
243. Id. at 507-08.
244. Id. at 508. The four outliers ranged from an overprediction of 395.6% to an under-
prediction of 108.5%. The relative prediction error represented the difference between the
actual results and the prediction expressed as a proportion of the predicted amount. This
accuracy measurement differs slightly from the MAPE, which measures error as a proportion
(percentage) of the actual value. Nonetheless, comparisons with other studies are still possible
because the results should not differ significantly between the two error measures. The average
prediction error ranged from 1.7% to 32.1% over the five years, with the largest average errors
in the two years of general economic declines. Id.
245. Id. at 509.
246. See, e.g., P. MCGRATH & F. WALSH, DISCLOSURE OF FINANCIAL FORECASTS TO
SECURITY ANALYSTS AND THE PUBLIC, CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT No. 602, at 3-9
(1973); Asebrook & Carmichael, Reporting on Forecasts: A Survey of Attitudes, J. ACCT., Aug.
1973, at 38; Corn, The Case Against Forecasting Earnings, MSU Bus. Topics, Summer 1974,
at 11; Skousen, Sharp & Tolman, Corporate Disclosure of Budgetary Data, J. ACCT., May 1972,
at 50. But see Benjamin & Strawser, The Disclosure of Forecast Information, OHIO CPA, Sum-
mer 1973, at 79 (managements were much more pessimistic about public disclosure than user
groups). See generally Daily, The Feasibility of Reporting Forecasted Information, 46 ACCT.
REV. 686, 686-72 (1971); FERF Study, supra note 234, at 26. Executives' opposition to disclo-
sure is heavily influenced by the fear of liability for inaccurate forecasts. See Abdelsamad &
Gilbreath, supra note 230, at 29; Benjamin & Strawser, supra, at 84-85.
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1. Management Forecasts Versus Analyst Forecasts
While the separate studies of management and analyst forecasts illustrated
the general range of accuracy of each, a more meaningful test compares fore-
casts by each group for a particular company over the same time period.
One review of the early literature on management and analyst forecasts re-
vealed no real difference in accuracy between them.2 47 Later studies, how-
ever, have consistently rated management forecasts as more accurate than
those of analysts.
For instance, in a study of eighty-eight forecasts between 1970 and 1971,
the MAPE of management forecasts was approximately 3.7% lower than
that of the "consensus" 24 8 analyst forecast. 249 Another study of sixty-five
forecasts between 1970 and 1973 also discovered that management forecasts
were more accurate than analyst forecasts. 250  Although these studies
showed that management forecasts were generally better, neither originally
indicated that the differences were statistically significant. 2 51
Later studies determined that management forecasts are significantly
more accurate than analyst forecasts. In a comparative analysis of 156 fore-
casts covering 141 firms during the period 1971 to 1974 conducted by Jaggi,
the MAPE for the entire period was 26.7% for management forecasts and
28.3% for analyst forecasts. 252 More importantly, for the entire period the
247. See Richards & Fraser, The Predictability of Corporate Earnings, 28 ATLANTA ECON.
REV. 43, 47 (1978).
248. Typically, the analyst forecast used for comparison is the average of several analysts'
forecasts. This method is necessary to facilitate comparison, but combining analysts' forecasts
has also been found to improve predictive accuracy. See, e.g., Dimson & Marsh, supra note
228, at 1289 (finding true differences in predictive ability among analysts with improvement in
accuracy over any single analyst by averaging all forecasts); Zarnowitz, An Analysis of Annual
and Multiperiod Quarterly Forecasts of Aggregate Income, Output and the Price Level, 52 J.
Bus. 1, 8 (1979).
249. Basi, Carey & Twark, A Comparison of the Accuracy of Corporate and Security Ana-
lysts' Forecasts of Earnings, 51 ACCT. REV. 244, 249 (1976). In addition, 70% of analyst
forecasts and 78% of management forecasts were within 10% of the actual results. Id. at 251.
250. Ruland, The Accuracy of Forecasts by Management and by Financial Analysts, 53
ACCT. REV. 439, 446-47 (1978).
251. After further analysis, Basi, Carey & Twark, supra note 249, did conclude that the
differences were statistically significant at the .01 level. See Basi, Carey & Twark, A Compari-
son of the Accuracy of Corporate and Security Analysts' Forecasts of Earnings: A Reply, 52
ACCT. REV. 741 (1977). But see Albrecht, Johnson, Lookabill & Watson, A Comparison of the
Accuracy of Corporate and Security Analysts' Forecasts of Earnings: A Comment, 52 ACCT.
REV. 736 (1977) (criticizing Basi, Carey & Twark study). Two other studies also failed to
findn statistically significant differences between management and analysis' forecasts. See Im-
hoff, The Representativeness of Management Earnings Forecasts, 53 ACCT. REV. 836, 846
(1978) (management forecasts slightly better than analyst forecasts, but difference not statisti-
cally significant); Imhoff & Pare, Analysis and Comparison of Earnings Forecast Agents, 20 J.
ACCT. RES. 429, 436 (1982) (analysis of 46 forecasts between 1971 and 1974 showed lower
average absolute errors for management than for analysts, but difference not statistically signif-
icant). The failure of Imhoff & Pare to find a statistically significant difference could be due to
the small sample or the failure to take into account the sequence of disclosure by the two
groups. See infra notes 257-268 and accompanying text.
252. Jaggi, Comparative Accuracy of Management's Annual Earnings Forecasts, 7 FIN.
MGMT. 24, 28 (1978) (covering 141 firms). The MAPE for management forecasts ranged from
13.9% in 1972 to 37.1% in 1971, while analysts' forecast errors ranged from 15.5% in 1972 to
47.8% in 1971. Id. Also, the distribution of error rates shows that fewer analyst forecasts
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difference in accuracy between management and analyst forecasts was statis-
tically significant at the .05 (5%) level.253 Moreover, management forecasts
were more accurate in each of the four years, with statistical significance at
the .01 (1%) level in 1971 and 1973 and at the .05 (5%) level in 1972 and
1974.254 Another study in 1979 involving 134 forecasts made during the
1967 to 1969 and 1972 to 1974 periods, also revealed the significantly greater
accuracy of management forecasts. 255 The MAPE for management fore-
casts was 11.7%, while analyst forecasts had an error rate of 13.8%, the
difference between them being statistically significant at the .06 (6%)
level.256 The utilization of a larger group of forecasts covering more firms
over a longer time period in these two studies may have contributed to their
finding a statistically significant difference in accuracy between these two
groups. Nonetheless, the overall general superiority of management fore-
casting ability seems evident from these studies.
Measuring management and analyst forecast accuracy involves another
important factor, that of disclosure sequence. Some of the earlier studies
failed to account for the influence of the prior release of a forecast by either
management or the analyst. This factor may be relevant to mandatory dis-
closure in tender offer situations if the management forecast was required to
be disclosed in close proximity to an existing published analyst forecast. Re-
cent research has more closely scrutinized the accuracy of analyst forecasts
that predate and postdate management forecasts. Jaggi, for example, re-
ported that the analyst forecasts that appeared before the management fore-
casts for the same firms were significantly less accurate, but no statistically
significant difference in accuracy occurred when management forecasts pre-
dated the analyst forecasts.257 This finding implies that analysts improve
their forecasts by incorporating the information in the management forecast
into their predictions.
A more extensive study by Waymire supports Jaggi's results. The data
sample consisted of 425 annual earnings forecasts by management and ana-
were in the lower error range. Out of 156 total forecasts, the number of management (analyst)
errors within 5% was 47 (32), 73 (63) were within 10%, and 111 (102) were within 25%. Id.
The analyst forecast was taken from Value Line's Investment Survey, which has been shown to
be among the most accurate sources of analysts' forecasts. See Brown & Rozeff, The Superior-
ity of Analysts Forecasts as Measures of Expectations: Evidence from Earnings, 33 J. FIN. 1, 12
(1978).
253. Jaggi's use of the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test to determine statistical significance en-
hances the validity of the results. The Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test, a nonparametric test, is
particularly suited to matched pair analysis such as comparing two forecasts for the same firm.
This methodology is generally more appropriate than the use of the parametric paired t-test,
which assumes that the differences in the matched pairs (forecast versus actual results) are
independent and drawn from the same population. Also, the Wilcoxon Test is not affected by
extreme outliers in one group that might bias general average error comparisons. See Brown &
Rozeff, supra note 252, at 3. For a description of the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test, see D.
HARNETT, STATISTICAL METHODS 704-05 (3d ed. 1982); C. HAWKINS & J. WEBER, STATIS-
TICAL ANALYSIS: APPLICATIONS TO BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 525-27 (1980).
254. Jaggi, supra note 252, at 29, exhibit 2.
255. Barefield, Comisky & McDonald, Accuracy of Management and Security Analysts'
Forecasts. Additional Evidence, 7 J. Bus. RES. 109 (1979).
256. Id. at 114.
257. Jaggi, supra note 252, at 29; see also Ruland, supra note 250.
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lysts between 1970 and 1973.258 The author segregated the independent ana-
lysts' forecasts into two groups that preceded publication of the management
forecasts by fourteen days or less (group 1) and more than fourteen days
(group 2); and two groups that postdated management forecasts by fourteen
days or less (group 3) and more than fourteen days (group 4). The results
demonstrated that management forecasts were more accurate than analyst
forecasts at statistically significant levels for both group 1 (.01 level) and
group 2 (.02 level).25 9 No statistically significant difference (at a .05 level)
in accuracy occurred between management forecasts and analyst forecasts in
groups 3 and 4.260 These results show that management forecasts are signifi-
cantly more accurate than prior analyst forecasts, and just as accurate as the
postdated analyst forecasts. 261 One possible explanation for these findings is
that management possessed inside information that allowed them to produce
superior forecasts. 262
A third study reviewed this timing disclosure issue, but extended the anal-
ysis to cover analyst forecasts twelve weeks before and after the management
forecast.26 3 The authors found that management forecasts occurring twelve
weeks after and up to four weeks before analyst forecasts were significantly
more accurate at a .05 (5%) or less level.2 64 Furthermore, management
forecasts published subsequent to analyst forecasts were significantly more
258. Waymire, Additional Evidence on the Accuracy of Analyst Forecasts Before and After
Voluntary Management Earnings Forecasts, 61 ACCT. REV. 129, 131 (1986). The management
forecasts were taken from the Wall Street Journal, and the analyst forecasts were from Stan-
dard & Poor's Earnings Forecaster, which contains forecasts from independent analysts and
Standard & Poor's in-house analysis. See supra note 227.
259. Waymire, supra note 258, at 136, 137. These results occurred utilizing two alternative
error metrics, an absolute percentage error metric and a raw absolute value error metric. Id. at
134-35.
260. Id.
261. Waymire also compared the accuracy of management forecasts with forecasts by Stan-
dard & Poor's in-house analysts with similar results. Consequently, neither set of analysts
produced significantly more accurate forecasts than management even when they postdated
the management forecasts. Id. at 140.
262. See id. Inside information may consist of future plans, unaudited financial data, or
other nonpublic information that impacts upon the firm's performance.
263. Hassell & Jennings, Relative Forecast Accuracy and the Timing of Earnings Forecast
Announcements, 61 ACCT. REV. 58 (1986). The management forecasts were gathered from the
Dow Jones News Retrieval Service, a computerized service including stories from the Wall
Street Journal, Barrons, and the Broad Tape. The analyst forecasts were from Zacks Invest-
ment Company's Icarus Service, which accumulates forecasts from up to 60 analysts. The
procedures for dating analyst forecasts used by Zacks allows for greater precision in catego-
rizing them relative to publication of the management forecasts. See id. at 62-63. Although
the forecasts were from a more recent time period than Waymire's, the sample was smaller,
covering 124 forecasts.
264. Id. at 67. With management forecast release date being week 0, analyst forecasts
released in weeks -12 to +2 were less accurate at a .01 level, weeks +3 and +4 were less
accurate at a .05 level, weeks +5 to +8 showed no significant difference, and weeks +9 to
+ 12 showed analysts to be more accurate at a .05 level. Id. Further analysis showed the more
accurate analyst forecasts were primarily those appearing in the last two quarters before fiscal
year end. Id. at 70. As a result, the superior accuracy was likely due to the accumulation of
additional information on the company's actual results through interim earnings reports rather
than forecasting ability. See, e.g., Abdel-khalik & Espejo, Expectations Data and the Predictive




accurate at a .01 (1%) level whether the forecasts were released early or late
in the fiscal year. 265 The differential in accuracy varied somewhat according
to the number of analysts following a company. Those companies with a
higher number of analyst forecasts had significantly better accuracy for their
forecasts released after the analyst forecasts, and the company forecasts were
as accurate as the analyst forecasts that were released up to seven weeks
after the management forecasts. 266 Firms with low analyst following (fewer
than seven) had significantly more accurate forecasts for their forecasts oc-
curring after and up to four weeks before the analyst forecasts; and the man-
agement forecasts were as accurate as the analyst forecasts released after the
company's forecast. 267 These results are consistent with those of Waymire.
The comparative accuracy research indicates that management forecasts
are generally more accurate than those of analysts. Possible explanations for
this result include management's possession of nonpublic inside information,
and its control over performance results. While manipulation of earnings
reports or actual performance to coincide with forecasts may exist to some
degree, 268 it is unlikely that this is a major factor because of the difficulty of
effective manipulation on a continuous and widespread basis. The disclosure
sequence studies indicate that management's superiority is probably rooted
in its informational advantages because the accuracy differential declines af-
ter management releases its forecast. At this time, analysts are able to incor-
porate information contained both in the forecast itself and in
contemporaneous financial disclosures that often accompany management
forecasts. Management, however, retains some significant accuracy advan-
tage for up to four weeks after its forecast disclosure, implying some contin-
ued superior utilization of current and inside information. Additionally, this
lag period indicates some skepticism of management's forecasts by analysts
who do not immediately adjust their forecasts to coincide with manage-
ment.269 This research provides further support for the conclusion drawn
from the stock return impact (information content) studies that management
forecasts contain information valuable to shareholders. 270
The implications of these studies for forecast disclosure in takeovers is
twofold. First, at any point in time, management forecasts tend to be more
265. Hassell & Jennirgs, supra note 263, at 69, 70.
266. Id. at 72.
267. Id.
268. See, e.g., Kamin & Ronen, The Smoothing of Income Numbers- Some Empirical Evi-
dence on Systematic Differences Among Management-Controlled and Owner-Controlled Firms,
3 ACCT. ORGANIZATIONS & SOC'Y 141 (1978); Kross, Earnings and Announcement Time
Lags, 9 J. Bus. RES. 267 (1981); Ronen, Sadan & Snow, Income Smoothing: A Review, 1 ACCT.
J. 11 (1977); Smith, The Effect of the Separation of Ownership from Control on Accounting
Policy Decisions, 51 ACCT. REV. 707 (1976).
269. See, e.g., Hassell & Jennings, supra note 263, at 71 (indicating that analysts do not
respond as quickly to "good news" management forecasts that exceed analyst forecasts as they
do to "bad news" forecasts); R. JENNINGS, REACTION OF FINANCIAL ANALYSTS TO CORPO-
RATE MANAGEMENT EARNINGS PER SHARE (Financial Analysts Research Foundation, Mon-
ograph No. 20, 1984) (analysts' forecast revisions are statistically correlated with release of
management forecasts).
270. See supra part II.c.2.
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accurate than analyst forecasts. As a result, any contemporaneous analyst
forecast will be less valuable than management's forecast. Moreover, man-
dating forecasts in a tender offer or merger situation allows management to
utilize the most recent information, which will enhance their relative accu-
racy. Second, forecast information is relevant and management forecasts
contain new information important to the shareholder's investment decision,
especially with tender offers where strong time pressures exist. While ana-
lyst forecasts may provide information counterbalancing an extremely unre-
liable management forecast, they are not a perfect substitute.
Moreover, analyst forecasts may be few or nonexistent for a particular
target company. The 1977 Advisory Committee on Disclosure noted that
many public companies have no consistent analyst following. 27 1 Analysts
tend to provide forecasts for larger firms that have higher investor inter-
est. 272 The major analyst forecast services cover between 1,500 and 3,000
companies, with substantial overlap. 273 As a result, an analyst forecast
many not be available to shareholders or may be out-of-date. Lastly, the
accuracy of consensus analyst forecasts decreases correspondingly with the
number of individual analyst forecasts. 274 Both the superior accuracy of
management forecasts and the limited availability of analyst forecasts weigh
in favor of mandatory disclosure of management forecasts in tender offers
and takeovers.
2. Comparison of Management and Analyst Forecasts
with Time-Series Models
a. Analyst Forecasts Versus Models
Statistical models provide a second alternative source of forecasts for
shareholders. Models represent a replicable methodology that is not depen-
dent on an individual forecasting agent. Therefore, if a model can predict
271. See REPORT ON DISCLOSURE, supra note 13, at XXII-XXIII; see also Reckers &
Taylor, supra note 172, at 29-30 (only 22% and 46% of surveyed analysts followed companies
with capitalization less than $50 million and $100 million, respectively).
272. See Reckers & Taylor, supra note 172, at 29 ("Given the limited number of stocks
followed per analyst, and a probable appreciable overlap of coverage, service by the financial
analyst community seems highly restricted to relatively large companies."). See, e.g., Way-
mire, supra note 258, at 133-34. In his study, Waymire noted that over one-third of the 425
forecast periods involved one analyst, while only 8% had five or more. Id. at 133. Also, 62%
of the smaller firms had one analyst forecast available compared to 37% of the larger firms.
Id. The NYSE companies, which were typically larger, had more analyst forecasts. Id. at 134;
see also Givoly, The Formation of Earnings Expectations, 60 ACCT. REv. 372, 375 (1985) (in
study including 6,020 forecasts between 1969 and 1979 covering 424 NYSE companies, only
58 companies had forecasts in at least 7 of the 11 years); Imhoff & Pare, supra note 25 1, at 431
(more analysts' forecasts for NYSE firms than for AMEX, Over-the-Counter (OTC), or locally
traded firms).
273. These include Standard & Poor's Earnings Forecaster (forecasts for approximately
1,500 companies by S&P internal analysts and 70 other analysts), Value Line's Investment
Survey (covering approximately 1,600 companies with forecasts by internal analysts), and
Lynch, Jones, and Ryan's Institutional Brokers Estimation Service (consensus earnings fore-
casts for approximately 1,500 companies). Another recent source is Zacks Investment Com-
pany's Icarus Service, which covers approximately 3,000 firms with forecasts by up to 60
analysts.
274. See supra note 248; notes 266-267 and accompanying text.
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earnings more accurately than analysts or management, disclosure by the
latter sources offers little benefit subject to any cost differentials. Statistical
models have been utilized for comparative studies because they provide an
understandable process for cross-sectional comparisons of various forecast-
ing methods available to management and analysts. They also are more sus-
ceptible to further examination for improvement of accuracy. In this area,
researchers have concentrated on time-series models, which use primarily
data of past results of the particular item being projected. Partly due to the
greater number of analyst forecasts, more research has taken place compar-
ing projections derived from models to those by analysts than to forecasts by
companies. Nonetheless, these comparisons indirectly provide information
relevant to management forecasts given that other studies show manage-
ments' superior accuracy over analysts. 27 5
After reviewing the early research comparing models with both analyst
and management forecasts, one pair of commentators stated that the evi-
dence was inconclusive. 276 For instance, some early studies showed insignif-
icant differences in accuracy between models and analyst forecasts. One of
the first studies was by Cragg and Malkiel, who reviewed 185 five-year fore-
casts made in 1962 and 1963 by fivie investment firms and two sets of naive
models. They concluded that the analysts' performance was only slightly
better than that of the models. 277 These results were supported by a 1972
study by Elton and Gruber examining annual forecasts by three groups of
analysts and the best of nine naive models, which showed no statistically
significant difference in accuracy. 278
Later more comprehensive studies contradict these findings and indicate
that analysts tend to be more accurate than statistical models. A 1977 study
by Richards, Benjamin, and Strawser comparing three naive models to ana-
lyst annual earnings forecasts for the 1969 to 1972 period for fifty firms and
the 1972 to 1976 period for ninety-two firms revealed that the analysts gen-
erally were more accurate.279 The MAPE for the analysts for the 1969 to
1972 period was 18.1%, while the models errors ranged from 20.8% to
26.6%.280 Similarly, the analysts had a MAPE rate of 24.1% and the mod-
els had error rates of 28.9% to 40.9% for 1972 to 1976.28 1 These differences
275. See supra part III.B. I.
276. See Abdel-Khalik & Thompson, Research on Earnings Forecasts: The State of the Art,
1 AccT. J. 180, 202 (1977-1978).
277. Cragg & Malkiel, The Consensus and Accuracy of Some Predictions of the Growth of
Corporate Earnings, 23 J. FIN. 67, 77 (1968) (involved a no-change model and change-equal-
to-past-change models).
278. See Elton & Gruber, Earnings Estimates and the Accuracy of Expectational Data, 18
MGMT. SCIENCE B-409 (1972). The analysts included a large pension fund, an investment
advisory service, and a large brokerage house. Id. at B-418. The nine models consisted of two
variations of moving averages, two linear regressions, four exponential smoothing models, and
a naive model. Id. at B-410 to -414. The brokerage house and pension fund outperformed the
best model, but the difference was not significant at even a .20 level. Id. at B-419.
279. Richards, Benjamin & Strawser, supra note 226, at 81. The three naive models pro-
jected based on: (1) no change in earnings, (2) constant dollar growth, or (3) constant percent-
age growth. Id.
280. Id. at 85.
281. Id. at 82.
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were statistically significant at the .05 (5%) level for two of the five years in
the later period as to the most accurate model and for three and four of the
five years as to the other two models. 282 Also, the error distribution range
revealed that the analysts had a greater incidence of smaller errors. Half of
the analysts errors were within 10%; whereas 34.7% of the best model's
errors were in this category. 283
Another extensive study of 6,020 annual forecasts between 1969 and 1979
involving 424 companies also revealed the superior performance of analysts
over two more simple extrapolation models, a univariate time-series model
(Model 1) and a linear trend regression model (Model 2).284 The MAPE
was 16.4% for the analyst forecast over the entire period, 19.3% for Model 1
and 20.3% for Model 2.285 The difference between the analyst forecast and
each of the two models was statistically significant at the .01 (1%) level. 2 8 6
Analyst forecasts were less accurate than Model 1 in only two of the eleven
years and were less accurate than Model 2 in only one year.28 7 The analyst
forecast error range of 10.4% to 25.9% was also lower and narrower than
the error ranges of the two models.2 88
Two studies comparing analyst forecasts to more sophisticated time-series
models also indicate the superiority of analysts to extrapolation models.
One study by Brown and Rozeff reviewed quarterly forecasts (one to five
quarters ahead) between 1972 and 1975 by an investment service, two simple
models, and the more sophisticated Box-Jenkins method.28 9 The hypothesis
282. Id. at 81, 82. No test for statistical significance existed for the 1969-1972 period.
283. Id. at 82; see also Brandon & Jarrett, Accuracy of Externally Prepared Forecasts, REV.
Bus. & ECON. RES., Fall 1977, at 35. The authors compared analyst forecasts for 27 firms
between 1970 and 1974 with seven naive models using six different error measuring-metrics.
In an average rank test, analyst forecasts were more accurate than any of the models regardless
of which error metric was applied. Id. at 41-42. The differences were statistically significant
for the general error metrics, but not for the relative error metrics. Id. at 43-44. The authors
stated, however, "we should still conclude for all practical purposes ... the mean forecasting
error... [for analyst] forecasts is less than the mean error of all naive forecasting models." Id.
at 45.
284. Fried & Givoly, Financial Analysts'Forecasts of Earnings: A Better Surrogate for Mar-
ket Expectations, 4 J. ACCT. & ECON. 85 (1982). The univariate time-series model was a sub-
martingale modified by an exponential smoothing process for years following large fluctuations
in earnings. Id. at 89-90. The regression model involved a linear relationship between the
expected change in market earnings using the average earnings of companies in the Standard &
Poor's Index as proxy for the market. Id. at 89. The expected change in market earnings was
estimated as the average growth over the prior five years. Id. See also Bamber, The Informa-
tion Content of Annual Earnings Releases: A Trading Volume Approach, 24 J. ACCT. RES. 40,
46-47 (1987) (finding analyst annual forecasts to be statistically significantly better than ran-
dom walk model forecast for sample of 397 firms); Bhaskar & Morris, The Accuracy of Bro-
kers' Profit Forecasts in the UK, 14 ACCT. & Bus. RES. 113 (1984) (finding accuracy of analyst
forecasts for English companies superior to three naive models).
285. Id. at 91.
286. Id. at 92. Analysts were also statistically significantly better at a .01 level for both
positive prediction errors (actual earnings above expectation) and negative prediction errors
(actual earnings below expectation). Id.
287. See id. at 91. In none of these instances were the differences statistically significant.
288. See id.
289. Brown & Rozeff, supra note 252 (covering 50 firms). The sample forecast size ranged
from 200 to 50 depending on the period. The analyst forecast was taken from Value Line's
Investment Survey. The two naive models were a seasonal martingale (no change from the
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of equal accuracy for the annual forecasts of all four agents was rejected at
the .01 (1%) significance level in three of the four years. 290 Comparisons of
individual sources showed the annual analyst forecast was more accurate in
every instance with the difference being statistically significant in eight out of
twelve situations. 291 With quarterly forecast evaluations, again equal accu-
racy among the four methods was rejected in fourteen of sixteen quarters at
statistically significant levels. 292 Out of fifty-two comparisons, the analyst
forecast was more accurate in forty-five, with statistical significance at a .05
(5%) level (or better) in thirty-three instances.293 The analyst forecasts' gen-
eral superiority was not confined to any model, year, or forecast horizon.
A more recent study also provides evidence of the superiority of analyst
forecasts to three universal variants of the sophisticated Box-Jenkins proce-
dure, which have been shown to be more accurate than firm-specific Box-
Jenkins models. 294 This study, comparing quarterly forecasts for 233 firms
between 1975 and 1979, found the analyst forecasts to be more accurate than
the three sophisticated models for one quarter, two quarters, and three
quarters ahead in 100%, 91%, and 81% of the instances, respectively. 295 In
addition, the analyst forecast errors were distributed in a more narrow range
than the models' errors.296 More important, the analysts' superiority was
statistically significant at the .01 (1%) level for all three forecast horizons as
to each of the models. 297 This research demonstrates the generally superior
accuracy of analyst forecasts over sophisticated time-series models for short-
term horizons. 298
same period a year before) and a seasonal submartingale (same as martingale except add
change of latest period over that of previous year). Id. at 5. The Box-Jenkins method creates a
firm specific model for each period. See generally G. Box & G. JENKINS, TIME-SERIES ANAL-
YSIS: FORECASTING AND CONTROL (rev. ed. 1976); C. NELSON, APPLIED TIME-SERIES
ANALYSIS FOR MANAGEMENT FORECASTING (1973) (providing a more accessible explanation
of Box-Jenkins methodology); Mabert & Radcliffe, A Forecasting Methodology as Applied to
Financial Time-Series, 49 ACCT. REV. 61 (1974).
290. Brown & Rozeff, supra note 252, at 6.
291. Id. at 6-8. In two of the four years, the analyst forecast was not statistically signifi-
cantly better than the Box-Jenkins forecast.
292. Id. at 8. The null hypothesis of equal accuracy was rejected in 13 quarters at the .01
level and in one quarter at the .05 level. Id. at 9, table 3.
293. Id. at 8, 10. In only one instance, a Box-Jenkins forecast, was a model forecast statis-
tically significantly more accurate than the analyst forecast. See id.
294. Brown, Hagerman, Griffin & Zmijewski, Security Analyst Superiority Relative to
Univariate Time-Series Models in Forecasting Quarterly Earnings, 9 J. ACCT. & EcON. 61
(1987). The study involved analyst forecasts from the Value Line's Investment Survey, and the
three statistical models developed by Brown and Rozeff, Foster, and Watts and Griffin. See
Brown & Rozeff, Univariate Time-Series Models of Quarterly Accounting Earnings Per Share.
A Proposed Model, 17 J. ACCT. RES. 179 (1979); Foster, Quarterly Accounting Data: Time-
Series Properties and Predictive Ability Results, 52 ACCT. REV. 1 (1977); Griffin, Time-Series
Behavior of Quarterly Earnings. Preliminary Evidence, 15 J. ACCT. RES. 71 (1977).
295. Brown, Hagerman, Griffin & Zmijewski, supra note 294, at 67-68.
296. Id. For example, for the one quarter ahead forecasts, approximately 75% of the ana-
lyst forecasts were within 10% of the actual results compared to approximately 58% for the
best model. Id. at 69-71.
297. Id. at 72-74.
298. See Collins & Hopwood, A Multivariate Analysis ofAnnual Earnings Forecasts Gener-
ated from Quarterly Forecasts of Financial Analysts and Univariate Time-Series Models, 18 J.
ACCT. RES. 390 (1980). The authors reviewed quarterly forecasts (one to four quarters ahead)
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The mixed results of this research have several possible explanations.
First, the forecasts in the early studies involved only a few years.299 Second,
Cragg and Malkiel reviewed five-year ahead forecasts, which are longer than
the mere common annual and quarterly forecasts in the later studies. Third,
the later studies utilized more recent data and offered a broader spectrum of
analysts. Analysts' forecasting ability probably has improved over time and
use of larger numbers of analysts in a "consensus" forecast also improves
accuracy. Therefore, the results of the later studies demonstrating the supe-
rior accuracy of analyst forecasts over the statistical models tested are more
persuasive.
b. Management Forecasts Versus Models
Fewer studies directly compare management forecasts with statistical
models. Those that have been conducted are consistent with the research
comparing analysts and models, which indicates the inferiority of statistical
models. An early study in 1972 reviewing forecasts by forty-nine companies
and six naive models for one year revealed that the former were generally
more accurate.3° A later study by Ruland involving a longer, four-year
period and forecasts by sixty-five firms supports this position. 30 1 Ruland
utilized a simple regression extrapolation model expected to be suitable for a
large number of investors.3 0 2 Management forecasts were more accurate
than the model in 68% of the instances, which was statistically significant at
the .01 (1%) level. 30 3
A third study by Hagerman and Ruland compared management forecasts
with a larger number of models. The authors analyzed ninety-eight annual
for 50 companies by Value Line analysts in the 1970-1974 period and four variations of the
Box-Jenkins model. The MAPE for the analyst forecast was lower than each of the models for
all of the forecast periods. Id. at 398. The differences were statistically significant at the .01
level for two of the models. Id. at 401, Also, the differences among the forecasts for the entire
period was statistically significant at the .01 level, which supports the finding of the general
superiority of the analyst forecast. See id. at 400-01. But see Imhoff & Pare, supra note 251
(finding no statistically significant difference between analysts and four Box-Jenkins based
models after adjusting for earnings variability).
299. Cragg and Malkiel's study covered forecasts made in only two years, 1962 and 1963.
Elton and Gruber's forecasts were made during a three-year period, 1964 through 1966. Also,
Cragg and Malkiel's study suffered from methodological problems such as the use of a defini-
tion of the earnings variable that was imprecise and not uniform across the forecasts sampled.
300. Copeland & Marioni, Executives Forecasts of Earnings per Share Versus Forecasts of
Naive Models, 45 J. Bus. 497 (1972). The MAPE for the management forecasts was 20.1%,
while the MAPE was 27.9%, 40.3%, and 39.7% for the three annual earnings models. Id. at
505; see also Green & Segall, The Predictive Power of First Quarter Earnings Reports, 40 J. Bus.
44 (1967) (finding management and models to be similar in accuracy). But see Holton, Discus-
sion of the Predictive Power of First Quarter Earnings Reports: A Replication, 4 EMPIRICAL
RES. ACCT.: SELECTED STUDIES 1966, at 37 (1966); Welsh, Discussion of the Predictive Power
of First Quarter Earnings Reports.: A Replication, id. at 40 (criticizing the findings of Green and
Segall).
301. See Ruland, supra note 250 (covering 1970 to 1973). The four years included both
poor and normal economic periods, unlike the Copeland and Marioni study. Id. at 445-46.
302. Id. at 444. The model estimated the forecasted change in earnings as a linear function
of the change in earnings over the prior six years. Id.
303. Id. at 445. Ruland used the Wilcoxon Matched Pairs Signed Ranks Test to determine
the significance level. See supra note 253.
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corporate forecasts for the five-year period 1969 through 1973 with projec-
tions of four models including the no-change model and three simple regres-
sion-based models. 3°4 The results showed that the management forecasts
were more accurate than each of the four models. 30 5 Furthermore, manage-
ments' superior accuracy over each of the models occurred in four of the five
years, illustrating that no particular year dominated the overall results.306
Company forecasts also had fewer large errors than the models. 30 7 These
results confirm those of the other studies.308
Combining the results of the comparative studies demonstrates the general
accuracy advantage of management forecasts over both analysts and extrap-
olative statistical models. This outcome is consistent with the information
content studies that show investors react to management forecast disclosure.
Neither analyst nor model forecasts provide adequate substitutes for man-
agement forecasts. Accuracy should not be the sole criterion for determin-
ing a disclosure policy, but the empirical evidence on the accuracy of
management forecasts relative to other available alternative sources for fore-
casts indicates that shareholders would benefit from increased disclosure.
3. Representativeness of Voluntary Management Forecasts
The above studies of management forecasts all involved voluntary fore-
304. Hagerman & Ruland, The Accuracy of Management Forecasts and Forecasts of Simple
Alternative Models, 31 J. ECON. & Bus. 172, 173 (1979). The four models were: (1) simple
time trend regression; (2) linear time trend adjusted for most recent earnings change; (3) no
change; and (4) regression based on expected change in general corporate profits. Id. at 172-
73.
305. Id. at 175. The accuracy and significance levels varied from .02 to .07 depending on
the model. Id.
306. Id.
307. See id. at 174-75 (tables 1 and 2 illustrate that company error percentages were in the
lower fractiles). Also, the median management forecast error (7.4%) was below that of the
models (13.1%-14.6%). Id.
308. But cf Kodde & Schreuder, Forecasting Corporate Revenue and Profit: Time-Series
Models Versus Management and Analysts, 11 J. Bus. FIN. & ACCT. 381 (1984) (involving
Dutch firms) (reporting no significant difference between management, analyst, and model
forecasts using random walk and exponential smoothing models for 38 firms for 1980); Nichols
& Groomer, A Study of the Relative Accuracy of Executives' Estimates of Earnings, 15 ABACUS
113 (1979) (additive exponential smoothing model was more accurate than management fore-
casts for 87 firms between 1968 and 1970). Both of these studies are limited by the small
sample sizes and the few number of years analyzed. Two other studies comparing manage-
ment forecasts with more sophisticated Box-Jenkins models are equivocal. A study by Lorek,
McDonald, and Patz found that Box-Jenkins forecasts were superior in some instances, but
only for those management forecasts in the least accurate range, with no differences between
the two sources for forecasts considered relatively accurate. See Lorek, McDonald & Patz, A
Comparative Examination of Management Forecasts and Box-Jenkins Forecasts of Earnings, 51
ACCT. REV. 321 (1976). In another study by Imhoff and Pare, management forecasts were
more accurate than four variations of the Box-Jenkins model based on an average rank test and
MAPE. See Imhoff & Pare, supra note 251, at 435. Additionally, these differences were statis-
tically significant at the .05 level or better as to three of the models. Id. at 436. After adjusting
the forecast errors by the standard deviation of the past earnings series, however, no statisti-
cally significant difference resulted among any of the forecast sources and management fore-
casts were only slightly better. Id. The small sample of only 46 forecasts may have
contributed to these conflicting results. In addition to the unclear superiority of Box-Jenkins
models, the complexity of this method and its general inferiority to simpler models makes its
usefulness questionable for public forecasts.
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casts. The possible motivations for voluntary disclosure of earnings fore-
casts are unclear. 30 9 Nonetheless, the explanatory implications derived from
these studies may vary to the extent the disclosures are unrepresentative of
the type of disclosure that would occur under a mandatory system. Abso-
lute resolution of this problem is impossible, but research comparing firms
that do and firms that do not disclose earnings forecasts tends to support
mandatory disclosure in takeover situations.
Since direct comparison of forecasts by disclosure and nondisclosure firms
is impractical, research comparing forecasting firms and nonforecasting
firms has concentrated on several factors believed to influence the ability to
make accurate forecasts. These factors include variability of income, firm
size, and market risk. A study by Imhoff reviewed the variability of earn-
ings, systematic market risk, and the accuracy of analyst forecasts.31 0 Com-
paring a random sample of 100 firms to ninety-two forecast disclosure firms,
he discovered that the mean of the coefficient of variation of four earnings
variables was lower for the disclosure firms. 311 Also, time-series tests of the
earnings variables over an eleven-year period showed disclosure firms had a
smoother earnings history.31 2 Imhoff also reported that the average system-
atic market risk of the disclosure firms exceeded that of the companies in the
Standard & Poor's index.31 3 The study also showed that analyst forecasts
for nondisclosure firms tended to be more variable and less accurate than
both management and analyst forecasts for the disclosure firms.
3 14
A more recent study by Cox supports the general belief that disclosure
and nondisclosure firms differ in certain respects. This study analyzed ap-
proximately 200 pairs of firms with respect to earnings variability, system-
atic market risk, and size. 3 15 Consistent with Imhoff's results, Cox found
that the coefficients of variation of net earnings and earnings per share dif-
fered between the two groups at statistically significant levels of confi-
309. See, e.g., Ajinka & Gift, supra note 220 (suggesting disclosure provides technique for
management to correct existing unrealistic estimates of future earnings in market); Trueman,
Why Do Managers Voluntarily Release Earnings Forecasts?, 8 J. ACCT. & ECON. 53 (1984)
(postulating one motive as managers' desire to inform investors of their ability to anticipate
future changes).
310. Imhoff, supra note 251.
311. Id. at 844. The author defined the coefficient of variation as the standard deviation of
the earnings variable divided by its mean value. The coefficient of variation provides a mea-
sure of the variability of the item over time. The four earnings variables consisted of net
income, net income before extraordinary items, operating income, and earnings per share. Id.
at 842.
312. Id. at 844.
313. Id. at 844-45. The value of this finding has been shown to be questionable. See infra
notes 314-315 and accompanying text. In addition, the ex post stock returns of the disclosure
firms were generally more volatile than the returns of the Standard & Poor's Index for the
1971 to 1974 period.
314. Imhoff, supra note 251, at 846. The variance in the relative prediction error for the
analyst forecasts was statistically significantly higher for the nondisclosure firms compared to
the forecasts by management (at a .01 level) and analysts (at a .05 level) for disclosure firms.
Id. The MAPE was also higher, but not at a statistically significant level, which weakens the
importance of this difference.
315. Cox, Further Evidence on the Representativeness of Management Earnings Forecasts.
60 ACCT. REV. 692 (1985).
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dence. 316 Furthermore, disclosure firms were generally larger than
nondisclosure firms. 317 Contrary to the impression in Imhoff's study, how-
ever, the systematic market risk was not significantly different between the
two groups. 318 Given evidence of the positive relationship between earnings
variability and systematic risk, 319 Cox held the coefficient of variation and
size variables constant when measuring market risk, which resulted in the
more precise finding. Therefore, any differences in risk between the two
groups was already reflected primarily in the differences in earnings
variability.
In a study by Jaggi and Grier of eighty forecast firms and a similar group
of nondisclosure firms, the authors made comparisons of earnings variability
and expected growth rate.320 They compared the expected earnings growth
rates of the two groups based on four statistical models, finding no signifi-
cant difference between them. 321 There was, however, a significant differ-
ence in the variance of actual earnings growth rates over the preceding ten
years, with the forecast group having more stable growth rates.322 Combin-
ing these two elements showed that variability in earnings was the major
factor differentiating the two groups, with no demonstrated difference in un-
expected growth rates.3 23
While these studies consistently demonstrate differences between disclo-
sure and nondisclosure firms as to variability of earnings and size, the effect
316. Id. at 698. The significance levels varied from .035 to .042. Id. No statistically signif-
icant difference in the coefficient of variation existed for operating income before depreciation,
indicating that the variability in earnings was attributable primarily to much lower fixed costs
as opposed to variable costs for the nondisclosure firms. Id.
317. Id. This finding was reliable at a .002 significance level. See also Hagerman & Ruland,
supra note 304, at 177-78 (finding forecast firms to be larger with .01 level of significance).
318. Cox, supra note 315, at 698-99. The null hypothesis of equal betas could not be re-
jected at the .05 level of significance. See also Hagerman & Ruland, supra note 304, at 178
(finding betas close to 1.0 for 69 forecast firms).
319. See, e.g., Beaver, Kettler & Scholes, The Association Between Market Determined and
Accounting Determined Risk Measures, 45 ACCT. REV. 654 (1970); Bowman, The Theoretical
Relationship Between Systematic Market Risk and Financial (Accounting) Variables, 34 J. FIN.
617 (1979). Cox found a statistically significant negative correlation between beta and size,
and a positive correlation between beta and earnings variability. Cox, supra note 315, at 694.
Evidence showed a slight negative association between size and earnings variability, but not at
statistically significant levels. Id.
320. Jaggi & Grier, A Comparative Analysis of Forecast Disclosing and Non-Disclosing
Firms, FIN. MGMT., Summer 1980, at 38. The nondisclosure group was made up of firms
appearing on the COMPUSTAT tape and were selected so as to be similar to the forecast firms
in terms of assets, yearly sales, debt equity ratios, sales asset ratios, rate of return, beta, and
total risk. Id. at 40-41.
321. Id. at 40-41. The four models were: (1) change equal to same dollar amount as previ-
ous year; (2) change equal to same percentage growth as previous year; (3) change equal to
average growth over prior ten years; and (4) no change from previous year. Id. at 39.
322. Id. at 41-42. Statistical significance was at the .05 level.
323. Id. The differences in the two groups as to the existence of a high or low unexpected
growth rate varied among the models. Id. at 42-43. High growth rates existed for both groups
with two models, while both groups had low growth rates for the other two models. These
differences might be due to the weakness of the models. These statistics indicate, however, that
forecast disclosure firms are not necessarily firms that tend to exceed historical earnings pat-
terns. Cf. Penman, supra note 207, at 157 (nondisclosure firms in this study tended to have
relatively poor earnings prospects and low security returns).
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of these factors on forecast accuracy is somewhat uncertain. The research
has produced conflicting evidence. Imhoff found a significant positive asso-
ciation between earnings variability and management forecast errors. 324 He
also found statistically significant lower error variance and generally lower
mean errors in management and analyst forecasts for disclosure firms than
in analyst forecasts for nondisclosure firms. 32 5 In a more recent study, El-
ton, Gruber, and Gultekin analyzed the relationship between analyst fore-
cast error and uncertainty about earnings growth. Using dispersion or the
standard deviation among the analysts' forecasts as a proxy for uncertainty,
they discovered a statistically significant positive relationship between fore-
cast error and uncertainty. 326 A probable cause of analysts' uncertainty is
earnings variability. Barefield and Comiskey have also reported a positive
relationship between analyst earning forecast errors and systematic market
risk, 327 which in turn is positively related to earnings variability. 328
Some evidence to the contrary implies little or no correlation between
forecast accuracy and earnings variability or systematic market risk. For
example, Imhoff reported no significant relationship between forecast accu-
racy and systematic market risk for the disclosure firms in his study.329 Ad-
ditionally, Jaggi and Grier identified different earnings variability for
disclosure and nondisclosure firms of similar size and market risk, but no
statistically significant difference in expected earnings growth. 330 This latter
finding rested on the difference between actual growth rates and projected
growth rates derived from four statistical models. The finding provides
some weak evidence of similarity in the ability of at least these common
models to forecast the earnings of these two groups of firms. This outcome
might have been due, however, to an insufficiently large difference in the
earnings variability of the two groups.33 1
Similarly, contrasting evidence exists on the relationship between firm size
and forecast accuracy. Hagerman and Ruland reported a statistically signifi-
cant association between increasing management forecast accuracy and
larger size.332 But they did not isolate size from other potential causes of
324. See Imhoff, supra note 251, at 844 n. 11, 846.
325. Id. at 846.
326. Elton, Gruber & Gultekin, Professional Expectations. Accuracy and Diagnosis of Er-
rors, 19 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 351, 361-62 (1984).
327. See Barefield & Comiskey, The Association of Forecast Error with Other Risk Meas-
ures, 2 J. Bus. FIN. & ACCT. 315 (1975).
328. See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
329. Imhoff, supra note 251, at 845. This finding is rather dubious given his other findings
of a correlation between earnings variability and nondisclosure analyst forecast errors.
330. See supra notes 321-322 and accompanying text. The selection of firms of similar size
and beta may have resulted in an uncharacteristic sample of nondisclosing firms, which cau-
tions against generalizing the results.
331. The selection of disclosing and nondisclosing firms with similar betas, 1.08 and 1.03,
respectively, supports this possible explanation because of the close association between earn-
ings variability and beta. See supra note 319.
332. See Hagerman & Ruland, supra note 304, at 176-77 (statistical significance at the .01
level). See also Basi, Carey & Twark, supra note 249, at 247. Some possible reasons for greater




differences in forecast accuracy. Also, size was not a dominant factor in
terms of relative forecast accuracy between management and the forecast
models. When analyzing the interaction of size and forecast horizon on ac-
curacy, they discovered that management outperformed the four models for
both large and small companies for short horizon forecasts, but not for small
company, long horizon forecasts. 333 This result suggests that factors other
than size, such as earnings variability, which is not as significant in long-
term as in short-term forecasts, might have influenced their results. Another
recent study of 397 firms between 1977 and 1979 found a statistically signifi-
cant (at a .001 level) inverse or negative relationship between firm size and
analyst forecast accuracy for the sample as a whole.334 This study, however,
also indicated that this inverse relationship between size and analyst forecast
accuracy did not exist for one group of non-NYSE firms in the sample.
335
Meanwhile, a study by Jaggi revealed no significant relationship between
management or analyst forecast errors and increasing firm size. 336 He di-
vided the sample firms into six size categories and found larger mean per-
centage errors in the two smallest and the largest firm groups. 337 This
pattern suggests that Hagerman and Ruland's results may have been biased
by the much larger errors in the smallest firms, while the increasingly larger
firms had less significant differences in accuracy. Although Jaggi found
management forecasts significantly more accurate than analyst forecasts
overall, differences in accuracy between them was statistically significant for
only three of the six size groups. 338 Therefore, no trend of higher accuracy
accompanied larger size.
Although ambiguous, the weight of evidence not surprisingly tends to in-
dicate that higher earnings variability negatively affects forecast accuracy.
The association between firm size alone and forecast accuracy is more dubi-
ous. Furthermore, the research does not reveal the extent of the increased
inaccuracy related to these factors. While the consistent finding of earnings
variability and size differences between disclosure and nondisclosure firms
implies that the latter will probably produce less accurate forecasts, this ef-
fect does not seriously weaken the argument for mandatory disclosure. Ab-
solute forecast accuracy is subsidiary to relative forecast accuracy and
tangential to the main issue, the relevance of management forecasts.
333. Hagerman & Ruland, supra note 304, at 176.
334. Bamber, The Information Content of Annual Earnings Releases. A Trading Volume
Approach, 24 J. ACCT. RES. 40, 53 (1986).
335. Id. at 55. The study segregated the sample by both exchange membership and fiscal
year-end. The group exhibiting no significant relationship between size and forecast accuracy
included those firms traded on the AMEX and OTC with fiscal year-ends of December 31.
336. Jaggi, Further Evidence on the Accuracy of Management Forecasts Vis-d- Vis Analysts'
Forecasts, 55 ACCT. REV. 96 (1980); see also Daily, supra note 246, at 692 (finding no relation-
ship between management forecast accuracy and size of firm based on both revenue and net
income); Rothe, Effectiveness of Sales Forecasting Methods, 7 INDUS. MKTG. MGMT. 114, 117
(1978) (sales forecasting error did not vary inversely with firm size for firms surveyed).
337. Jaggi, supra note 336, at 100. The smallest errors occurred in the third and fifth larg-
est size categories.




Moreover, the earnings variability and size differences between the two
groups of firms militates in favor of mandatory disclosure. First, earnings
variability would have a similar impact on the accuracy of management and
analyst forecasts; and the variability probably would have a lesser negative
effect on management's forecasting ability because of management's greater
knowledge of the company's business. Second, management forecasts would
tend to lessen the uncertainty associated with firms with volatile earnings,
thereby at least narrowing the range of investors' earnings expectations.
4. Firm Size and the Value of Information
Firm size also is associated with the value of new information to investors.
Typically, the amount of public information available is related to the size of
a firm. Factors responsible for this phenomenon include production of infor-
mation within the firm and incentives for external producers. Larger firms
have greater resources to produce financial information. 339 Financial ana-
lysts and business writers concentrate on larger firms, which have more ex-
tensive investor interest, and thus provide a more lucrative return on
information production.3 40 Greater production and dissemination of infor-
mation increases investors' ability to evaluate independently firms and stock
values, so that additional disclosures by company management become mar-
ginally less important. 34' Conversely, where less public information about a
firm exists, disclosures by management take on heightened importance.
For instance, in a study of NYSE and Over-the-Counter (OTC) firms,
Grant demonstrated that the information content of company disclosures is
related to the amount of existing public information available on the firm.342
The OTC firms had fewer published interim news items than the NYSE
firms. 343 Grant found that the stock market reacted much more strongly to
annual earnings announcements by the OTC companies than the NYSE
companies. 344 The differences between the information content measures of
the two groups during the week of the announcement was statistically signif-
339. See, e.g., Alchian, Information Costs Pricing and Resources Unemployment, 7 W.
EcON. J. 109 (1969).
340. See, e.g., Stern & Norby, Investment Research and Market Structure: Today and To-
morrow, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Jan.-Feb. 1972, at 24.
341. See, e.g., Gonedes, Corporate Signaling, External Accounting and Capital Market
Equilibrium: Evidence on Dividends, Income, and Extraordinary Items, 16 J. ACCT. RES. 26,
29 (1978). This does not mean that management disclosures on items for which alternative
sources exist are totally unimportant because this information may possess superior reliability
or incremental informational value. See, e.g., Foster & Vickrey, The Incremental Information
Content of the 10-K, 53 ACCT. REV. 921 (1978). Company disclosures may also have a cost
advantagecompared to generation of the same information by external sources. All of these
factors are relevant to disclosure of management forecasts.
342. Grant, Market Implications of Differential Amounts of Interim Information, 18 J.
ACCT. RES. 255, 267 (1980). The sample included 211 OTC and 101 NYSE firms. Id. at 259.
343. Id. at 256-57.
344. Id. at 262-63. Both the mean (2.596) and the median (1.066) information content
measures based on abnormal price variability for the OTC firms during the week of the earn-
ings announcement exceeded those (mean of 1.282, median of .454) of the NYSE firms. Id.
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icant at a .001 level. 345 Also, the study indicated some relationship between
the number of published news items and the size of the market reaction to
the announcements. 346
Two more recent studies provide even stronger evidence that information
content of earnings disclosure is associated with the size of the firm. One
study by Zeghal involving over 1,400 companies indicated an inverse rela-
tionship between firm size and the informational content of company an-
nouncements. 347 He analyzed the information value based on "adjusted
returns" and on trading volume. 348 After categorizing the sample into
small, medium, and large firms based on market value, Zeghal found the
informational value of the announcements based on adjusted returns differed
significantly for each category. 349 In addition, the informational value of the
announcements increased as the size of the company decreased. 350
A second study by Atiase of earnings announcements involving 200 firms
also revealed an inverse relationship between stock market reaction and firm
size. Analyzing weekly abnormal returns surrounding release of the earn-
ings announcements relative to average returns during the predisclosure pe-
riod, Atiase found stock price movements more than two times above
average during the week of disclosure for the smaller firms. 351 In addition,
345. Id. at 265. The median of the information content measure for the OTC firms was
significantly greater than for the NYSE firms. Id.
346. See id. at 266.
347. Zeghal, Firm Size and the Informational Content of Financial Statements, 19 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 299 (1984). The study reviewed 16,119 announcements of quar-
terly and annual financial statements by 1,402 companies in 200 industry categories for 1973 to
1975. Id. at 301.
348. "Adjusted return" was defined as the difference between a security's actual return and
the return on a comparison portfolio. Zeghal used a variance measurement methodology
rather than the typical capital asset market risk-return methodology. This approach compen-
sates for some of the problems associated with the capital asset pricing model, especially re-
lated to firm size. See id. at 302, 304; Brown, Kleidon & Marsh, New Evidence on the Nature
of Size-Related Anomalies in Stock Prices, 12 J. FIN. ECON. 33 (1983) (finding anomalous
excess market returns for smaller firms using Capital Asset Pricing Model).
349. Zeghal, supra note 347, at 306. The significance level was 0.000, indicating virtually
100% certainty that the null hypothesis of no informational value could be rejected. See also
Firth, The Relative Information Content of the Release of Financial Results Data by Firms, 19
J. AccT. RES. 521, 528 (1981) (finding inverse relationship between size and information con-
tent of company announcements for English firms).
350. Zeghal, supra note 347, at 306; see also Collins, Kothari & Rayburn, Firm Size and the
Information Content of Prices with Respect to Earnings, 9 J. ACCT. & ECON. 111 (1987) (earn-
ings announcements have greater effect on prices of small firms because less public information
available than for large firms).
351. Atiase, Predisclosure Information, Firm Capitalization, and Security Price Behavior
Around Earnings Announcements, 23 J. ACCT. RES. 21 (1985). The author evaluated abnor-
mal price movements according to an indexed variance base for both the 104-week period prior
to fiscal year-end, and a 26-week period from the end of the fiscal year to the beginning of the
earnings announcement week. The sample was partitioned into equal numbers of large and
small firms based on the size of capitalized equity values. The 100 small firms consisted of 50
OTC and 50 NYSE and AMEX firms. The 104-week price movement for the small firms was
222% above average, while the 26-week price movement was 137% above average. These
results were statistically significant at a .005 level of confidence. Id. at 29-30. The OTC firms
experienced the largest market reaction-104-week (284% above average) and 26-week (194%
above average)-suggesting the earnings announcement contained more information content
for these firms, probably due to less predisclosure financial information concerning them.
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abnormal returns were pervasive, occurring for 89% of the smaller firms.3 52
More importantly, a statistically significant (at a .0001 level) negative or in-
verse association between stock price revaluation and firm size existed, with
larger abnormal return variance as firm size grew smaller. 35 3 The careful
methodologies used by Zeghal and Atiase, combined with the high statistical
confidence levels, furnish strong evidence supporting their findings. These
price impact studies establish that the information content of company dis-
closure varies inversely with the amount of public information and size of a
firm.
In addition to the price impact studies, recent research on trading volume
indicates that earnings announcements contain information content that is
related to firm size. Consistent with the price reaction, 'Zeghal found a sig-
nificantly larger volume of trading during the announcement period for
smaller firms. 35 4 Two other recent studies by Bamber support this view.
The first study of approximately 1,200 annual earnings announcements re-
vealed that trading volume increased significantly during the three-day pe-
riod surrounding the announcement over the median volume for the year.355
Moreover, trading volume related inversely to firm size with proportionately
greater abnormal volume for the smaller companies.356 This differential
market reaction can be attributed to the greater surprise value of earnings
announcements for smaller firms for which less public information is
available. 357
The second study by Bamber focused on the impact on the magnitude and
352. Id. at 32-33, table 6. Only 20% of the large firms experienced abnormal returns dur-
ing the announcement week, which indicates that information concerning the earnings report
had already been impounded into the security price. This is consistent with the view that more
information affecting stock prices exists for larger firms with a greater investor following and is
incorporated into stock prices more quickly. See also Freeman, The Association Between Ac-
counting Earnings and Security Returns for Large and Small Firms, 9 J. ACCT. & ECON. 195
(1987) (results consistent with Atiase's hypothesis).
353. Atiase, supra note 351, at 33-34. These results were statistically significant utilizing
both parametric and nonparametric tests, Id.; see also Freeman, supra note 352, at 220-26
(cumulative abnormal returns were statistically significantly greater in both positive trend and
in final month of earnings announcement for small firms than large firms).
354. Zeghal, supra note 347, at 306; see also Beaver, The Information Content of Annual
Earnings Announcements, 6 J. ACCT. RES. 67 (Supp. 1968); Morse, Price and Trading Volume
Reaction Surrounding Earnings Announcements: A Closer Examination, 19 J. AccT. RES. 374
(1981).
355. Bamber, supra note 334, at 48. The author's analysis included two types of measure-
ment procedures to determine abnormal trading volume. One type used the median trading
volume for the year as the normal expectation variable; the second type used the percentage of
shares traded adjusted by a market index utilizing a linear regression model. The primary
results were essentially the same for both approaches with only minor differences in specific
areas. The author also found that trading volume was positively correlated with the absolute
value of unexpected earnings using both analyst forecasts and the no-change random walk
model to determine the value of the "unexpected" earnings component. Id. at 49-50.
356. Id. at 51-52. The median trading volume measurement metric indicated a stronger
correlation than did the market adjusted volume metric. Also, the inverse correlation was
most significant for NYSE firms not having December 31 fiscal year-ends and less pronounced
for the non-NYSE firms. Id.
357. Another potential cause for the surprise value could be the greater difficulty in accu-
rately forecasting earnings for small firms because of greater variability in their earnings series.
See Bamber, supra note 334, at 51-52 (finding correlation between size and forecast errors of
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duration of trading volume for quarterly earnings announcements. The re-
suits from this study were consistent with those of the prior study, with the
magnitude of trading volume being inversely related to firm size for each of
the first three quarterly announcements. 358 Further, trading volume was
positively correlated with the amount of the unexpected earnings based on
both analyst and a seasonal random walk model's forecasts. 359 This study
also showed that the duration of trading volume tended to be related to firm
size and the value of unexpected earnings. Generally, significant trading vol-
ume extended for several days beyond the day of the earnings announcement
for the smaller firms and firms with higher unexpected earnings.36° This
result suggests that earnings announcements were more informative for
small firms that generated less public and private information and for firms
whose earnings were more difficult to predict. The latter fact was further
evidenced by the finding that the magnitude and duration of trading volume
was positively associated with the value of unexpected earnings even when
firm size was held constant. 361 These trading volume studies furnish addi-
tional support that corporate financial disclosures provide useful information
for investors, especially concerning smaller firms.
The above research demonstrates a positive association between firm size
and the value of disclosure of actual earnings. Other research by Cox indi-
cates that this relationship also exists for prospective information. In a re-
view of management forecasts, Cox found a statistically significant positive
correlation between the information content of company forecasts as shown
through abnormal returns, and both firm size and earnings variability. 362 In
addition, the research indicated some evidence that the information content
of the forecasts was not significantly dependant on forecast horizon.363 This
outcome suggests that although longer horizon projections tend to be more
inaccurate, longer term company forecasts still provide valuable information
to investors. Moreover, the positive association between earnings variability
and the information content of the management forecasts illustrates that ac-
curacy is not the determinant factor in the value of this information to inves-
tors, despite greater inaccuracy associated with increased variability. This
study provides direct evidence that the differences between disclosure and
random walk model). This factor is likely to be less influential than the absence of information
factor.
358. Bamber, Unexpected Earnings, Firm Size, and Trading Volume Around Quarterly
Earnings Announcements, 62 ACCT. REV. 510, 520-21 (1987); see also Kiger, An Empirical
Investigation of NYSE Volume and Price Reactions to the Announcement of Quarterly Earn-
ings, 10 J. ACCT. RES. 113 (1972) (economic models demonstrate impact of release of interim
reports on price and volume of NYSE stocks traded).
359. Bamber, supra note 358, at 518-20.
360. Id. at 521-24.
361. See id. at 524-28.
362. Cox, Earnings Variability, Firm Size, and the Information Content in Management
Forecasts of Annual Earnings, 6 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL'Y 139, 149 (1987) (involving 284 fore-
casts between 1969 and 1976). The author found statistically significant abnormal stock re-
turns for the two days surrounding the announcement of the forecasts. No similar significant
correlation existed as to systematic market risk (beta). Id.
363. Id. at 150-51. The study showed no statistically significant correlation between fore-
cast horizon and the size of the abnormal market returns.
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nondisclosure firms should lead to enhanced information content for fore-
casts of the latter, and supports the validity of other research on the informa-
tion content of management forecasts that utilized voluntary company
projections.
In summary, management forecasts for nondisclosure firms are likely to
be less accurate, but the degree of greater inaccuracy is unknown. The rela-
tive accuracy of management forecasts compared to available alternative
sources probably would not differ. The smaller size of nondisclosure firms
suggests fewer analyst forecasts and less public financial information for
these firms. Empirical research illustrates that the market's reaction to cor-
porate disclosure is a function of firm size, primarily due to the generation of
less public information about smaller firms. As a result, management fore-
casts would tend to have even more information content and be more valua-
ble to shareholders of smaller firms.
The limited available research on the size of takeover targets tends to
show that a substantial majority are small to medium based on market value
of common stock. For instance, approximately two-thirds of all the tender
offers between 1981 and 1986 involved targets of less than $100 million.364
The average size for targets of any-or-all tender offers between 1981 and
1983 was $113.7 million, with 67% of the firms' value being less than $80
million. 365 Similarly, 60% of the targets of partial offers were valued at less
than $80 million. 366 A review of merger and acquisition activity for 1984
through 1987 reveals that over 50% of the acquisitions during this period
involved a purchase price of $25 million or less, while 75% involved
purchases of $50 million or less.367 Furthermore, those acquisitions in the
lowest priced category, involving purchases valued at between $1 million
and $5 million, constituted either the largest or second largest number of
mergers and acquisitions for the 1984 to 1987 period. 368 This evidence indi-
364. See Sec. Exchange Act Release No. 2,1079, supra note 10, at 86,931 (discussing tender
offers occurring between 1981 and 1983). The percentage of total tender offers below the $100
million level was 75% for 1984, see Austin & Bernard, Tender Offer Update: 1985, MERGERS
& AcQUISITIONS, Spring 1985, at 67, 67; the percentage was 64% for 1985, see Tender Offer
Update: 1986, supra note 9, at 55; and the percentage was 68% for 1986, see Tender Offer
Update. 1987, supra note 8, at 49.
365. See Sec. Exchange Act Release No. 21,079, supra note 10, at 86,931, 86,932. Any-or-
all offers constituted 62% of all tender offers in this period. Firms valued at below approxi-
mately $100 million can be considered small to medium size companies. See, e.g., Zeghal,
supra note 347, at 306, where firms of less than $20 million were categorized as small, and
firms between $20 million and $130 million were classified as medium.
366. See Sec. Exchange Act Release No. 21,079, supra note 10, at 86,932.
367. In 1984 and 1985, three-fourths of the reported mergers were valued at less than $50
million and two-thirds were below $25 million. See A Lively Market in Small Deals, supra note
10, at 18 (1984 statistics); 1985 Profile, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, May-June 1986, at 45, 48
(1985 statistics). Acquisitions valued at $25 million and below were involved in approximately
one-half of all the mergers in 1986 and 1987. See Prominence of Small Deals, MERGERS &
ACQuISITIONS, May-June 1988, at 11, 11. Takeovers valued at $50 million or less made up
approximately two-thirds of all acquisitions occurring in 1986 and 1987. Id.
368. In 1984 and 1985, this group made up the largest category of mergers. See A Lively
Market in Small Deals, supra note 10, at 18 (1984 acquisitions); 1985 Profile, supra note 367,
at 48 (1985 acquisitions). In 1986 and 1987, takeovers valued in this range were the second
most frequent type of purchase. See Prominence of Small Deals, supra note 367, at 11. In
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cates that mergers and tender offers often involve target firms for which
company forecasts will be especially valuable because of the lack of alterna-
tive public information.
IV. OBJECTIONS TO MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
A. Potential for Misleading Investors
The most common argument against mandatory disclosure of earnings
forecasts is the potential for misleading investors. 369 The SEC and the
courts generally have focused on this issue with regard to investors' giving
company forecasts undue credibility. 370 Critics contend that mandatory dis-
closure of forecasts would produce harmful information because providing
misleading or inaccurate information to shareholders could lead to improper
allocation of resources.371 Additionally, some contend that investor confu-
sion about whether a forecast was possibly too optimistic or pessimistic
would decrease its value. 372
Underlying this objection is a belief that investors cannot estimate the
quality of forecast information and are therefore likely to attach excessive
credibility to it.373 First, this view exaggerates the naivet6 of investors who
deal regularly with prospective financial information. 374 In addition, the
SEC's adoption of the "differential disclosure" approach, whereby disclo-
sures are designed to serve both sophisticated and naive investors, attempts
to promote full disclosure even though some information might confuse un-
sophisticated investors. 375 Reflecting this approach, the 1977 Advisory
addition, just under 50% of all mergers in 1984 and 1985 involved purchases valued at $10
million or less. See A Lively Market in Small Deals, supra note 10, at 18; 1985 Profile, supra
note 10, at 48. Meanwhile, mergers valued at less than $10 million constituted approximately
30% and 32% of all mergers in 1986 and 1987, respectively. See Prominence of Small Deals,
supra note 367, at 11.
369. See, e.g., Asebrook & Carmichael, supra note 246, at 41 (analysts, accountants and
executives expressed concern about investors misinterpreting forecasts); Carpenter & Daily,
Controllers and CPA's: Two Views of Published Forecasts, Bus. HORIZONS, Aug. 1974, at 73,
76-78 (executives surveyed felt users would misinterpret forecast information); Stewart, supra
note 169, at 83 (investors placing too much faith in forecasts was most serious problem of
public disclosure). But see Benjamin & Strawser, supra note 246, at 81 (executives much more
pessimistic about investor confusion than analysts surveyed).
370. See supra notes 18-19, 68-69 and accompanying text; cf Del Noce v. Delyar Corp.,
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,670, at 90,293 n.7 (average investor
lacks expertise to analyze appraisal information properly).
371. See, e.g, Note, Mandatory Disclosure of Corporate Projections and Goals of Securities
Regulation, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1525, 1534 (1981) [hereinafter Mandatory Disclosure] (pub-
lished forecasts could reduce investors ability to evaluate competing investment opportunities
accurately); see also Stewart, supra note 169, at 79 (management forecasting might increase
market volatility, which would interfere with resource allocation).
372. Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 371, at 1536.
373. See Del Noce, supra note 370, at 90, 293 n.7.
374. See Sec. Act Release No. 5,362, supra note 23, at 82,667; FAF STUDY ON DISCLO-
SURE, supra note 232, at 36 (fear of misleading investors has been grossly exaggerated); RE-
PORT ON DISCLOSURE, supra note 13, at 273-74, 300-01 (presenting empirical evidence that
investors are not in large part unsophisticated); Schneider, supra note 13, at 269.
375. See Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 565-66 (E.D.N.Y.
1971); Proposed Amendments to Regulation S-X Providing for Disclosure of Significant Ac-
counting Policies, Sec. Act Release No. 5,427, [1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1988]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
Committee on Disclosure advocated a disclosure policy based on a "reason-
ably knowledgeable investor" model, which included forecasts, and rejected
the arguments based on investor confusion. 376 Moreover, potential investor
confusion can be partially alleviated by additional disclosure accompanying
the forecast, such as a cautionary statement on the tentative nature of projec-
tions, a description of the underlying assumptions, and information on the
extent of uncertainty in the forecast. 377 The SEC has abandoned the pater-
nalistic approach of protecting the uninformed investor because this ap-
proach represents an unrealistic view of the marketplace, which now has
professional advisors filtering information for investors.378
A second aspect of the argument that investors could be misled is a pessi-
mistic view of management forecast accuracy. This view originated in early
studies evaluating absolute forecast accuracy based on the concept that error
rates above 10 to 15% rendered the forecast potentially misleading. 379 Such
an approach ignores the more important issue of the relative accuracy of
management forecasts. Empirical evidence supports the view that manage-
ment forecasts tend to be more accurate than alternative sources such as
analysts and statistical models. 380 Additionally, stock market reaction to
public disclosure of forecasts provides a signal for shareholders as to the
value of the forecast information as judged by the market as a whole. As a
result, claims that investors will be misled by forecasts that are exceedingly
inaccurate or so inaccurate as to be immaterial are highly questionable.
Moreover, mandatory disclosure should subject forecasts to greater scrutiny,
thereby enhancing reliability and accuracy.381
B. Costs of Mandatory Disclosure Policy
A balanced analysis of imposing disclosure obligations on corporations
requires consideration of the potential costs of the proposal. Mandatory
forecast disclosure would probably result in some increased financial ex-
penditures by corporations, but several factors limit the extent of the addi-
79,519 at 83,242 (Oct. 4, 1973) (explaining differential disclosure); WHEAT REPORT, supra
note 19, at 10.
376. See REPORT ON DISCLOSURE, supra note 13, at D-9; Sommer, supra note 35, at 50.
377. The courts have recognized cautionary statements as a method of reducing undue
reliance by investors. See South Coast Serv. Corp. v. Santa Anna Valley Irrigation Co., 669
F.2d 1265, 1269 (9th Cir. 1982); Alaska Interstate Co. v. McMillian, 402 F. Supp. 532, 573 (D.
Del. 1975).
378. See WHEAT REPORT, supra note 19, at 51-54; Fiflis, supra note 18, at 105-07.
379. See, e.g., A. T. KEARNEY, INC. & SIDLEY & AUSTIN, PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF BuSI-
NESS FORECASTS 27 (1973) [hereinafter KEARNEY, INC., PUBLIC DISCLOSURE]; (Financial
Executive Research Foundation study suggesting that an error rate above 15% rendered a
forecast "unreasonable") Daily, supra note 246, at 687-88.
380. See supra text accompanying notes 247-274.
381. See, e.g., REPORT ON DISCLOSURE, supra note 13, at D-15 (formal publication of
projections likely to cause firms to exercise greater care in their preparation); Fiflis, supra note
18, at 119 (better to have projections in filed documents receiving SEC review); New Ap-
proaches to Disclosure in Registered Security Offerings-A Panel Discussion, 28 Bus. L. 505,
508 (1973) (Carl W. Schneider expressed opinion that inclusion of soft information in SEC
filings would increase report's reliability); Note, Corporate and Insider Disclosure of Asset Ap-
praisals Under Rules lob-5 and 14a-9, 61 B.U.L. REV. 683, 701 (1981).
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tional costs. Furthermore, corporate disclosure of forecasts is the most
efficient method for providing this information to shareholders.
The vast majority of corporations produce internal budgets. 382 Indeed,
earnings and other financial projections are commonly prepared internally
by most companies as a regular business practice. 383 Existing SEC regula-
tions require reporting companies to collect much of the historical firm-spe-
cific data used in forecasting. Many companies also gather general industry
and economic information for planning purposes. In addition, the advent of
computers has expanded the ability of companies to store and retrieve infor-
mation at a much lower cost. More importantly, target companies often
develop financial evaluations of the firm when confronted with a takeover.
Some courts have virtually required the boards of directors of target compa-
nies to consult firm valuation reports, which include prospective informa-
tion, as a part of their duty of due care under state law. 384 The cost of
dissemination will often be small because target companies already must
publish or send shareholders a statement on the tender offer. Additionally,
shareholders expect some information from management. 385 As a result,
any additional preparation costs related to mandatory disclosure of forecasts
should not be significant.
Public disclosure of management forecasts will be more cost efficient be-
cause a single entity with superior access to data can produce a forecast at
lower cost than can individual investors. A theoretical study shows that
public disclosure can result in lower expense for shareholders because, in the
absence of public disclosure, investors would seek costly information; if in-
formation were publicly disclosed, all investors would abstain from generat-
ing the information. 386 Based on a model assuming competitive traders with
constant risk aversion preferences, the author demonstrates that public dis-
closure of information increases the ex ante utility of all traders for two main
reasons: (1) the savings of resources that companies would otherwise devote
to information production for individual investors, and (2) improved risk
sharing because public disclosure brings together traders' beliefs and reduces
382. See Gray, Proposal for Systematic Disclosure of Corporate Forecasts, FIN. ANALYSTS
J., Jan.-Feb. 1973, at 64, 71; Kripke, supra note 20, at 1197.
383. See KEARNEY, INC., PUBLIC DISCLOSURE, supra note 379, at 11 (97% of companies
surveyed prepared forecasts of earnings, expenses, and sales); Ellingsen & Rubin, Audition
Developments, 1 J. ACCT., AUDITING & FIN. 76, 76 (N.S. 1986) ("The use of prospective
financial statements has increased dramatically in recent years, and their use is quickly becom-
ing an accepted part of life for many companies .... "); F. LEES, supra note 174, at 7, 12 (397
of 405 companies surveyed prepared internal forecasts); cf. Rothe, supra note 336, at 115 (fore-
casting rated as important or very important activity by 95% of firms in study).
384. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 274-76 (2d
Cir. 1986); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 876 (Del. 1985).
385. See rule 14e-2a, (17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2a (1988)) (target company to give statement
recommending acceptance or rejection, or expressing no opinion, or stating unable to take
position, within 10 days of offer); rule 14d-9f (17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9f (1988)) (requiring filing
of schedule 14d-9 in conjunction with compliance with rule 14e-2); see also Note, A Proposal
for Affirmative Disclosure by Target Management During Tender Offers, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
190, 215-16 (1975) (congressional policy of Williams Act compels disclosure for shareholder's
benefit).
386. Diamond, Optimal Release of Information By Firms, 40 J. FIN. 1071, 1073 (1985).
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the degree of speculative positions taken by informed traders.38 7
The value of information to investors depends on its information content
both absolutely and relative to its possession by other investors. For exam-
ple, if the information is sufficiently costly and the quality of prior informa-
tion is high such that it is not cost effective to acquire new information, then
investors will not acquire it even if that would give an investor some infor-
mational advantage over other investors. Likewise, if the cost of new infor-
mation and the quality of prior information are low enough to justify
acquiring the new information, then each investor will do so, even if all other
investors also acquire it, in order to prevent the investor from being at an
informational disadvantage. Between these two extremes, the number of in-
vestors acquiring the information will adjust according to a cost-benefit
equilibrium. 3s8
The public release of information will affect the private information deci-
sions of investors as a whole only if they know whether or not the corpora-
tion will disclose the information. Therefore, a mandatory disclosure policy
is preferred to the current voluntary policy, which severely limits the benefi-
cial elimination of duplicative information production by investors. Gener-
ally, the firm has a cost advantage over investors in producing information
about itself because of its superior access to and broader range of data.
Comparing the costs of a firm to that of all investors in the aggregate in
producing the same information reveals a large cost advantage for the firm.
In effect, the firm's cost of producing the information, which would elimi-
nate private information acquisition, becomes negligible on an individual in-
vestor scale. 389 As a result, releasing information becomes more desirable
because all investors will have a higher expected utility from this policy as
opposed to nondisclosure.
In addition to cost savings, the homogenization of information improves
risk sharing by reducing the speculative positions of traders who would
otherwise possess privately acquired information. Traders could trade away
from the risk allocation position based on the unequal possession of private
information because of the uncertainty in the information content of the
stock price.390 This improved risk sharing would enhance the efficient allo-
cation of capital resources.
Applying this analysis to the issue of management financial forecasts mili-
tates in favor of mandatory disclosure. Only if the information has a very
387. Id. at 1073.
388. Id. at 1078.
389. Id. at 1081-82.
The value of public release is that it homogenizes information and eliminates the
use of resources to produce information. All traders are made better off: ....
A key to this unanimity is the fact that the firm needs to produce much less
information than the aggregate of all traders, implying that the cost of the firm
producing the information is negligible, and no relevant questions of how the
costs are shared across investors arise.
Id. at 1083.
390. Id. at 1084. Public disclosure would reduce the variability of the market price by
equalizing access to the information.
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low cost per unit of precision and public disclosure would not reduce the
number of investors willing to expend resources for private acquisition,
would public disclosure not be cost effective. Forecast information is very
important to investors who have demonstrated a willingness to expend a
large amount of resources to acquire it. The desire for future-oriented infor-
mation is especially high in tender offer situations where investors must
make a quick decision on disposal of their shares. Firms have cost advan-
tages in generating forecasts partially through greater access to information.
These benefits would particularly favor smaller firms with less existing pub-
lic information. Mandatory disclosure of forecasts would enhance share-
holders' information acquisition and eliminate duplication. Improved risk
sharing in takeover situations would increase efficient utilization of capital
resources in the economy. As a result, cost considerations do not outweigh
the benefits of mandatory public disclosure of financial forecasts. 391
V. FORECASTS IN TAKEOVERS IN ENGLAND
A. Forecasts Recognized as Relevant
In England, takeover practices have been scrutinized since the early
1960s. An early attempt at control consisted of indirect regulation through
rules applicable to licensed securities dealers (Licensed Dealer Rules), 392
which prescribed the content of offer documents. The Licensed Dealer
Rules proved to be ineffective largely because the majority of takeovers were
handled by intermediaries such as merchant banks that were not subject to
these rules. 393 In 1959, the Governor of the Bank of England established a
body consisting of leading private London city institutions to study good
business practices in the conduct of mergers and takeovers. After an active
period of merger activity, they created the Panel on Take-overs and Mergers
to propose rules and oversee takeovers. In 1968, the Panel issued The Code
on Take-Overs and Mergers (City Code),394 which was designed to regulate
391. But see Abdelsamad & Gilbreath, supra note 230, at 29 (executives surveyed felt bene-
fits of publishing earnings forecasts were less than costs); Dean, supra note 160, at 522 (costs of
publishing forecasts may outweigh any public benefit); Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 371,
at 1539 (proponents of mandatory forecasting overestimate benefits and underestimate costs).
392. The Licensed Securities Dealers (Conduct of Business) Rules 1960, STAT. INST. 1960,
No. 1216, reprinted in M. WEINBERG, M. BLANK & A. GREYSTOKE, WEINBERG AND BLANK
ON TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS 717-26 (1979) (Appendix C). The Department (then Board)
of Trade promulgated these rules, which set out schedules I and II, detailing information to be
included in the offer document such as the specific terms of the offer. A third schedule (sched-
ule III) required disclosure of information involving potential conflicts of interest in relation to
a recommendation by the target board. Schedule 111(8) did require target management to
delineate any material change in the financial prospects of the target, but this was the only
provision involving prospective information. Some other general criminal anti-fraud statutes
such as The Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, ch. 45, section 13(1),
do prohibit intentionally or recklessly misleading forecasts in securities dealings.
393. See P. BEGG, CORPORATE ACQUISITION AND MERGERS 128 (1985).
394. THE CITY CODE ON TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS (Council for the Securities Indus-
try, 5th rev. ed. 1981 & 6th rev. ed. 1985) [hereinafter CITY CODE]. Since 1978, the Panel has
been incorporated as a member of the Council for the Securities Industry, which was created
to coordinate the efforts of the various private institutions involved with securities matters.
Representatives from institutions that make up the membership of the Panel include in part:
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merger practices. The City Code was more comprehensive than the Li-
censed Dealer Rules and applied to all public companies. As a result, in
1983, the Licensed Dealer Rules were revised, substantially eliminating the
provisions dealing with takeovers. 395 This left the City Code as the primary
regulatory reference. As a private organization, the Panel relies on extrale-
gal enforcement mechanisms such as adverse publicity and industry peer
pressure.396
From its inception, the Panel has recognized that earnings (profit) fore-
casts contain information relevant to shareholders' decisions in takeover sit-
uations. The Panel stated that it believes that directors' opinions on the
immediate future profitability of a company constitute the most important
factor in deciding whether to invest or disinvest in the company.397 In its
1971 Annual Report, the Panel emphasized the importance of prospective
information to shareholders. 398 In contrast to the then prevailing practice in
the United States forbidding projections, the Panel has encouraged forecasts
as being consistent with the general policy that "shareholders must be put in
possession of all the facts necessary for the formation of an informed judg-
ment as to the merits and demerits of an offer."' 399 Given the importance of
The Stock Exchange, The Association of British Insurers, The Institute of Chartered Account-
ants in England and Wales, The Confederation of British Industry, The Issuing Houses Asso-
ciation, and The National Association of Pension Trusts. Other associations such as The
National Association of Security Dealers, Investment Managers, and the Consultative Com-
mittee of Accounting Bodies also support the Panel and City Code. See CITY CODE introduc-
tion, constitution (a). The City Code was revised in 1985, resulting in modifications in its
format, but the substance was not altered. See Morse, The New City Code, 1985 J. Bus. L. 277.
395. The Licensed Dealers (Conduct of Business) Rules 1983, STAT. INST. 1983, No. 585.
The revised rules do provide that an offer document must disclose "sufficient information
about the investment to provide a person.., with an adequate and reasonable basis for decid-
ing whether or not, or on what terms, to accept the offer ...." Id. rule 9 (1)(a). In addition,
rule 27 requires licensed dealers to comply with any "generally accepted standards as to what
constitutes good market practice," which would include the City Code. Furthermore, as to
friendly takeovers involving private companies, the Department of Trade has issued a General
Permission exempting takeover documents from the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act
1958 (section 14), which prohibits distribution of certain documents where full and fair disclo-
sure has occurred. The documents must state that reasonable care has been used and no mate-
rial facts have been omitted. Also, directors must obtain independent legal advice concerning
the transaction, and the tenor of that advice must be made available to shareholders. See J.
FARRAR, COMPANY LAW 516 (1985).
396. See Demott, Current Issues in Tender Offer Regulation: Lessons from the British, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. 945, 955 (1983). Some commentatores have criticized this lack of legal au-
thority. See, e.g., P. DAVIES, THE REGULATION OF TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS 45 (1976).
The criticism is concentrated more on this aspect of the British system than the content of the
rules. Demott, supra, at 955.
397. Panel Report for Year Ended March 31, 1970, quoted in Damant, A Note on Practice
In the United Kingdom: Financial Forecasting by Companies, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Sept.-Oct.
1972, at 44, 45; see also A. JOHNSTON, THE CITY TAKE-OVER CODE 233 (1980).
398. See Panel Report on the Year Ended 31st March 1971, quoted in Grieves, English
Profit Forecasts, 5 REV. SEC. REG. 919, 922 (1972), in which the Panel stated, "[Riesponsible
profit forecasts are a vital element in shareholders' assessment of the worth of equity invest-
ments." See also M. WEINBERG, M. BLANK & A. GREYSTOKE, supra note 392, at 275-76.
399. CITY CODE, rule 15(1) (1981 ed.); see A. JOHNSTON, supra note 397, at 113. See also




forecasts, the British believe that the absence of regulation results in a
greater danger of circulation of suspect forecast information.
B. Provisions for Enhancing Reliability
In order to protect shareholders, the City Code requires that forecasts be
reviewed by third-party consultants and be accompanied by a discussion of
assumptions.4° ° These provisions attempted to prevent misleading forecasts,
yet not inhibit distribution of relevant information. 4° 1 In recognition of the
importance attached to prospective information, forecasts released prior to
the commencement of an offer fall within the City Code, and companies
must again release the forecasts in the takeover documents, along with the
400. See CITY CODE, rules 28.2, 28.3, 28.4 (former rule 16(2)). Provisions dealing with
profit forecasts now appear in rule 28 and the accompanying notes, whereas, prior to the revi-
sion in 1985, they appeared in rules 15 and 16 and practice notes 6 and 7. These rules state in
part:
Rule 28.2 The Assumptions
(a) When profit forecasts appear in any document addressed to shareholders
in connection with an offer, the assumptions, including the commercial assump-
tions, upon which the directors have based their profit forecasts, must be stated
in the document.
(b) When, after an offer document has been posted, a profit forecast is given
in a press announcement, any assumptions on which the forecast is based should
be included in the announcement.
Rule 28.3 Reports Required in Connection with Profit Forecasts
(b) [T]he accounting policies and calculations for the forecasts must be ex-
amined and reported on by the auditors or consultant accountants. Any finan-
cial advisor mentioned in the document must also report on the forecasts.
Rule 28.4 Publication of Reports and Consent Letters
Where an offer document has been posted, the reports must be included in
the document containing the forecast or, where the forecast has been made in a
press announcement, in a circular which must be sent to shareholders with a
minimum of delay after the announcement is published; the reports must be
accompanied by a statement that those making them have given and not with-
drawn their consent to publication.
Id. Originally, auditor reports were not required to be published with the document, but this
requirement was added a year later in 1969 to further the policy of providing relevant informa-
tion to the shareholders. See A. JOHNSTON, supra note 397, at 55-56.
In addition to the rules, the City Code contains accompanying notes which further amplify
aspects in the rules. The note to rule 28.2 discusses the requirement for assumptions. It states
in part:
1.(a) It is important therefore that by listing the assumption on which the fore-
cast is based some information should be given to help shareholders in forming a
view as to the reasonableness and reliability of the forecast. This should draw
the shareholders' attention to, and where possible quantify, those uncertain fac-
tors which could materially disturb the ultimate achievement of the forecast.
(c) [A] duty is placed on the financial advisers to discuss the assumptions with
their client and to satisfy themselves that the forecast has been made with due
care and consideration. Auditors or consultant accountants should satisfy
themselves that the forecasts, so far as the accounting bases and calculations are
concerned, have been properly compiled on the footing of the assumptions
made.
CITY CODE, rule 28.2 note.
401. See CITY CODE, practice note 6(1) (1981 ed.): "The Code is designed to strike a
balance so that, although there is no room for recklessness and irresponsibility, the directors
do not feel inhibited from communication to shareholders information which may be relevant
to the value of their shares."
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attending report by the third parties. 4° 2
Despite the acknowledged relevance of forecasts, mandatory disclosure
does not appear to be a requirement of the City Code.40 3 Although disclo-
sure of profit forecasts occurs more frequently in England than in the United
States, target companies still release forecasts in fewer than a third of the
takeover situations. In 1980 and 1981, 32% and 21%, respectively, of the
published takeover documents contained forecasts by target management. 4°4
The Panel monitors forecasts for compliance with the City Code as part of
its enforcement process. Initially, the Panel supervised all forecasts, but
found so few exceeded its general reasonableness range for accuracy that
now it only checks them randomly or in response to a complaint.4° 5 In fact,
the Panel has never issued a public statement criticizing a company for re-
leasing a misleading forecast. 4 °6
A study by Westwick of forecasting accuracy in British takeovers between
1.969 and 1970 reveals a fairly high level of reliability. For target company
forecasts, approximately 71% were within 10% of actual results.4 7 Targets
who successfully fought off a suitor tended to produce more accurate fore-
casts than those who eventually succumbed to the takeover. 408 Moreover,
the large forecast errors of the losing target companies tended to be over-
estimates rather than under-estimates. 4° 9 These results suggest that exces-
sively optimistic forecasts by targets did not fool the market and that natural
market forces tend to mitigate the threat of forecasts misleading sharehold-
ers. Consistent with this conclusion was the discovery that the nature of the
bid did not appear to affect significantly the reliability of the target company
forecasts. Forecasts by target firms opposed to the bid were generally not
less accurate than those in friendly takeovers. 4 10 Even though hostile targets
402. See id., rule 28.6(b). Profit forecasts published in a press announcement after initial
offer documents have been sent also fall under the City Code and must be sent to shareholders
with disclosure of assumptions and third-party review. See also CITY CODE, rule 28.4, quoted
supra note 400.
403. See A. JOHNSTON, supra note 397, at 233; Ashton, The Role of the Reporting Account-
ant, in PROFIT FORECASTS 81, 82 (C. Westwick ed. 1983).
404. See Wade, The Role of the City Panel, in PROFIT FORECASTS, supra note 403, at 119,
127. For offer documents issued in 1969-1970, target company forecasts appeared in approxi-
mately 36% of the offer documents. See Schmitthoff, British Business Law: Companies, 1971 J.
Bus. L. 218, 222 (296 total offer documents circulated); cf. Westwick, Profit Forecasts in Bid
Situations, ACCT., July 1972, at 10, 13 (107 forecasts by target firms).
405. See A. JOHNSTON, supra note 397, at 113. The Panel has adopted a standard of 10%
error as reasonable. For 418 bids between May 1969 and September 1971 containing forecasts
by both offeror and offeree firms, 80 were not within 10% of actual results, and in only five
cases were the errors not adequately explained. Id. Similarly, 35 out of 173 forecasts in take-
over documents issued in 1970-1971 had errors exceeding 10%, with unsatisfactory explana-
tions in only two cases. See Carmichael, Reporting on Forecasts: A UK Perspective, J. ACCT.,
Jan. 1973, at 36, 44.
406. See Wade, supra note 404, at 127.
407. See Westwick, supra note 404, at 13.
408. Id. Seventy-eight percent of the forecasts by targets that remained independent were
within 10% of actual results compared to 70% of the targets where the bid was successful. Id.
409. See id. at 14. Sixteen percent of the losing targets' forecasts were more than 22%
above actual results; 5.4% had forecasts of that magnitude below actual results.
410. Id. at 15. For friendly bids, 80% of the targets' forecast errors fell within 10%, while
77% of the forecasts by targets in a hostile takeover had a similar error rate.
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have a greater incentive to manipulate a forecast, their projections are also
subject to greater scrutiny by investors. Indeed, the integrity of target man-
agement is a very important issue in takeover contests and issuance of an
unreasonable forecast generally would be counter-productive. These find-
ings indicate that the potential for misleading forecasts in takeover situations
is not as great as one would initially expect.
The British experience demonstrates that disclosure of financial forecasts
in takeovers is feasible, but the English approach does not go far enough.
Critics argue that differences in the legal systems of the United States and
England, such as the absence of class actions, derivative suits, contingency
fees for attorneys, and the assessing of costs against losing plaintiffs, weaken
reliance on the British experience for analysis of United States public disclo-
sure policy.411 Despite these factors and the Panel's policy of not impeding
disclosure, dissemination of this important information occurs in less than
half of the takeovers in England. Rather than showing the inadvisability of
mandatory disclosure, these differences illustrate that the existence of a lib-
eral voluntary disclosure climate still is unlikely to produce sufficient publi-
cation of financial forecasts. Unlike the largely private regulatory system in
England, the SEC has an affirmative obligation to promote the distribution
of relevant financial information. The failure of the various voluntary policy
approaches to produce full disclosure indicates that the investing public
needs a mandatory disclosure policy.
VI. CONCLUSION
A major objective of federal securities laws is to provide investors with
relevant information upon which to base investment decisions. Future-ori-
ented financial information is among the most important information be-
cause it deals with the essence of the investment process, expected return.
Despite this fact, the SEC has abandoned its obligations by failing to pro-
duce a coherent, satisfactory policy toward disclosure of financial projec-
tions. The current voluntary disclosure policy has not created enough
incentive for companies to provide forecasts, thereby depriving shareholders
of a valuable source of information.
In the absence of SEC guidance, the courts have generally refused to re-
quire public disclosure of forecasts, focusing on perceived unreliability. The
present case law is confused and conflicting, with several different standards
applying to the duty of companies to provide "soft information." Only the
Third Circuit has suitably dealt with the relevance of forecasts by adopting a
balancing approach, while the Sixth Circuit has rejected this approach. The
recent Supreme Court decision in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson412 appears to sup-
port utilization of a balancing approach, but this standard is still difficult to
apply and involves a case-by-case analysis.
411. See, e.g., Dean, supra note 160, at 520; Van Arsdell, Forecasting.: A View from Eng-
land, CPA J., Jan. 1974, at 20, 21.
412. 108 S. Ct. 978, 99 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1988). For a discussion of Levinson, see supra notes
148-156 and accompanying text.
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The TSC Industries materiality standard requires a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable investor would consider the information important. The
theoretical foundation for the relevance of forecast information is manifest.
Stock price valuation depends on the expected financial performance of the
firm. Investors naturally concern themselves more with the future prospects
of companies than with past events. The empirical evidence clearly demon-
strates that management forecasts represent important information. The
market impact studies reveal that forecasts have information content, con-
veying new and valuable information to investors. These studies show that
the market readjusts stock prices in reaction to the information contained in
company forecasts about future performance. This research provides strong
evidence of the materiality of company forecasts because information con-
tent studies involve a broad range of investors, and represent a stricter stan-
dard of proof than the TSC Industries test since stock price movements
indicate that investors took affirmative action in response to the information.
The objections to mandatory disclosure are insufficient to support the con-
tinuation of current practice. Claims of inaccuracy fail to take into account
the relevancy of forecasts. Management forecasts tend to be more accurate
than those of the two alternative sources for this information, analysts and
statistical models. Management has an informational advantage over both
of these sources, which enhances the accuracy of their projections. Provid-
ing additional disclosure on the uncertainty of forecasts can diminish the
overstated threat of misleading shareholders. Additional public disclosure
should force management to provide more reliable forecasts.
In addition, cost considerations militate in favor of mandatory disclosure
of forecasts. Companies can generate projections much more efficiently than
individual shareholders. Most companies already produce internal projec-
tions for on-going business purposes. Also, companies have greater access to
firm-specific information. The availability of advanced computers and fore-
casting software reduces costs. Additionally, mandatory disclosure would
benefit all shareholders by creating a clear policy that should induce inves-
tors not to duplicate the company's efforts or attempt individually to obtain
this information.
Financial forecasts are especially relevant in corporate control contests.
Target shareholders face an immediate decision whether they should give up
their right to future profits of the firm. Takeovers involve long-term conse-
quences, yet shareholders are often ill-equipped because of the lack of future-
oriented information. Many target firms are not large enough to have an
analyst following: without management forecasts, shareholders are left with
little or no forecast information. The prevalence of mergers and tender of-
fers requires the SEC to address the problem of providing target sharehold-
ers with relevant information. The British experience demonstrates that
companies confronted with takeover situations may provide reliable com-
pany forecasts, but that a voluntary approach is unlikely to create a sufficient
amount of disclosure. The SEC should reassess its position and adopt a
mandatory disclosure policy for corporate control acquisitions.
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